

Political Recruitment
in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil
(1890-1970)

By

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	11
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	x11
KEY TO SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
GLOSSARY	xvi
ABSTRACT	xx
PART I INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter 1 The Scope of This Study	2
Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework	11
Chapter 3 The Setting in Minas Gerais	36
PART II LEGISLATIVE RECRUITMENT	72
Chapter 4 The Office of Federal Deputy (pre-1945)	73
Chapter 5 The Office of Federal Deputy (1946-1971)	103
Chapter 6 The Office of State Deputy (1947-1971)	132
PART III RECRUITMENT TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS	158
Chapter 7 State Cabinet Secretaries	159
Chapter 8 Governors and Vice Governors	174
PART IV THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS: Interviews with Three Elite Samples (1945-1970)	189
Chapter 9 Political Socialization	190
Chapter 10 Initial Selection and Recruitment	201
Chapter 11 Recruitment to First Candidacy as Deputy and First Cabinet Service	217
PART V CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS: Interviews with Current Legislators	241
Chapter 12 Changing Patterns of Career Advancement and Candidate Recruitment in 1970	242

	Page
PART VI CONCLUSIONS	271
Chapter 13 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research	272
APPENDICES	284
I Methodological Note	285
II Research Inventory on Political Recruitment	305
III List of Governors, 1890-1971	308
IV List of Vice Governors, 1890-1971	309
V List of Cabinet Secretaries, 1890-1971	310
VI List of Federal Deputies, 1890-1937	325
VII List of Federal Deputies, 1946-1971	335
VIII List of State Deputies, 1947-1971	340
IXA Federal Election Zones, 1894-1905	349
IXB Federal Election Zones, 1906-1930	350
X Materials Used in Background Data Collection	351
XIA Interviewers' Introduction Letter	355
XIB Questionnaire	357
BIBLIOGRAPHY	378
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	398

LIST OF TABLES

Number		Page
4.1	Principal Occupation by legislature, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	75
4.2	Principal Occupation vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	77
4.3	Region of Political Support by legislature, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	79
4.4	Region vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	81
4.5	Summary of Change over time by legislature, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	82
4.6	Summary of Change over time by cohort, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	83
4.7	Principal Occupation by cohort, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	85
4.8	Inter-regional Geographic Mobility, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	91
4.9	Percent of Cohorts Remaining at Successive Legislatures, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	95
4.10	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming Federal Deputy (1890-1937)	99
5.1	Principal Occupation of Federal Deputies by legislature (1933-1971)	105
5.2	Principal Occupation vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	108
5.3	Region of Political Support by legislature, Federal Deputies (1933-1971)	109
5.4	Region vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	111

Number		Page
5.5	Summary of Change over time by legislature, Federal Deputies (1933-1971)	113
5.6	Summary of Change over time by cohort, Federal Deputies (1933-1971)	114
5.7	Principal Occupation of Federal Deputies, by cohort (1933-1971)	116
5.8	Inter-regional Geographic Mobility of Federal Deputies, by cohort (1933-1971)	117
5.9	Principal Occupation by Party of First Service, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	118
5.10	Region by Party of First Service, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	120
5.11	Party of First Service vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	121
5.12	Recruitment of Candidates for Federal Deputy, by party (1950-1970)	123
5.13	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming Federal Deputy (1946-1971)	128
6.1	Principal Occupation of State Deputies, by legislature (1947-1971)	134
6.2	Principal Occupation vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, State Deputies (1947-1971)	136
6.3	Region by legislature, State Deputies (1947-1971)	137
6.4	Region vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, State Deputies (1947-1971)	139
6.5	Summary of Change over time by legislature, State Deputies (1947-1971)	140
6.6	Summary of Change over time by cohort, State Deputies (1947-1971)	141
6.7	Principal Occupation of State Deputies, by cohort (1947-1971)	143
6.8	Inter-regional Geographic Mobility of State Deputies, by cohort (1947-1971)	145

Number		Page
6.9	Principal Occupation by Party of First Service, State Deputies (1947-1971)	146
6.10	Region by Party of First Service, State Deputies (1947-1971)	148
6.11	Party of First Service vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables, State Deputies (1947-1971)	150
6.12	Recruitment of Candidates for State Deputy, by party (1950-1970)	151
6.13	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming State Deputy (1947-1971)	155
7.1	State Cabinet Secretariat vs. Seven Recruitment and Background Variables (1890-1971)	161
7.2	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming State Cabinet Secretary (1890-1971)	169
8.1	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming Governor (1890-1971)	177
8.2	Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming Vice Governor (1890-1971)	179
8.3	Summary of Background and Political Career Data for Governors, Vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies (1890-1971)	181
8.4	Region of Political Support by Governors, Vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies 1890-1971 (in percents)	184
8.5	Prior Political Positions Held: Governor, Vice Governor, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies 1890-1971 (in percents)	185
8.6	Immediate Portal Positions for Governor, Vice Governor, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies 1890-1971 (in percents)	186
9.1	Specific Motivations Involved in Initial Socialization	191
9.2	General Agent Involved in Initial Political Socialization	191
9.3	Prime Motivation Involved in Initial Political Socialization by Five Independent Variables	193

Number		Page
9.4	General Agent Involved in Initial Political Socialization by Five Independent Variables	193
9.5	Epoch of Political Socialization	195
9.6	Age at Initial Political Socialization	195
9.7	Probability and Strength of Association among Variables of Political Socialization	196
9.8	Epoch of Political Socialization by Age Group	197
9.9	General Socialization Agent by Prime Motivational Factor	199
10.1	Type of First Political Office	203
10.2	Level of First Political Office	203
10.3	Epoch of First Political Office	204
10.4	Age at First Political Office	204
10.5	Motivations Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Elected)	205
10.6	Prime Motivation Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Elected) by Five Independent Variables	205
10.7	Motivations Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Nominated)	208
10.8	Prime Motivation Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Nomination) by Five Independent Variables	209
10.9	Probability and Strength of Association among Variables of Political Socialization and Recruitment to First Office	211
10.10	Prime Motivation by Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Elected)	213
10.11	Prime Motivation by Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Nomination)	213
11.1	Residence at First Candidacy for Deputy	218
11.2	Age at First Candidacy for Deputy	218

Number		Page
11.3	Party of First Candidacy for Deputy	219
11.4	First Candidacy for Deputy; Reasons for Party Choice	219
11.5	Prime Reason for Party Choice by Party of First Candidacy	221
11.6	First Candidacy for Deputy; Recruitment Mechanism	223
11.7	Recruitment Mechanism by Six Independent Variables	224
11.8	Specific Reasons Given for Decision to Announce First Candidacy for Deputy	226
11.9	Prime Reason Given for Decision to Announce First Candidacy for Deputy by Six Independent Variables	227
11.10	Probability and Strength of Association among Variables of Recruitment to First Candidacy for Deputy, Recruitment to First Political Office, and Political Socialization	229
11.11	Recruitment Mechanism by Social Mobility	232
11.12	Antecedents Prior to Nomination to First Cabinet Service	233
11.13	Antecedents broken down by Six Independent Variables	233
11.14	Reason Given for Decision to Accept Nomination to First Cabinet Service	235
11.15	Reason for Acceptance of Nomination broken down by Six Independent Variables	235
11.16	Specific Reasons for Accepting Nomination to First Cabinet Service	236
11.17	Prime Reason for Accepting Nomination by Six Independent Variables	236
11.18	Probability and Strength of Association among Variables of Recruitment to First Cabinet Service, Recruitment to First Political Office, and Political Socialization	238
12.1	Relative Rank Orders of Political Offices	244
12.2	Change in Relative Rank Orders of Political Offices	246
12.3	Differences between means of Rankings of Political Offices for the 1962/1963 and 1970 Periods	247

Number		Page
12.4	Changes in Relative and Mean Rankings of Political Offices from 1962/1963 to 1970	248
12.5	Best Positions from which to Launch a <u>Man</u> Candidacy for State Deputy	252
12.6	Best Position from which to Launch a <u>Woman</u> Candidacy for Federal Deputy	253
12.7	Base Office for State and Federal Deputies	254
12.8	Level of Base Office for State and Federal Deputies	254
12.9	Career Perspectives of State and Federal Deputies	256
12.10	Reasons why Former Mayors became Candidates for Deputy in the 1970 Elections	262
12.11	Responses Citing who made Decisions for Party Regarding States for Deputy by party and election year	265
A1.1	The Institutionally Defined Elite Group, distribution by three historical periods, 1890-1971	290
A1.2	The Parameters of the Sampling Process; Cabinet Secretaries, and State and Federal Deputies, 1945-1971	296

LIST OF FIGURES

Number		Page
1.1	Brazil: Locating the State of Minas Gerais	5
2.1	Hosca's Model of "Preparation and Replacement of Elites," "Principles" and "Tendencies"	14
2.2	The Chinese Box Puzzle: The Successive Narrowing of the Many who are Governed by the Few who Govern	23
2.3	Causal Influences and Decision Points in the Political Recruitment Process	24
2.4	Representation of the Stages and Decision Points in the Process of Political Recruitment	29
3.1	Minas Gerais and São Paulo: Population as Percentage of Brazil's Total Population (1890-1970)	37
3.2	The Physiographic Regions of the State of Minas Gerais	40
3.3	Proportion of Seats won in Chamber of Deputies, by party (1945-1970)	52
3.4	Proportion of Seats won in the State Assembly, by party (1947-1970)	56
4.1	Turnover of Legislators, by legislature (1894-1935)	93
4.2	Legislative Longevity, in "third-lives" (1890-1930)	96
4.3	Career Advancement Patterns, Federal Deputies (1890-1937)	■
5.1	Turnover of Legislators, by legislature (1945-1971)	125
5.2	Career Advancement Patterns, Federal Deputies (1946-1971)	126
6.1	Career Advancement Patterns, State Deputies (1947-1971)	153
7.1	Current Age and Number of Prior Positions Held by Administration, Cabinet Secretaries	163

Number		Page
7.2	Current Age Time Senses for Cabinet Secretaries, and State and Federal Deputies (1890-1971)	165
7.3	Turnover of Cabinet Secretaries by Administration	166
7.4	Career Advancement Patterns, Cabinet Secretaries (1890-1971)	168
8.1	Career Advancement Patterns, Governors (1890-1971)	175
8.2	Career Advancement Patterns, Vice Governors (1890-1971)	178
12.1	"The Old (Style) Politician"	259
12.2	The New Politician	260

KEY TO SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- AL--Assembléia Legislativa (state assembly)
- ALT--Aliança Libertador Trabalhista
- APSR--Agencia Political Science Review
- ARENA--Aliança Renovadora Nacional
- CD--Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies)
- DCP--Departamento de Ciência Política (at the JFMS)
- DER--Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem (MG state highway department)
- ESP--Estudos Sociais e Políticas (monograph series published by the RBEF in Belo Horizonte)
- JP--Journal of Politics
- MDB--Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
- MG--Minas Gerais
- MJPS--Midwest Journal of Political Science
- PCB--Partido Comunista Brasileiro
- PDC--Partido Democrata Cristão
- POQ--Public Opinion Quarterly
- PP--Partido Progressista (1935-1937)
- PR--Partido Republicano (post-1946)
- PRD--Partido Republicano Democrático (founded in 1970)
- PRN--Partido Republicano Mineiro
- PROD: Political Research Organization and Design
- PRP--Partido Representação Popular
- PSD--Partido Socialista Democrático

PSP--Partido Socialista Popular
PST--Partido Socialista Trabalhista
PTB- Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
PTN--Partido Trabalhista Nacional
RBEP--Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos
SUDENE--Superintendência do Desenvolvimento Econômico do Nordeste
JDB--União Democrática Brasileira (1937)
JDN--União Democrática Nacional
UFMG--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
WPQ--Western Political Quarterly

GLOSSARY

- ALA**--a branch or faction of a political party.
- ALA REBELDE**--a break away (or split) group faction of a party.
- ALIANÇA LIBERAL**--the political movement supporting the candidacy of Getúlio Vargas for president in the 1930 elections. (See pp. 48-50.)
- AMULEIRSE**--an employee (usually public) working the morning shift only.
- "AO POVO MINEIRO"**--to the people of Minas Gerais (To whom the Manifesto Mineiro was directed.)
- BANCADA**--legislative delegation, e.g., bancada mineira--the Minas Gerais delegation in the federal Chamber of Deputies.
- BIISTAS**--faction within the PRB supporting the candidacy of Crispim Jacques Dias Fortes for governor. (See pp. 44-45.)
- CADRE**--a pool of available and practicing politicians at the state level. (See Appendix I.)
- CÂMARA**--Chamber; as in Chamber of Deputies.
- CASSAÇÃO, pl. CASSAÇÕES**--termination of an elected mandate or public employment by executive (federal) decree. May also involve deprivation of political rights for 5 or 10 years.
- CASSADO**--a person suffering cassação.
- CHEFES**--literally "chefs," interior political chiefs.
- CHEFE DE GABINETE**--the position of first executive officer to a state cabinet secretary. Prior to 1964 this was the term used for the governor's executive officer (now called the Secretary of Government).
- CHEFE DE POLÍCIA**--Chief of state police forces, within the Secretariat of Interior and later became the Secretary of Public Safety.
- CLUBE REPUBLICANO**--local clubs established in the 1870's and 1880's favoring abolition of the monarchy and a republican form of government for Brazil.

- COMISSÃO EXECUTIVA--the five executive committee (See Tarasoff)
- CORDELL, pl. CORONÉIS--pol. chief of the 1930s. stress upon political power was based on vertical solidarity in the tenant-landlord relationship.
- CORONELISMO--a style of politics based on the local power of the coronéis
- CORONELISTA--adjective from coronel, see
- CONFLITO CORONELISTA--a struggle between the administration in the state capital and the local coronéis. (See pp. 86-87)
- CÚPULA--the apex of political power in the state. (See Appendix I)
- DIRETÓRIO--local (or regional) party directorate or committee
- DOMINANTES--term applied to those with predominant political influence, usually economically based.
- DOCTORES--term of deference, title of person with a university degree, most commonly those with law degrees.
- EFETIVADO--a suplente who has permanently taken the seat of a resigning or deceased deputy.
- ESCOLA POLÍTICA--"political school," term applied to the PSD, due to the party's reputation as an effective political training institution. (See pp. 119-120.)
- ESTADO NOVO--"The New State", corporativistic institutional arrangement imposed by the Vargas regime in 1937.
- EXTRA-CHAPA--an independent candidate running against the official slate of the PRM during the First Republic.
- GOVERNO DOS "MAGISTRADOS"--Government of the Civil Servants," the first phase of the post-Vargas interventor period in 1945, when the state's administration was placed in the hands of career civil servants, mostly from the judiciary.
- INTERVENTOR--federally appointed state chief executives; can also be federally or state appointed local mayors.
- JEQUITINHONHA--geographic region in Northeastern Minas Gerais (See Figure 3.2.)
- MANIFESTO MINEIRO--a call for a return to a democratic regime, published by a group of mineiros in late 1943. (See p. 50.)

MATA--geographic region in Eastern Minas Gerais. (See Figure 3.2.)

MESA--the officers elected to the mesa sit in the state assembly, (consist of deputies and federal senators, also forming the executive committee of each house.)

METALÚRGICA--geographic region in the triângulo mineiro. (See Figure 3.2.)

MINEIRO--a person from Minas Gerais

MUNICÍPIO--local government unit below the state level in Brazil

OS SEUS--"his [own] candidate" indicated or preferred candidate of a politician or political chief.

PALÁCIO DA LIBERDADE--the Governor's palace in Belo Horizonte

PARTIDO CATÓLICO--dissident electoral faction formed around the União labor group for the constituent assembly elections in 1890. (See pp. 42-43.)

PARTIDO PROGRESSISTA--party organized as the situação in support of the Vargas regime (and valladares in Minas Gerais, 1935-1937. (See p. 50.)

PAULISTA--a person from the state of São Paulo.

PESEBISTA--a member or supporter of the PSD.

PETEBISTA--a member or supporter of the PTB.

POÍTICA DE CAFÉ COM LEITE--political combination of Minas Gerais and São Paulo alternating national political power during the First Republic.

POLÍTICA DOS GOVERNADORES--in that national politics were worked out at the dupla level among the one-party state machines; the governors of the largest states formed the decision-making nucleus during the First Republic.

PREFEITO--prefect, or mayor, chief executive of the local município (Called agente executivo during the First Republic.)

PRESIDENTE--President (in the First Republic the state governor was called the Presidente do Estado.)

PRESTÍGIO ELEITORAL--"electoral prestige," the political capital accrued by a politician after successive (and successful) electoral tests

REVANCHÊ--recurrence, return, comeback.

- RIO DOCE--geographic region in Eastern Minas Gerais. (See Figure 3 2.)
- RÍTIHO DE BRASÍLIA--"pace of Brasília [construction]" (campaign slogan of Israel Pinheiro in 1965) (See p. 63.)
- SARGENTACÃO--the practice of political apprenticeship, "advancing up through the ranks."
- SECRETÁRIO--secretary, particularly state cabinet secretary.
- SECRETARIADO DA SAÚDE--"nostalgic cabinet." (See p. 64.)
- SERTÃO--arid region of Northeast and Southeastern Minas Gerais
- SILVIANISTAS--faction within the PRM supporting the candidacy of Silviano Brandão for Governor. (See p. 48-50.)
- SITUAÇÃO--party or political faction grouped around those in current administrative control.
- SITUAÇÃO LOCAL--the situação group at the município level.
- SUPLENTE--an elected substitute within the proportional representation system for the offices of vereador, deputy and senator.
- TARASCAL--nickname for the PRM executive committee (See Chapter 3, Note 31.)
- UDENISTA--a member or supporter of the UDN.
- VEREADOR--town councilman, municipal legislator
- VICE PRESIDENTE--Vice President.

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POLITICAL RECRUITMENT IN THE STATE OF
MINAS GERAIS, BRAZIL (1890-1970)

By

David Verge Fleischer

March, 1972

Chairman: Dr. Andres Saenz
Major Department: Political Science

This study is based on two levels of analysis: social backgrounds and recruitment motivations. The former is based on data gathered for 30 governors, 17 vice governors, 265 cabinet secretaries, and 368 federal deputies serving from 1890-1971, and 302 state deputies serving from 1947-1971. The latter is based on 140 interviews conducted during 1970 and early 1971 with samples of deputies and secretaries, stratified over the 1945-1970 period.

The social background analysis includes the following variables: occupation, region of birth, geographic mobility, education, family ties, age, institutionalization, party affiliation, turnover, and cohort longevity. Career advancement patterns are also examined for each group. In addition to certain bivariate comparisons, change over time analysis is also presented in terms of legislative and administration cohorts.

The most interesting findings include: the role of the PRM in recruitment of deputies from more institutionalized political careers after 1900; geographic mobility into the *Metallúrgica* and away from the Southern regions, circulation between elected and appointed positions (especially during the First Republic) in conformance with the comprorissu coronelista pattern, the role of the PSD in the post 1945

period as an escala política (with its sargentapão pattern), and the effects of the 1964 revolution and of party system in terms of construction of prior recruitment patterns.

The analysis of motivational data was broken down by initial political socialization, recruitment to first office, and recruitment to first candidacy as deputy or service as cabinet secretary.

Those evidencing career, and achievement motivations, and political family ties were socialized and entered first office at earliest ages. JDB candidates explained their party choice more frequently in programmatic terms, whereas for the PSD and PR family influence and sargentapão were more common. The PTB had a more "traditional" pattern, while new adherents to the ARENA and MDB cited "programmatic/ideological" reasons for party choice, in higher proportions.

The effects of the 1964 Revolution are examined in the analysis of interviews with legislators serving in 1970, 35 federal and 51 state deputies. Through hierarchical rankings of political positions within Minas for two time periods, it was ascertained that executive positions accrued more prestige after 1964, to the detriment of legislative office, and with the mayor of Belo Horizonte and the majority leader in the A. C. being perceived as executive positions.

Although state deputy was observed to be the most frequent base office for federal deputy (both perceived and observed), only 11.3% of the current state deputies cited interest in the latter office. More state than federal deputies expressed future career ambitions, and the former showed a marked disinterest in advancement to the federal arena.

Attempts by the national government to foster renovation through increased recruitment "from the grass roots" were not successful in

Minas as only five local mayors (out of 722) became candidates for deputy in 1970.

The problems of integration within the new AREVA party are examined in terms of the continued existence of the ex-parties and the adoption of coexistence criteria regulating patronage and balanced recruitment

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Prior to presenting the analysis of data gathered through field research, some preliminary discussion is warranted. Thus Part I will attempt to place the scope of the present study in proper perspective, discuss the theoretical problems involved, and provide an outline of the political context within the state of Minas Gerais.

CHAPTER 1

THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

This study investigates the process of political recruitment during an important transition stage in Brazilian political history-- as the country evolved from the first Republic, with its high degree of sub-system autonomy and dominated by a land-based political style, through an interim period of centralization of authority and politics of industrialization, to the beginnings of a mass-based, urban style of competitive politics.

The Context

From the list of studies compiled in Appendix II, it is apparent that by far the larger proportion of research on political recruitment has been conducted in the more developed countries, approximately two-thirds of the bibliography encountered. Of the remaining studies conducted in "third world" countries, the Latin American area has received relatively little attention, the Middle East/North Africa and Asia each accounting for more field research on political recruitment.

William A. Jervis, in a "cursor" survey of the literature, laments the lack of quantity (as well as quality) of studies on "political leadership" for Latin America:

That which has been written on Latin American political leadership commonly suffers from a host of serious methodological shortcomings. For this reason, these studies (at least in the eyes of empirically-oriented scholars in comparative politics) have contributed little to a systematic

understanding of Latin American political processes.¹

Essentially the same can be said for Brazil, to date no comprehensive study of the recruitment of the nation's political elite has been attempted. Robert Packenham's evaluation written in 1965 is still valid

Practically no systematic studies of the social backgrounds of national politicians exist--for example cabinet ministers, deputies and senators, influential military officers, and even presidents and vice-presidents--and only of some state and local functionaries.²

Two studies have been conducted among national congressmen, but did not involve political recruitment per se.³ In her investigation of political parties, Peterson provides some insights as to the role of the party convention in the selection of candidate slates for the 1958 elections in three states.⁴ A background study of the Guanabara state Assembly was compiled by Pita and Arruda, however, only unidimensional distributions were reported.⁵ A questionnaire administered among state deputies in Minas Gerais (elected in 1956) contained some items on social backgrounds and pre-Assembly office held, and were cross-tabulated with party and attitudes towards economic development.⁶

In a pioneering effort, Orlando Carvalho compiled background data on 31,660 political actives in Minas Gerais during 1948}. Attempting to link state and municipal level politics with social system changes, Carvalho cross-tabulated the backgrounds of state and federal deputies, and local mayors, vereadores and diretórios by party; relating the latter to demographic changes observed from the 1940 and 1950 censuses.⁷

A number of community power studies have dealt peripherally with initial selection and recruitment at the local level. Five of the latter have been aptly reviewed by José Murilo de Carvalho.⁸

The upshot of all this is that for Brazil, research on what might be loosely termed "political recruitment" has:

- (1) followed the social background approach;
 - (2) focused on the state or local level of politics;
 - (3) analyzed a specific office or institution⁹ at one point in time;
 - (4) not utilized survey research techniques to investigate the recruitment process from the participants' perspective; and
 - (5) not embodied a conceptual framework of political recruitment.
- However, the above studies have provided some useful insights as to the role of family, student activism, education, social class, political parties and prior political experience in the process of initial selection and subsequent recruitment into political roles.

Analytical Scope

The analysis in the present study will focus on the changing recruitment patterns of the political elite in one Brazilian state-- Minas Gerais. (See Figure 1, locating the state within Brazil.) Based on prior conceptualizations of the process of political recruitment, together with the insights and deficiencies evident in research conducted in Brazil, a strategy for analysis was developed which:

- (1) examines recruitment as a longitudinal process over an 80 year time frame;
- (2) combines the approaches of social background analysis with survey research methods--eliciting elite attitudes and recollections of the recruitment process; and
- (3) compares recruitment to a number of offices at both the capital



Figure 1.1--Brazil-- Locating the State of Minas Gerais

and cadre levels of the state's political elite.¹⁰

This conceptual framework is developed in Chapter 2.

In Brazil, state politics is "where it all begins," and only rarely are individuals directly recruited to the national level without at least some activity in local and/or state politics.¹¹

Minas Gerais has chosen for two principal reasons: the state has traditionally participated disproportionately in the decisions taken by the national civilian political elite, and secondly, the state offers an approximation of a regional micro-model of the nation.¹²

The historical scope attempts to compare recruitment patterns during the First Republic (1890-1930), through the "attenuating" Vargas period of transition, with the post-1945 re-democratization epoch, and the post-1964 "revolutionary" phase. The state's political history for the full period is summarized in Chapter 3.

The analysis in Part II will attempt to relate changes in the social and economic systems with changes in background criteria used in the initial recruitment of future state-wide legislators, and their subsequent career advancement patterns. During the First Republic, federal deputies were observed (in Chapter 4) to effectively utilize the compromisso coronelista, involving the alternation between administrative and elected positions, to enhance their electoral career chances. Also, within the one party system, the P.R.M. had a definite institutionalizing effect on recruitment patterns after 1900.

For the post-1945 period, background analysis is continued for federal and state deputies (in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively) regarding changes in the above mentioned phenomena, within the context of a multi party system and increased electoral competition. Effects of the

interim Vargas period are also considered.

Recruitment to the state executive is analyzed in Part III. Chapter 7 examines recruitment to the position of state cabinet secretary for the full period (1892-1917). As will be seen in Part V, the various secretariats may be stratified regarding their political prestige and importance, an attribute which is also seen as changing over time. Background and recruitment variables are broken down by secretariat and administration for the 265 individuals involved.

Recruitment to the cúpula (or apex) of the state political elite is presented in Chapter 8. The backgrounds and career advancement patterns of 30 governors and 17 vice-governors are compared, and also related in summary form to the data presented in Chapters 4 through 7.

The recruitment process from the perspective of the recruitee is treated in Part IV. Data gathered through interviews with samples of state and federal deputies, and cabinet secretaries serving during the post-1945 period are examined within the framework of a three-stage recruitment process.¹³

Early political socialization of the individual is examined in Chapter 9. Included are the effects of family, political personalities, student activism, and early political activities.

Initial selection and recruitment to first political position is related to prior socialization, to background characteristics, type of structure or individual performing the recruitment function, and style of recruitment evidenced. This is in Chapter 10.

Finally, subsequent career advancement to the institutional position under scrutiny (deputy or secretary), is analyzed in Chapter 11. The main aspects considered here are type of candidacy mechanism and

recruitment style, involvement of political party, and personality, the effects of prior political career, and certain key background characteristics (namely family, education, and region).

Part V considers the recruitment process from a more current perspective, and is based on interviews with state and federal deputies serving in the 1970 session. Chapter 12 focuses on changing patterns of career advancement with particular attention given to the effects of the 1964 revolution. This is accomplished thru rankings of a series of political positions both prior to and following the revolution. The current legislators' evaluation of the recruitment process within the state includes their own career perspectives, the attractiveness of the political system in recruiting new candidates for deputy, and the role of party as a recruiting structure.

Conclusions are presented in Part VI and integrate the findings from the analysis of background data (Parts II and III) with those based on the interview data (Parts IV and V). Suggestions for further research are also presented in Chapter 13.

NOTES - CHAPTER 1

¹William F. Welsh, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Leadership in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 6:3 (Fall, 1970), 3-34. The journals surveyed were 960 to 960 were the Journal of Inter American Economic Studies and the Journal of Inter American Studies. A similar evaluation is also found in The Politics and Structure of Research in Latin American Political Science, in Charles A. Keyser, ed., Social Science Research on Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 166-213.

²Robert A. Packenham, "A abordagem política no Brasil: ponto de vista de um norte-americano," Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política, 8:1 (January/April, 1965), 17.

³Lloyd A. Free, Sore Terra (and applications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians) (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1961), and Robert A. Packenham, "The National Legislature in Brazil," in Weston A. Ager (ed.), Latin American Legislatures: Their Role and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1971), 259-297.

⁴Phyllis J. Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties: Formation, Organization and Leadership, 1945-1959," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962), 271-82.

⁵Waldo Aguiar Martines and José Maria de Arruda, "Composição sociológica de assembleia legislativa do estado da Guanabara," Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política, 8:3 (1º Semestre, 1966), 120-44.

⁶Tocary A. Bastos and Thomas J. Walker, "Partidos e forças políticas em Minas Gerais," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos (RBEP), 31, May, 1971, 117-38.

⁷Orlando M. Carvalho, "Ensaio de Sociologia Eleitoral," Estudos Sociais e Políticos, 15:1, 1ª e 2ª edição. Edição Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1954, 66-80.

⁸José Murilo de Carvalho, "Estudos do poder local no Brasil," RBEP, 25/26 (July, 1968/January, 1969), 23-48.

⁹With the exception of Orlando Carvalho, *op. cit.*

¹⁰For a detailed discussion of the choice of institutional positions within the universe of the state political elite, and for a definition of the terms elite and elite cadre, see Appendix I, "Methodological Note."

¹¹Francisco Clementino Antunes Dantas, federal deputy from Minas Gerais, and now deceased, was Finance Minister during the early 1960's, was known to have learned the fact that he had not acquired any experience in municipal politics or state government prior to his activities at the national level. Related in an interview with Tarcisio de Almeida Neves, Brasília, September 3, 1970.

¹²For a more detailed discussion of the rationale involved in choosing a state system (and that of Minas Gerais in particular), see Appendix I. For an expanded discussion of the applicability of a regional analysis to Minas Gerais, see Chapter 3.

¹³Sampling procedures are outlined in Appendix I.

¹⁴Materials used in the interviewing are found in Appendix XI.

CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concept "political recruitment" was first used by Lester Seligman in the 1950's,¹ with the advent of functional analysis in the 1960's, political recruitment came to be termed one of the input functions operating in all political systems.² Over the past ten or twelve years students of comparative politics have increasingly used this function (either as their prime focus or one element) in the analysis of the various political systems. The recruitment function has also become a frequently used analytical tool in the field of comparative state politics in the United States. (For an enumeration of these studies, see Appendix II.)

Before proceeding to the detailing of the specific theoretical framework used in the present study, it would be useful to review the broad theoretical background on which recruitment studies are based.

Such studies can be grouped along three general lines of inquiry: 1) elite studies; 2) studies of the social backgrounds of political leaders and their individual career patterns, and 3. psychological studies of elite motivations, attitudes and pre-dispositions.

Elite Studies

The study of political recruitment involves use of the term "political elite," i.e., the individuals "recruited" from the mass of citizens from some kind of "select" or differentiated group. How can this term "elite,"

and more specifically "political elite" be adequately defined?

Janowitz has defined elites as,

those members of a functional group, a social organization or society who exercise the most power. They are the individuals who actually (in political life) have access to the dominant group values and a large control the access of the non-elites to these values.³

Thus, the access to power and the control of group values are keys to identifying elites. Mosca and Pareto, in their classical writings, saw the political elite as controlling the state.⁴ The elite may be based on a dominant social position (Mosca), or on certain psychological traits allowing the elite to exploit social conditions within the community (Pareto). In a certain sense, the political elite can be thought of as the "top power class" in a community or political system.⁵

With further refinement of the concept political recruitment in mind, it is appropriate to examine Mosca's ideas a bit further. In discussing his concept of the "ruling class," Mosca differentiates political systems by the flow of authority (legitimation of the rulers and the source of recruitment of the ruling class).⁶

Authority flows either downward--the "autocratic principle" (authority granted by some higher official)--or upward--the "liberal principle" (authority granted by the ruled, usually through an election). The recruitment of the ruling class will be effected through either "aristocratic" or "democratic" tendencies. The tendency is aristocratic when new members of the ruling class are recruited from the descendants of the existing rulers. The democratic tendency is operant when the ruling class is renewed from the lower classes, i.e., those ruled.

Mosca states that both recruitment tendencies are present in all political systems, and that either in its extreme form is problematic

Extreme aristocratic recruitment may tend to isolate the rulers from the needs and demands of the society in general. The opposite extreme denotes a revolutionary situation, wherein a ruling class hardly exists, due to almost constant replacement from below. Although it is observed that the latter situation would tend to stabilize, as the revolutionary lower classes are always led by a compact minority, which almost inevitably transforms itself into the new ruling class.

Mosca's two principles of authority flow and two recruitment tendencies are combined into a two-by-two design which was used to classify the four combinations of system-types observed at that time. Figure 2.1 is a representation of this scheme.

Studies by Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills have attempted to identify powerful groups in local communities and the United States, but neither fully considers the complexities of the various power structures existing within a given system.⁷ Instead of assuming a concentration of power in a single group, Dahl sees several groups, each influencing a particular policy output area, and each drawing on a somewhat different (but to varying degrees overlapping) social or economic power bases.⁸ Dahl thus advances a polyarchic view of political leadership.

Such studies have been successful in identifying and differentiating political elites, but do not explore their origins, nor the process by which certain individuals were able to gain access to the elite, while others, with similar socio-economic positions in the community or nation, are (were) not recruited to positions within the political elite.⁹

Studies of Social Backgrounds and Career Patterns

Perhaps the most common approach to the examination of political

THE "NEW" TYPE OF "PROLETARIAN AND REPLACEMENT OF STATES" AND "REVOLUTION"

F. O. F.		
AUTHORIZATION "POLITICAL PLAN"		
SOURCE (FROM) OF POLITICAL "REVOLUTIONS"	A B C D C R A T I C (downward)	L I B E R A L (upward)
A B C D C R A T I C (revolve by descent)	hereditary monarchies	Poland
D I C H R A T I C (revolve) from classes (over than rulers)	Chinese "imperialists" Buenos Aires Church USA (selection of executive branch)	Great Britain Jehovah's Witnesses (Prophetic) (see article)

recruitment has focused on the social backgrounds and career advancement patterns of important office holders. Usually, a specific institutional political position is chosen to define the elite section to be examined, and background and career data are gathered for individuals, either passing through the position, or who have been candidates for the position during a given time period. Underlying such investigations are notions of "representativeness" (or the lack thereof) of the elite section vis a vis the mass population, on certain socio-economic variables.¹⁰

In 1954, Donald Matthews synthesized a number of such "background" studies, and concluded that the upper-level of political decision-makers in the United States tends to come from upper-status occupations, have higher-than-average levels of education, be predominantly Protestant, white and native born.¹¹ In a later study, Matthews found these same characteristics among U.S. Senators during the post-World War II period,¹² while Schmidhauser demonstrated a similar trend for Supreme Court Justices.¹³

On the other hand, Forthall and Gosnell's studies of Chicago precinct workers (in 1928 and 1935) showed that recruitment was predominantly from the lower classes.¹⁴ But, later studies by Bone and Harrod found that local party committeemen tended to come from the better educated sections of the population.¹⁵

Frey in his study of the Turkish political elite compares the backgrounds of National Assembly Deputies to the mass of Turkish society, and finds that,

Turkish society is predominately agricultural. However, among deputies, agriculture occupied less than 10 per cent of the total group... The two groupings that were

greatly overrepresented were the professionals and the officials, approximately ten to twenty times their weight in the male population.¹⁶

Frey raises the difficult question of how to define the mass population for comparison purposes, urban males, all males over 21, heads of households, the population of the 20 largest cities in Turkey, etc.? Thus the fallacy of attempted "representational" elite-mass comparisons on background variables.¹⁷

However, background variables, when taken over time, can provide valuable insights into the changing structure of the elite, especially configurations of relative access to decision-making. Frey examines Turkey's Grand National Assembly from 1920 through 1957 and concludes that the proportions of lawyers, medical and other professions, and traders steadily increased, while military and other officials, and religious declined over the total period, and "localism" (the percentage of deputies born in the region they represent) starts at 62 per cent and drops to a low of 30 per cent in 1935, and increases to a high of 65 per cent by 1957.¹⁸ Frey concludes that these changes in the occupational makeup of the Assembly, parallel the nation's political development, growth of the multi-party system, and enhanced prestige and importance of certain occupations in Turkey. Regarding the "U shaped" curve of localism over time, Frey states that this mirrors the death of Ataturk (in 1938), the advent of multi-party politics (in 1946), and the steady increase in the legal, trade and professional occupation groups (which are more locally based).

Gattsman in his longitudinal study of British MPs is able to link changes in the occupational and class structure of the House of Commons to certain decisive watersheds of increased enfranchisement, in the 19th

century) and changes in the level of urbanization and economic makeup of the nation.¹⁹

In his initial study of political careers in the United States,²⁰ Schlesinger demonstrated the importance of holding legislative or law enforcement offices as portal to the governorship. In his later and more comprehensive study, utilizing political career data for governors, and senators from 1914 to 1958,²¹ Schlesinger was able to discern the existence of an "opportunity structure" (which varies in size and shape by state, party system and region), certain more efficacious career patterns, and the existence of a "manifest" office and a "base" office, concepts which will be quite useful in analyzing the recruitment process in Minas Gerais.²²

Although these types of studies provide useful insights into the changing power and prestige relationships within a given political elite, reflect changes in the social, economic and political systems, and provide useful information about political promotion within the higher levels of the political elite--little or no inferences can be drawn as to how and why such political actors were initially recruited, and subsequently progressed to their present positions within the elite.

Psychological Studies- Motivations and Attitudes

These studies attempt to answer the questions: Why do certain individuals seek public office (elective or appointed)? How were they initially recruited into politics? What factors were involved in their subsequent career advancement?

Lasswell has theorized that power may not be the primary motivation of political office-seekers, as power-oriented individuals are likely to

be too inflexible and compulsive to be successful politicians. Instead, he says, political leaders,

are oriented toward power as a coordinate or secondary value with other values such as respect, recognition and wealth.²³

In their study of San Francisco Bay Area municipal councilmen, Eulau and Koff were able to discern two types of social status types, mobiles and stables (inter-generationally). The status stables (non-mobiles) appeared to seek office motivated by accruing rewards in direct personal terms, whereas, the mobiles aspired to office with motivations in terms of the direct effect legislative service would have on their social status and occupation.²⁴

Rosenzweig also found upward social mobility to be a factor involved in the candidacy of 16 congressional aspirants in western Massachusetts for the 1956 elections, the prime motivations cited were accruing prestige and respect, in terms of friendships built and services rendered.²⁵ However, the key to such expectations (and thus motivation) "depends on what you were [before becoming a candidate]."²⁶

Several researchers have attempted to compare elite and mass in terms of personality types and inventories. In 1950 McCaughy reported a comparison of 18 South Carolina state representatives and senators with two control groups-- local service club members, and a group of adult college graduates. The legislators evinced strong, stable personalities in relation to the mass groups-- less neurotic, more self-sufficient, more extroverted, more dominant, more masculine, more self-confident, and less tense.²⁷ Ideologically, the elite group was found to be less fascist, but slightly more conservative. Conservatism was positively correlated with age, and interestingly, negatively with the level of retail sales in the home county.

Browning did essentially, the same thing, in his comparison of businessmen active in politics with a matched set of background characteristics; group of non-active businessmen.²⁸ He also compared the personality "incentives" of his sample of first candidates from metropolitan Boston, with standard and scores for adult and college student.²⁹

In a comparative article based on prior research (based on businessmen in eastern cities,³⁰ and non-career workers in Louisiana parishes,³¹ Browning and Jacob conclude that motivations of political aspirants vary with local circumstances:

relatively plentiful opportunities for power and achievement in the economic arena channel strongly motivated men into economic rather than political activity; in communities where politics and political issues are at the center of attention and interest, men attracted to politics are likely to be more strongly power- and achievement-motivated than in communities where politics commands only peripheral interest, political systems that offer upward political mobility attract men with relative, strong achievement and power motivation, and concentration in a political system in matters of strictly party or factional organization and power, to the near exclusion of public policy concerns, tend to keep men with strong affiliative needs out of politics.³²

Regarding specific reasons given for seeking office, Gosnell and Forthel found that among precinct-level politicians (who are generally of low social status) the prime motivation was personal material gain.³³ In later studies conducted in Seattle and Vancouver, material gain was not a motivating force to candidacy.³⁴

Other researchers have found the level of inter-party competition and party organization to be an important variable affecting stated motivations for seeking office.

In their study of four state legislatures, White, et al., found that "the more competitive the party system, the more professionalized

political skills, or or political office hold, and party sponsorship were cited. And the less the competition, the more frequently "opportunity, contact with private and political careers, achievement of personal goals, and interest in sponsorship were cited as motivations." 35

Although South's analysis focused on individual initiation to be positively correlated with education and intergenerational social mobility, he concluded that for his Michigan legislators, party was the most significant source of decision to run, equally for both parties. 36

While Fisman found that among congressional trail blazers (in the 1966 elections), holding prior party office significantly increased the amateurs' motivations to seek higher office (congressman), 37 Prewitt and Wolfson, in subsequent analysis of the data for the 172 Bay Area councilmen, found ambition (or aspiration to a higher political position) to be directly related to the ambitions' perceptions of the office aspired to. 38 However, a series of intervening variables were found effecting the latter bivariate relationship: personality, ascriptive (race, sex, religion, ethnicity) barriers, structural considerations (location within the opportunity structure), and background variables (mainly status and age).

Relevant studies focusing on motivation, attitudes, aspiration, or ambition, generally examine entry to one specific office (usually at a middle level), and at a specific point in time. They tell us little about the manner through which the individual (who has held prior office, initially not interested in politics, and was initially recruited). Two alternative designs are conceivable: first, a panel of initial recruits to local (but ambition stimulating) offices could be followed through time

along their political careers, or elite sections at various levels of political office could be interviewed with recall-type items. The former would by necessity have to be a large sample in size (to assure minimal numbers after attrition) and thus extremely costly, while the latter would be more economical, but less illuminating. A modified version of the latter design was used in the current study.

A second problem encountered in "psychological" type studies, especially in ones involving personality inventories, involves elite receptivity, which will diminish with higher level of political office. For example, the battery of personality tests and the questionnaires run by McCaughy, Schwartz, and Soule would not be acceptable to governors, national legislators or cabinet members.

Political Recruitment as a Longitudinal Process

As was seen above, much of the theoretical basis of the concept, political recruitment, has been built on rather specific or restricted cases; specific geographically, in terms of position in the political hierarchy, and temporally. What is needed, therefore, is a comprehensive and longitudinal conceptualization or model of political recruitment as an on-going process--from the point of initial motivation, selection, and recruitment thru subsequent career advancement, and embodying many of the key concepts and stages discussed above.

The foregoing will attempt the synthesis of such a conceptualization, directed at developing a framework which is both suitable and valid for the analysis of political recruitment within a state political system in Brazil.

The Recruitment Process: Who?

Recruitment can be viewed as a continuous "screening" process

by which individuals possessing certain personality traits and occupying a particular political positions in the community are screened by political institutions for elective office.³⁹

Figure 2.2 details Prentiss's representation of the successive narrowing [or screening] of the many who are governed to the few who govern.

The Chinese Box Puzzle model appropriately represents the stages in this screening process.


As will be seen below, this representation of the process is lacking, primarily because it is not adequate for the process of recruitment to non-elective political positions, does not provide for the "re-cycling" of candidates, nor for alternative sequencing within the longitudinal process, nor for the process of career advancement. However, Prentiss's scheme does remain a good interpretation of the narrowing involved in the initial selection and recruitment process.

The Recruitment Process: How?

Figure 2.3 presents a more adequate representation of the longitudinal recruitment process. Browning devised this scheme for purposes of computer simulation of the recruitment process, thus the need to incorporate "re-cycling," alternative and multiple sequences, and continuous flow aspects.⁴⁰


Browning's version was developed for partisan elections in the United States, and involves the following stages in the recruitment process. Party and interest group leaders play the prime role in recruiting candidates (2). Some individuals accept, others reject such overtures (5). Their decisions will depend on their perceptions of the

Figure 2.3--The Chinese Box Puzzle: The Successive Narrowing of the Mass who are Governed by the Few who Govern



Source: P. H. H. K. (1980), p. 24.

Fig. 2. Sequence of events and description of steps in the Full-time Recruitment Program



system's characteristics, the opportunity structure, consequences of their holding office, and on their evaluations of such perceived attributes. (1) and (3).

Some may be "self-starters," initiating their own candidacies, perhaps in consultation with part, leaders, but not directly recruited by the leaders (1), (2), and (4). The latter aspirants and former recruits then compete for nominations (6) and in elections (7). The resulting office holders then adopt certain behaviors in office (8), as determined by the system characteristics (1), and their individual attributes (3).

The stages are then successively repeated in future time periods, in which certain parameters may change—system characteristics, the bases of individual decisions, and the individuals' office holding experiences from previous time periods.⁴¹

Browning then proceeds to detail sub-models and their respective decisional conditions for predicting aspirations, election outcomes, and incumbents' behavior choices, based on his data for businessmen.⁴²

For present purposes, a discussion of the simulation will be foregone in light of the necessity of modifying Browning's model by adding certain specific components of the recruitment process that were judged important in the theoretical review above.

First, an additional "box" (BG) is needed which would enter the sequences (1)-(BG)-(2) and (1)-(BG)-(3)-(4). (BG) would be the set of politically relevant background characteristics possessed by the individual, including his network of "S-groups" and other "electoral" attributes.

Occupation would be one of the crucial social variables found in

(BG) Occupation,] role rather than status alone is the important factor here. Certain occupations by their nature involve bargaining, negotiation and "bruserage." Jacob explicates this concept, stating that

certain occupations frequently place their practitioners into a bargaining role where they deal ith outsiders (non subordinates) and try to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. The lawyer is the classic example. He is the negotiator between parties who are in conflict or who desire to reach a common end,... But not all lawyers play this role,...the corporation lawyer who principally acts as legal advisor rather than as negotiator is seldom found in politics.... Insurance salesmen, realtors, independent merchants are others frequently found in a brokerage role.⁴³

Age, as discussed above is another important characteristic of the individual, affecting his perceptions of the system's opportunity structure, and thus would be included in (BG).

Place and type of formal education received were found to be important recruitment criteria in Minas Gerais during the historical period, as were ties with important political families within the state.⁴⁴ These also are included in the box (BG), and an effort will be made to see if their influence has changed over time.

Browning has included both party and interest group structures as performing the recruitment function within box (2). In lieu of the research and subsequent conceptualizations reported by Schwartz, Seligman, and Schlesinger, and as necessitated by the Brazilian situation, these two structures will be separated, thus facilitating a representation of their role in the recruitment process--interacting sequentially and/or independently.

Based on the findings of Seligman and others,⁴⁵ this interaction will be further conditioned by the level of inter party competition

existent in the given system, at the specific point in time.

Seligson has refined his conceptualization of mechanisms involved in the recruitment process and their relation to inter- and intra-party competition, which may be synthesized into a typology of six. The six mechanisms which are relevant to the Brazilian case are:

(1) Self-recruitment--when the self-starter joins the contest without prior clearance with party leaders. Usually the self-starter is not a "pure" mechanism, in the sense that his candidacy normally mobilizes secondary support groups (Schwartz's "S-Groups").⁴⁶ This mechanism was seen operating in both competitive and dominant party areas.

(2) Conscription--involves the "drafting" of candidates to run for office by the local party organization, usually in a "hopeless" minority party situation. Conscripts are generally drawn from the ranks of loyal party activists, who are not office seekers, but because of party discipline, accept candidacy.

(3) Inner circle selection--refers to groups (often cliques of friends and business associates) surrounding the candidate, but not constituting a faction, and denotes a certain level of intra-party competition in a competitive party situation.

(4) Factional selection--often reflects personal rivalries among party sub-groups, and is observed in the absence of any central party coordination.

(5) Co-optation--is the fourth mechanism involving the party or party sub-groups. Here, a candidate not militantly identified with the party or its sub-groups is invited or persuaded to become a candidate. Such candidates often have achieved high social and/or economic status,

attained notoriety or extra-political positions of prestige. This mechanism may be used to strengthen the party's organization and enhance its electoral chances--however, with the risk of the candidate's potential independence, and perhaps even future domination of the local party structure. Co-optation frequently is present in highly competitive party situations.

(6) Agency sponsorship- with this mechanism, persons are almost "hired" to become candidates (with little communication with party leaders) and subsequently "represent" the interests of the sponsoring groups. Alternatively, this might be termed the "legitimation" of a lobbyist as a representative of the electorate with the appropriate party label. Like co-optation, agency recruitment may lead to incumbencies that are quite independent of party orientation and discipline. This mechanism occurs frequently in dominant and competitive party situations.


Political Recruitment: A Working Conceptualization

In summary, Browning's model (as it appears in Figure 2.3), can now be modified to incorporate subsequent discussion, and to fit the Brazilian situation. This modified representation is detailed in Figure 2.4.

Box (8G) embodying key background variables influences both the individuals' perceptions of the political system and his recruitment by the structures involved in the process.

Recruitment may follow alternative sequences: self starting, (3)-(5)-(6), agency sponsorship, either, (8G)&(1)-(2a)-(5)-(6), or (8G)& 1,-(2a)- 2b,- 5)-(6), or by party or party sub groups,

1004 4--Representation of the Stages and Decision Points in the Process of Political Recruitment



(8G)(1)-(2b)-(5)-(6).

Recalling Schwartz's observations regarding the activation, motivating and teaching role of recruitment structures, the latter are seen as conditioning the individuals' perceptions and motivations, (2a)-(3) and (2b)-(3).

To account for recruitment to a positive positions within the party or political positions within the bureaucracy, individuals pre-selected in sequence (5)-(6, are appointed (7), either by a central political authority or thru a party caucus.

The individuals' behaviors in office (8, are recycled in the next time period (9), as he aspires either to a renewal of present incumbency, or a move to another political position. These behaviors affect the individual's future perceptions and motivations, and as the office holder is now an attribute of the political system, thus perhaps altering its characteristics.

Upward mobility (career advancement) may be seen as an ascending spiral of recycling, which may involve what Seligman terms "branching off," or

Switching off to positions outside politics, such as prominent business positions, may help a [political] career materially. Since there is a close relationship between various interests and government, politics is interdependent with several career lines- business, law, appointive governmental positions.⁴⁷

Elsewhere, Seligman has pointed out that this recycling can involve downward as well as upward mobility--the proverbial rise and fall of political leaders.⁴⁸

Both "branching off" and downward mobility were in evidence during the historical period in Minas Gerais,⁴⁹ and subsequent analysis will assess their effect on career advancement patterns over time, through the

contemporary period.

The above synthesis of prior theoretical constructs on the topic of political recruitment, with appropriate modifications to the Brazilian case, has resulted in an analytical framework representing the states and crucial decision points in the process of political recruitment. This framework will form the basis of analysis of the process in Parts II thru V.

NOTES - CHAPTER 2

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²Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 16-33, and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 72, 47-48.

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⁵Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and a Bibliography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), 13.

⁶Mosca, loc. cit., 394-429.

⁷Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structures (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership in U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957) and L. P. Finkle, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). For a more recent study of community power see editor's ed., Industrial City, see Robert Perrucci and Marc Pilisuk, "Leaders and Urban Elites: The Inter-organizational Bases of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 35:6 (December, 1970), 1040-57.

⁸Robert A. Dahl, "Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," APSR, 52:2 (June, 1958), 463-69.

⁹For an interesting synthesis of the stratification and polyarchic approaches to elite studies, see Robert Przeworski, Who of the Top? A Study of Community Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). For further discussion, see Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 25:4 (October, 1960), 636-44, Leon Polst, "Urban Elites in the Analysis of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 24:6 (December, 1959), 796-803, and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," APSR, 56:4 (December, 1962), 447-52.

¹⁰For example, Goodman, Swanson and Cornell employ the "representational" of four (with a small, but non-negligible, correlation with the residence) neighborhoods in the S. Goodman, Royce R. Swanson and Peter E. Cornell, "Political Recruitment in Four Selection Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 1970, 82-93.

¹¹Donald J. Matthews, The Social Background of Politics: 1800-1860 (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

¹²Donald J. Matthews, Senators and their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

¹³John R. Schindler, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," NAES, 3:1 (February, 1959), 1-57.

¹⁴Sonya Fenthal, Congress of Democracy: A Study of a Precinct Captain (New York: World War II Press, 1946), and Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics (Chicago: Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1937).

¹⁵Hugh A. Bone, Grass Roots Party Leadership (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), and Louise Harrod, "Participation in Political Parties: Social Party and Machine," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1957). However, Seattle and New Haven (in the 1950's) were somewhat different environments than depression-era Chicago.

¹⁶Frederick M. Frey, The Turn on Political Elite (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 82.

¹⁷For another example of a "representational" analysis, see Goodman, Swanson and Cornell, op. cit.

¹⁸Frey, loc. cit., 180-92.

¹⁹William L. Guttmann, The British Political Elite (London: MacGibbon and Key, 1963).

²⁰Joseph A. Schlesinger, How they Became Governor (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957).

²¹Joseph A. Schlesinger, Promotion and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

²²The "base" office is defined as a common mode of political experience, not necessarily the first public office held, ibid., 70-72. The "manifest" office is defined as the office most obviously in the line of promotion, in terms of similar electorates and political functions, and shared political arena, ibid., 99-100.

²³Harold D. Lasswell, "Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of the "Authoritarian Personality" (Garden City: Free Press, 1954), 221.

²⁴ Heinz Eulav and David Koff, "Occupational Mobility and the Political Career," *APQ*, 5 (October, 1962), 521.

²⁵ Robert W. Rosenzweig, "The Political Career and the Career in Politics," *MJPS*, 1:2 (August, 1957), 163-172.

²⁶ *ibid.*, 167. The phrase was quoted by Rosenzweig from several of his interviewees.

²⁷ John B. McInneigh, "Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina," *APSR*, 44:4 (December, 1950), 903.

²⁸ Rufus P. Browning, "Businessmen in Politics: Motives and Circumstances in the Rise to Power," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1960, and his "The Interaction of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for Office," *Journal of Social Issues*, 24 (July, 1968), 93-109.

²⁹ David C. Schwartz, "Political Recruitment: A Comparative Essay in Theory and Research," (Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T., 1961).

³⁰ Browning, "Businessmen in Politics..."

³¹ Herbert Jacob, "Why Men Seek Political Office: Motivation and Social Status in the Recruitment of Locally Elected Officials," Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1961.

³² Rufus P. Browning and Herbert Jacob, "Power Motivation and the Political Personality," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (Spring, 1964), 90.

³³ Gasrell, *op. cit.*; and Forthel, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Bone, *op. cit.*; and Harrod, *op. cit.*, respectively.

³⁵ John C. Ashike, et al., *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1962), 98-131 and their "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Osamu Murvick (ed.), *Political Decision Makers* (New York: Free Press, 1961), 120.

³⁶ John W. Soule, "The Influence of Political Socialization, Interpersonal values and Differential Recruitment Patterns on Legislative Adaptation to the Michigan House of Representatives," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1967), 113-15.

³⁷ Jeff Fishel, "Ambition and the Political vocation: Congressional Challengers in American Politics," *JP*, 33 (February, 1971), 54.

³⁸ Kenneth Frewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambition and Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," *APQ*, 22 (June, 1969), 298-308.

³⁹Robert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the United States," *ibid.*, p. 244 (November, 1962), 700.

⁴⁰Rufus F. Dreyfus, "Attitudes about Political Recruitment: A Partisan Study of the Political Elite," William E. Miller, ed., *Simulation in Political Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 343-326.

⁴¹*ibid.*, 304-305.

⁴²*ibid.*, 313-321. Quotation from Browning, "Businessmen in Politics..."

⁴³Jacob, "Initial Recruitment...," 709-710. William L. Guttsman, "Social Stratification and the Political Elite," *British Journal of Sociology*, 11 (June, 1960), 127-150, and Jason A. Schlesinger, "Lawyers in Politics: A Clarified Case," *JPS*, 11 (May, 1957), 26-39, also mention brokerage-type occupations.

A partial list of other possible occupations (including brokers of information), adapted to the above analysis might include general practitioners, pharmacists, dentists, lawyers, route salesmen, barbers, hotel and restaurant owners, merchants, real estate and insurance salesmen, creamery and farm supply operators, auto owners, carter drivers, local union officials, pastors and lay church workers, and undertakers.

⁴⁴David J. Fleischer, "Recrutamento Político em 1945, 1890/1918. Análise dos antecedentes sociais e das carreiras políticas de 111 deputados federais," *OSP*, vol. 3, Coleção Zéze (Edições Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1971), 32, 43-45, 62-69, 73.

⁴⁵Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics..." his "A Preliminary Study..." and his "Political Recruitment and Party Selection: A Case Study," *JPS*, 55 (March, 1961), 77-86. See also Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of...", 711-712, *ibid.*, 304-305, 711-720, Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 109-120, and Schlesinger, *ibid.*, 144-147, 153-155.

⁴⁶Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 117. "S-growers" refer to extra-party secondary support networks, which mobilize support for pre-primary candidate selection.

⁴⁷Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics..." 15.

⁴⁸Lester G. Seligman, "Political Leadership: Status Loss and Downward Mobility," Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1966, 2.

⁴⁹Fleischer, *op. cit.*, 69-71.

CHAPTER 3
THE SETTING IN MINAS GERAIS


An Overview

Due to the eighteenth century gold rush, and subsequently to its fertile soils and pastures, Minas Gerais had become Brazil's most populous and perhaps its wealthiest state by 1890. From Figure 3.1 it is observed that only after the demise of the First Republic, in approximately 1935, did the population of the state of São Paulo surpass that of Minas Gerais. However, Minas Gerais percentage of Brazil's total population declined steadily from 1890 to 1960. This was the result of a proportionately larger international migration into São Paulo and the other southern states, but also due to outward migration of mineiros to the growing industrial centers of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

The advent of the First Republic in 1889 heralded an era of important changes for the state. The conflict between the cities of Ouro Preto and Juiz de Fora for political dominance led to the creation of a new capital city--Belo Horizonte--located in the rapidly developing mining zone.

Encouraged by the autonomy granted the states under the federal constitution and functioning with a system of locally "supervised" elections,¹ a new type of politician emerged during the late 1890's--the coronel. The only political party operating within the state, the P.R.M. (Partido Republicano Mineiro), was actually a coalition of these regional political

Figure 3 - African Grasses and Silo Pans, Population as Percentages of Base 1's Total Population, by Census Year (1990-1970)



chiefs and their local cohort groups. Once established, the P.R.M. machine functioned quite smoothly through 1918. It was during this period that Minas came to share the monopoly of national political power with São Paulo, through the "politics of the governors." This involved the alternation of the Brazilian presidency between the two most powerful states.²

In 1918 this smooth operation was temporarily interrupted when Artur Bernardes and Raul Soares (the "renovators") and the regional chiefs from the Zona da Mata gained control of the P.R.M. at the expense of the dominant coronéis from the southern region of the state.

This reform movement was short-lived and by 1926 the old style coronéis had regained political control of the state, which they maintained until 1933.

During the period from 1933 thru 1947, Minas Gerais was administered by six federally appointed intervenors. Notable among these was Benedito Valladares, who came to be a durable figure in mineiro politics thru 1970.

In 1947 the state entered an era of open, democratic politics with a multi-party system, and dominated by intense political activity. Competing parties alternated the governorship thru the electoral process three different times. A clientelistic style of politics came to replace Coronelismo throughout most of the state, and a mass-based, urban style began to appear in the early 1960's, especially in the larger cities.

The state political system became more closed from 1966 to 1971, as the military regime, which had taken power in Brazil two years before, became solidified and reaction to it became more vociferous. This same period saw the end of the multi-party system, and an uneasy attempt to

implant a two party system overlaid on the old structure

Because Minas Gerais covers an area within both the North-South and the East-West transitional zones of Brazil, it presents perhaps the widest regional disparities to be found within any state of the Republic. Thus, in addition to being one of the two most powerful states of the First Republic, Minas Gerais offers the investigator somewhat of a micro-model of Brazil.

The Northeastern region referred to as the Jequitinhonha valley,³ is very similar to the sertão of Brazil's northeast and is included in the drought polygon currently under the administration of the Sudepe organization.⁴ The land tenure system and agricultural exploration in this area closely resemble those of the Brazilian Northeast. The northern region is nearly identical to the Jequitinhonha Valley except that the former is less densely populated and cattle raising is more of a predominant economic activity.

The Mata and Southern regions are mountainous and quite densely populated, having been the first areas settled during the eighteenth century gold rush. These areas are intensely cultivated in staples and milk production. In the South, coffee predominates as a cash crop and land holdings tend to be somewhat more evenly distributed, due to hereditary distribution.

The zone toward the center of the state is extremely rich in minerals. Here the nucleus of the state's industrialization began to take shape during the latter half of the First Republic. Also, this was the region chosen for the new state capital which was inaugurated in 1898. The Rio Doce Valley is also very rich in minerals, especially iron ore, which were not exploited until after the First Republic.



5.232 The Physiographic Regions of the State of Minas Gerais

The West and Triangle regions produce beef cattle and staple crops. The Triangle is a more recently settled area with a climate and geography similar to Southern Goiás and Mato Grosso.⁵

Historical Discussion

In order to better understand the political recruitment process in Minas during this period, and to put the observations drawn from the data into historical perspective, an examination should be made of the reorganization of the state's political structure after the fifteenth of November, 1889.

One of the factors carried over from the Empire was the political rivalry between the cities of Ouro Preto and Juiz de Fora. The political elites of these two cities were represented by Cesário Alvim and Fernando Lobo, respectively.⁶ Ouro Preto was "the political capital, of conservative, if not monarchic, traditions; and Juiz de Fora, the largest center of industrial activity and of population of the state."⁷ The dispute between these cities crystallized around two issues: the transfer of the state capital from Ouro Preto and the adoption of a state constitution implementing the federal constitution that was expected to give Minas substantial political independence, or autonomy, within the new federal system.⁸ The citizens of Ouro Preto felt that if a new capital city were to be built, the old capital, "Ouro Preto," should be reconstructed, while the political forces in Juiz de Fora desired the new capital located in a more "neutral" area, and were suspicious of the relationship of the Cesário Alvim-Ouro Preto faction with the Deodoro regime in Rio.⁹

Political activity centered around the choice of delegates to

represent Minas at the Constituent assembly which met in Rio on November 15, 1890. Declaring himself not a candidate, Fernando Lobo convened a meeting of representatives of various local Republican clubs in Juiz de Fora on August 5, 1890.¹⁰ After two days of heated discussions the sixty five delegates approved an official slate of candidates.¹¹ Despite Lobo's attempts at unity, a dissident electoral vehicle was established: the Partido Católico. Most notable among these dissidents were Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada, João Pen do, Carlos Peixoto, Silviano Brandão, Sabino Barroso, and Diogo de Vasconcellos.¹² The campaign slogan elaborated by the party's central directorate was "He who wants a military and despotic Republic, vote for the official slate. He who wants a moderate, honest and liberal Republic, vote for the Catholic and nationalist slate."¹³

Cesário Alvim, even before being nominated provisional interventor in Minas, began politically to "punish" the dissidents from his position as Minister of the Interior and Justice in Rio.¹⁴

Elections for the state constituent assembly were to be held only after the national constituent assembly had promulgated the new Constitution.¹⁵ However, Alvim, now acting chief executive of Minas, had scheduled them for January 25, 1891.¹⁶ The legality of this action was protested by the dissidents in a telegram to the government in Rio, claiming that Alvim was acting in opposition to the national congress.¹⁷

The national government took a neutral position, and the "official" state constituent assembly was elected, but with considerable abstention.¹⁸ Alvim was elected governor by the assembly in the spring of 1891, and his decline began in November of that year with his support of Pedreira's coup in Rio. Aristides Maia's attack in the Jornal do Comercio is an

example of the reaction:

In government, if not in Alvim, wasn't uttered the monarchial system only one, in itself, to signify the expedient, and appointments that he takes, old friends and adherents of the Liberal Party are preferred.

The general opinion there was a crime that vilified the whole nation, and the nobles and Para nobly, repelled this affront, and they protested against this violence.

The noble officers demand that you [Alvim] immediately resign from the post that you do not know how to occupy nobly.

However, the overt act directly preceding Alvim's resignation was the proclamation of the Estado do Sul de Minas in Campanha on January 30, 1892.²⁰ Although short-lived, this movement served as a reflection of public opinion by its attempt to form a separate state from the South and the portion of the Mata dominated by Luz de Fora.

This background puts into perspective the observations made from the aggregate data of the first years of the republic in Minas. Although Cesário Alvim resigned, individuals of the same backgrounds were recruited into the state political elite (post of federal deputy) in 1893 (legislature II), despite the large turnover of personnel (twenty-five new deputies, out of the thirty-seven), as can be seen in Figure 4.1. This latter phenomenon was due to the demise of Cesário Alvim and his "official" candidates of 1890.²¹

The period through 1897 can be considered neutral or static in that Affonso Pena and Bras Forte were more austere and less partisan than Alvim. During this period, the stage was set for a somewhat different type of politics: the emergence of an institutionalized P.R.M. (Partido Republicano Mineiro). This more subtle change can be noted in our observed first "divergence" beginning in 1897. The age of new deputies, shifts in occupational proportions and a smaller turnover are all related to this "divergence" or transformation.²² The smaller turnover

can be seen as resulting from the "bureaucratic" effect of the Bies Forte and Affonso Pena administrations. The two sen legislatures, II, and IV, seem to have a strong, lasting influence as cohort groups. (See Table 4.9.)

With one of "theirs" already in the Partido da Liberdade (Silviano Brandão the new proprietor set in motion a plan in 1898 to found officially the P.R.M. This new party, in 1901, became the dominant political force within the state (Table 4.9), and its role in the recruitment process will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

The new party group soon was faced with the question of succession after Silviano Brandão, which divided the P.R.M. into those favoring Bernardes Monteiro and those supporting Francisco Sales.²⁴ The latter was a canny politician who since 1888 had been carefully organizing his republican machine in the form of Clube Republicano in the South and elsewhere in the state.²⁵ In 1902, Sales was able to win the governorship fairly easily. However, his own succession was not so easy to "make," for he was faced with two other contending factions: the silvianistas and the blistas.²⁶ The current occupant of the governorship would direct the negotiations, the choice falling to one of his confidants, but also one acceptable to the big chiefs.²⁷ Which is exactly what Sales did. Acting as an arbitrator between the above forces, he conserved his own prestige by pushing a neutral choice, Joao Pinheiro, and at the same time, was able to assure his future dominance and influence over the top elite through the inclusion of Bueno Brandao on the official slate as vice governor.²⁸

The consequence of Sales' recruitment effort is revealed by the membership of his cabinet (1902-06): Jofre Borges, Antônio Carlos,

Coronel Francisco Bressane, Olinto de Azevedo, Carlos Peixoto, Afrânio de Melo Franco and João Luiz Alves²⁹ Sales continued to be the central power figure through the tenure of De Faria Almeida (1914-18), when the succession became the point of rebellion for the "renovators," Raul Soares and Artur Bernardes da Silva.

Internal conflict in a vertical sense is evident in a case in Diamantina related by Francisco de Assis Barbosa. The local coronel, Olímpio Mourão, a post office functionary, rebelled against the "official" choice of Bernardo Monteiro as a candidate for federal deputy from the first district, o seu, and proceeded to "elect" Teles de Meneses, a doctor from Bahia, of great local esteem.³⁰

Before looking at the succession question of 1918, the tightly knit leadership structure of the Tarasca (or P.R.M. Executive Committee)³¹ should be examined. Levindo Coelho, who achieved a permanent seat on the Committee only after eight years, explains that, "there was a rotation every year in the Executive Committee, the president being chosen in order, and one was reelected president only after everyone had had his turn."³²

The smooth operation of the Tarasca in distributing power and patronage in Minas ended abruptly in 1918, prior indications of this change were noted in the background analysis of the IX legislature (1915-17). The power axis was swinging toward the Zona da Mata and away from the South. This movement was led by two members of the 1900 class of the São Paulo law school; Raul Soares from Ilhéus, and Artur Bernardes from Viçosa. These two were recruited into the P.R.M. with little difficulty, and Barbosa states that the dominantes of the Tarasca congratulated themselves on the entry of an able new generation

of politicians.³³

The recruitment of Artur Bernardes reveals the importance of family ties. Bernardes owed his early entry as mayor of Lagos and rapid rise in regional politics in the Zona da Mata to the position and political influence of his father-in-law, Vaz de Melo.³⁴ This aspect of recruitment is very difficult to examine empirically, over such a long period for the whole state. (See Parts III and IV) for a more extended discussion of the role of the family in the recruitment process.)

Paulo Annoni, a biographer of Bernardes, and Assis Barbosa differ in their assessment of the effect of the "renovators" on coronelismo mineiro. The former states that "the war against coronelismo was limited affecting only those who showed themselves "insensitive to progress."³⁵ While the latter holds that with "Bernardes in the governorship there began a radical transformation in the operation of mineiro politics with the fall of the coronéis that put the all-powerful Sales into ostracism."³⁶

The new regime called for a moralization of the public service,³⁷ a new economic plan, and a fiscal policy for the "absolute exclusion of political interests in financial questions."³⁸ It even altered the structure of the party, in that recruitment from the bureaucracy was to be done away with and ex-governors were to be made non-voting, honorary members of the Executive Committee of the P.R.M.³⁹

Bernardes' political ascendancy continued directly into the presidency, as he attempted to apply his moralization and anti-corruption campaign to the republic.⁴⁰ The "politics of the governors" (of Minas Gerais and São Paulo) were continued as Bernardes engineered the election of Washington Luiz in 1926.

However, his position of leadership within the P.R.M. had become

precarious. The untimely death, in 1924, of Bernardes' successor at the Palácio da Liberdade, Raul Soares, facilitated the resurgence of political forces opposed to Bernardes and his "renovators." Francisco Melo Viana, who had been Soares' minister of the Interior and was elected to complete the latter's term. Together with Antônio Carlos Pflieger de Andrade, who was the leader of the Minas delegation in the Chamber of Deputies, he was able to control a majority of the members of the Tarasca.⁴¹

Bernardes tried to maintain his leadership in Minas through personal emissaries, and even made several political trips to Belo Horizonte and through the Zona da Mata. However, he was forced to devote most of his time to the series of crises facing his federal regime, and never was able to regain control of the P.R.M.

The final period of the First Republic in Minas Gerais represents a regression towards the earlier style of coronelismo, as Melo Viana passes the governorship to Antônio Carlos. Indicative of the change in style was the re-emergence of Francisco Sales, who reportedly was received at the Palácio da Liberdade by Melo Viana the day after the Tarasca had nominated Antônio Carlos, thus ending Sales' eight years of "ostracism."⁴²

In contrast to this apparent "regression" towards coronelismo during the Melo Viana and Antônio Carlos administrations (1924-1930), Minas Gerais was witnessing certain political developments that had first begun in the larger urban centers of São Paulo, Rio and the Northeast earlier in the decade. Although Belo Horizonte was primarily a white collar, administrative city,⁴³ with only an embryonic working class, demands began to be articulated for a broadening of political

participation in the state.

As will be seen in the analysis below, many of the state's First Republic political elite received their university training in the São Paulo Law School. During the 1920's the local law school in Belo began to gain prominence as a "training ground," or recruitment channel for potential politicians. In addition to their classroom legal training, the law students were now acquiring a more practical training in the form of street demonstrations and political organizing.

In 1928 the law students were active in the movement to change Belo's municipal "deliberative" council (appointed by the governor), to a popularly elected body. Their efforts to achieve elections by secret ballot were also fruitful that year. Thus, a reform slate was able to elect a majority to the new municipal council, in opposition to the government backed slate.⁴⁴

Throughout the First Republic the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo had effectively alternated the national (civilian) presidencies, with two exceptions. This bargain was called the "política dos governadores," because the incumbent governors from the two states usually ascended to the presidency. This arrangement was also termed "a política de café com leite," from the two states' prime economic activities.

This arrangement broke down in 1930, when the incumbent president, Washington Luis, imposed the nomination of a fellow paulista, Júlio Prestes, as his successor. Minas supported the opposition Aliança Liberal, led by Getúlio Vargas, governor of Rio Grande do Sul, a southern state which had never been privy to the arrangement. However, when the various Republican Party machines in states not supporting the

Aliança Liberal, returned a majority for the "official" candidate, Vargas denounced electoral "frauds and intrusions," declaring Rio Grande do Sul in revolt against the central government, with the cautious support of Minas Gerais and Paraíba.⁴⁵

The 1930 Revolution and the Estado Novo

On November 4, 1930 the Army installed Vargas as "provisional president," and a new political era began for Brazil. The P.R.U. had had great difficulty deciding on a successor for Antônio Carlos during the uncertain months of 1930, and finally recalled 74-year old Dlegário Maciel from semi-retirement to be inaugurated two months prior to the "1930 Revolution."

A revolution had taken place against the old order, yet Minas which exemplified the coronelista system was slow to feel any changes. The paullista uprising and civil war were defeated in 1932 with the help of a constituent assembly to be elected in 1933.⁴⁶ However, thru all this, Minas was the only state where the elected governor remained in office, in all others centrally appointed interventores had been installed.

The "ancien regime" came to an end in September, 1930, with the death of Dlegário Maciel and subsequent appointment of Benedito Valladares as interventor the following December.

Valladares had held local political office and served as member of the national constituent assembly for a month prior to being named the state's chief executive. Vargas passed over various aspiring candidates who had risen thru the ranks of state-wide legislative and executive office, and chose a loyal confidant who was to serve him well during his

twelve year tenure.⁴⁷

A new majority party coalesced in support of the incumbent regime, the Partido Progressista (P.P.), with the now opposition continuing under the P.R.M. standard. A state constituent assembly was installed in 1935 and duly elected a civilian governor. The return to a participatory system was short lived, however, with the advent of the Estado Novo two years later. Valladares was confirmed as chief executive and continued until Vargas' ouster in 1945.

By 1943 Brazil had sent an expeditionary force in support of the Allies' invasion of Italy. At home pressure was building for a return to the democracy that was being fought for in Europe.⁴⁸ A group of mineiro intellectuals formalized these demands in their manifesto "Ao povo mineiro," published October 24, 1943.⁴⁹ Although the immediate effect was a loosening of government censorship, as newspapers were permitted to publish the manifesto, most of the signators were forced out of jobs in the public and private sectors.⁵⁰

By mid-1945 candidates were being articulated for the up-coming presidential and constituent assembly elections. However, Vargas began to vacillate, thus appearing to be preparing another 1937-style coup, and was deposed by the army on October 29, 1945.

Although the candidate of the "ins," General Dutra, was elected and installed in January, 1946, Minas Gerais did not inaugurate a popularly elected governor and state assembly until March 21, 1947. Valladares left office with Vargas, and was elected to the National Constituent Assembly on the PSD slate, with the largest state-wide plurality. The state had four chief executives during the interim intervenor period from November, 1945 to March, 1947.


The Multi-Party System

With the advent of the democratic constitution, temporary alignments appeared. Four major parties organized in mid 1945 and elected delegates from Minas to the national constituent assembly on December 2, 1945.⁵¹

The Partido Social Democrático (PSD) was an aggregation of individuals and interests associated with the "ins," i.e., the regime in power during the Valladares period (1933-45). During his tenure, Valladares had appointed the mayors in all the state's 316 municípios.⁵² Now on April 8, 1945 all were "invited" to Belo Horizonte to form the PSD mineiro, 312 were in attendance.⁵³ Twenty federal deputies were elected.⁵⁴ See Figure 3.3 for the proportions in this and subsequent elections.

Opponents to the out-going regime formed the grouping which took the name União Democrática Nacional (UDN). Many of the original members had supported the candidacy of Armando Salles under the União Democrática Brasileira (UDB) label during the abortive 1937 presidential campaign, and had also been signators of the Manifesto dos Mineiros, in 1943. This group, which has also been loosely labeled the "liberal constitutionalists,"⁵⁵ elected seven deputies.

The personality and following of Artur Bernardes formed the nucleus of the Partido Republicano (PR). Although the elder statesman had sided with the Aliança Liberal during the Revolution of 1930, he had favored the paulistas' constitutionist revolt in 1932, for which he was imprisoned and exiled. He returned in 1935 for a brief two year stint as federal deputy, but went into opposition during the Estado Novo.



period. Six deputies were elected.

A sub-group of the "ins" was also organized, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB). This party was more urban oriented and was set up by Vargas as his electoral vehicle to out-flank the left and the Communist Party, and to serve as a following cultivated among the working classes during his syndicalist regime. Two deputies were elected.

While the constituent assembly worked on the new constitution in Rio, the interim governments in Minas were finding it increasingly difficult to cope with popular manifestations in favor of a rapid return to locally elected government. The naming of the third interventor in less than a year, Isaías Lins (long time bureaucrat of both pre- and post-1930 administrations), by President Dutra, generated considerable hostility, especially in Belo Horizonte. When Lins's motorcade proceeded from the train station to the governor's palace, it was met by angry crowds and even stoned at some intersections.⁵⁶ Scarcely a month later Dutra named a replacement, Alcides Lins, on December 21, 1946.

The "ins" had been turned out of office, as it were, one month prior to the general elections of December 2, 1945, and in turn all local and regional officials appointed by Valladares were removed and more neutral substitutes named from the ranks of the state's judiciary.⁵⁷ Still the PSD was able to win a striking electoral victory, electing 20 of Minas' 35 federal deputies, even though the group had lost control of local political and law enforcement offices (traditionally crucial for the proper "making" of elections). This indicated the broad organizational base structured into the formation of the party. The resources of electoral mobilization rested in the hands of the many local leaders and chiefs astutely cultivated by Valladares and the "ins" while in

power, landowners, professionals, bureaucrats, merchants, etc. Selection was always carefully tailored to the idiosyncrasies of each local situation.

However, this initial success was short lived. In Riker's terminology, the PSD could be considered a "top heavy" coalition, in which the "political goods" were divided among an overwhelming majority, thus resulting in a meager share distribution to each participant.⁵⁸

The focal point was the party's nomination process for the gubernatorial elections scheduled for early 1947. The ala (wing) of the PSD sometimes termed "progressive," "youthful" or "rebel," led by Fernando de Melo Vianna came to Belo in July, 1946, bent on altering the party's traditional "top-down" organizational structure and decision-making procedures. Each ala presented its own candidate (Carlos Coimbra da Luz and José Francisco Bias Forte) and in the end a compromise "elder statesman," Wenceslaw Brás, was resurrected, and grudgingly accepted by the ala rebelde.⁵⁹ However, the traditional forces led by Valladares organized a "cloak room" majority and forced their original choice, Bias Forte, on the convention, with Valladares as the PSD candidate for Senator. In opposition, the ala rebelde bolted the convention and decided to support the UDN candidate, Milton Campos, who with additional support from the PR was eventually elected governor. As part of the bargain, Artur Bernardes Filho was the UDN/PR candidate and defeated Valladares for senator. Some of the dissident delegates to the PSD convention ran for state deputy under the UDN label in support of Campos, while others remained on the PSD slate but supported Campos in the state assembly after their election. The latter came to be termed the "PSU rebelde." In many municipalities the UDN had not been able to organize

a local party did reemerge during the 1945-46 period, but in some cases the PSD splinter group became increasingly dissident and formed the nucleus of the UDN organization.⁶⁰


Carpos' election was received with great euphoria among the long suffering "outs." After the crushing defeat of their presidential candidate a year earlier, the UDN was able to elect the governor and had a supporting coalition in the new state assembly. (See Figure 3.4 for a breakdown of the parties' proportions in the state assembly for this and subsequent elections.) During his abbreviated 46-month term (the new state constitution subsequently established a five-year term for future governors), Carpos' administration made a good start at reorganizing the state's efforts at economic and social development.

Shortly after the 1947 elections, Juscelino Kubitschek, began working from his position as federal deputy to attempt to reunite the PSD. An able bargainer and coalition builder, Kubitschek was able to attract many of the "dissidents" back to the party in time for the concurrent gubernatorial, legislative and presidential elections of 1950.

Serving as chefe de gabinete, federal deputy and mayor of Belo Horizonte during the Valladares period, Kubitschek had become a very astute politician, ably working out "accords" with local chefes throughout the state. So that, although both Bias Fortes and Valladares were actively seeking the party's nomination (the latter hoping for a Vargas-style comeback), Kubitschek had the main delegate strength and won handily, and without the crippling scism of 1947.⁶¹

The PR entered a coalition with the PSD in return for the vice-gubernatorial nomination, and the promise of several cabinet posts.⁶² The UDN was thus effectively isolated and nominated Gabriel Rezende

Figure 3.4: Percentage of Utilization in the State Assembly, by Party, From 1947 to 1970



Passos, a federal deputy who had also been a cabinet secretary during the valladares period but who had opposed the regime during the Estado Novo. The UDM was handicapped by Carpos' "political" stance during his administration, i.e., not using the governorship to repay prior, or accrue future, political obligations among inter or politicians.⁶³ Passos had the additional liability of the UDM's presidential candidate Brig Gomes, in his second attempt.

In contrast, Kubitschek appeared not to suffer from his party's running its own candidate against Getúlio Vargas at the national level;⁶⁴ winning easily and polling a 200,000 vote margin ahead of the three-way split of the presidential vote.

Kubitschek's 50-month abbreviated administration was marked by a "targets" program concentrating public investments in the areas of energy and transportation, aimed at sustaining the state's economic "take-off." With a majority coalition in the state assembly (which was increased in the 1954 elections), Kubitschek was able to project the program of his incumbency on the national level, a pique for the nomination for the presidency under the PSD label in 1955.

Having secured the nomination, Kubitschek resigned as Governor on March 31, 1955, to devote full time to his campaign. Thus the PR, which had participated in both the Carpos' and Kubitschek governments, was able to claim the governorship for a brief 10-month period. With the death of Artur Bernardes (the day before his party succeeded to the governorship), leadership was passed to his son Artur Bernardes Filho and Clóvis Salgado.

The 1955 election for governor reflected the development of the state's political parties during the first ten years of re-democratization.

Three parties now actively vied for the governorship.⁶⁵

The PTB, evolving from its minor status in 1947 with 8.9 percent of the state legislature, to 15 percent in 1955, now rivaled the UDB for third place. The PTB nominated its own candidate for governor, newly elected federal senator, Carlos Alberto Lúcio Bittencourt.

A virulent critic of both the valadarens and Kubitschek regimes, and UDB ideologue, João Bilac Pinto was his party's choice. During the last year of the Campos' administration, the UDB greatly enhanced its relative position, rivaling the PSD for the plurality position in the state assembly. With the advent of Kubitschek in the governor's palace, however, the party was reduced to third place status in the 1954 elections, being surpassed by the PR.

The PSD, in turn, retained its alliance with the PR, and nominated a coalition ticket: Bias Forte - Artur Bernardes Filho.

Much of the PTB's electoral strength accrued to the victorious PSD - PR candidates following Bittencourt's sudden death in an airplane crash during a late campaign tour in the northern part of the state.⁶⁶ Again the udenistas were the "outs."

The Bias Forte administration saw further gains by the PTB in the 1958 elections, and was to some extent overshadowed by Kubitschek's ambitious program of economic development and construction of Brasília at the national level.

These first 15 years of re-democratization embodied a gradual process of change from a predominant style of clientelistic politics (and in some areas, the land-based system of mutual dependency, i.e., coronelismo), to a growing importance of the new mass-based, urban, "populist" type political style. The transistor radio and in the late

1950 s, television had greatly enhanced the efficacy of a mass-political appeal to the electorate.

At the national level, the charismatic Jânio Quadros was waging a presidential campaign with a "step out corruption,"⁶⁷ while the UD used much the same theme in the concurrent campaign for the governorship. Inflation was beginning to be felt by the middle classes, in addition to the working class wage earner.

The "ins" nominated Tancredo Neves, Vargas' last Interior Minister, President of the Bank of Brazil under Kubitschek, and Finance Secretary in the final half of the Bias Forte administration.

The UD's candidate was José de Magalhães Pinto, wealthy banker, signator of the 1943 manifesto, Campos' Finance Secretary and four-term federal deputy. Pinto adeptly built a coalition including the PP and most of the minor parties, and was elected in October, 1960, by a comfortable majority.

Pinto's program was remarkably similar to that of Juscelino Kubitschek, in that he also concentrated heavy public investments in development projects and incentives for industrialization. This program was also quite thorough, (politically speaking), in that physical evidence of his administration's efforts (a new school, health post, etc.) was visible in nearly every one of the state's 722 MUNICIPALITIES. With Jânio Quadros' resignation in August, 1961, PTB vice-President and Vargas protégé, João Goulart was allowed to ascend to the presidency of a parliamentary system (with the defeated Tancredo Neves as prime minister), thus resolving Brazil's second severe constitutional crisis in less than six years.

Although Magalhães Pinto attempted to maintain normal relations with the Goulart government (which represented all the real and imagined evils his party had fought so long and just), federal state relations became increasingly strained in late 1963 and 1964. Both Pinto and Kubitschek (elected federal senator from Goiás in 1952) nurtured ambitions for the presidency in 1965, and both had a stake in maintaining the current system and open channels of succession.

The 1962 elections saw an increased (over 1958) plethora of electoral coalitions, and a radicalization of politics. The moderate or "positive" left was struggling to surmount Brazil's staggering inflation without jeopardizing the country's development efforts. While the "negative" left continued its attacks on both the Goulart government and its detractors from the center and right.⁶⁸

Pinto's efforts were very effective. For the first time during the post-1945 period, the UDN achieved a plurality in the state assembly, electing 32 percent of the 82 deputies, a large increase over their position in 1958. The coalition supporting Pinto in the assembly enjoyed a comfortable 60 percent majority.

The 1964 Revolution and its Consequences

Ambitions and strategies revolving around the 1965 presidential and gubernatorial elections were suddenly interrupted in April, 1964, when the government of João Goulart was overthrown and a military president, José Humberto Castelo Branco, installed. The ensuing purge removed the mandates and/or political rights of many politicians in Minas Gerais. Among the latter was Juscelino Kubitschek.

Magalhães Pinto was one of the three state governors who comprised

the main civilian component of the conspiracy, and actually struck the first blow as troops from Juiz de Fora moved down the mountains, advancing on Rio. Under the military government, Pinto still nurtured presidential ambitions (as did Carlos Lacerda, with governor of Guanabara). Thus, as the anti-inflation austerity program implanted by the new military government began to cause a mild recession which became unpopular with almost every class and sector of the state, Pinto became increasingly ambivalent vis a vis the national government.

This posture was particularly expedient for the UDN during the gubernatorial campaign of 1965, as the PSD attempted to identify the UDN with the military government's unpopular wage and credit policies.

Three of the front runners for the UDN nomination had been members of Pinto's cabinet—Oscar Dias Correia, and Jose Monteiro de Castro, both three-term federal deputies, and Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveira Rezende, who had never stood for elected office, but who had held various cabinet posts. Although Pinto imposed the nomination of Roberto Rezende on the convention, probably one of the other two aspirants would have been selected in an open convention, and made a better showing against the PSD.⁶⁹

Another asset accruing to the PSD was the considerable ground swell of sympathy for Kubitschek after being "unjustly" eliminated by the military government. His personal choice for the nomination was Sebastiao Paes de Almeida, wealthy Sao Paulo banker and businessman who had led the PSD federal deputy slate in 1962. Almeida was declared "inelegible" to run by the military government, because of alleged wholesale vote buying in 1962, but Kubitschek's second choice, Israel Pinheiro da Silva was accepted. Pinheiro, the son of a former governor, was a

three-ten federal deputy, the director of the construction of Brasília, and a long-time Kubitschek consultant who had also served in Valladares' cabinet during the 1930's.

Pinheiro was elected as was Francisco Negrão de Lima in Guanabara, another Kubitschek ally, and long-standing gineiro politician, such to the consternation of the udenistas and many landline military. The latter began pressuring President Castelo Branco to annul the elections, or at least thoroughly investigate the past histories of these two Kubitschek stand-ins.

Castelo Branco (who had previously promised that anyone duly elected would take office) responded by abolishing all political parties, and guaranteed the inauguration of all governors-elect.

Party reorganization moved quite slowly at first. The Branco government had been sustained in Congress by a loosely organized coalition aggregating the pro-revolution forces within the multi-party system, which was now used as the basis for the new pro-government party, ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional). The two governors elected in opposition to the military regime were expected to form the nucleus of the opposition party, the MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro).

Negrão de Lima joined the MDB, but Pinheiro surprised many (including his own party) by joining ARENA. There was a second consternation for the udenistas in Minas, the candidate who defeated the JCM in October (1965), enlisted in "their" pro-revolution party the following February.⁷⁰

The delicate mission of effecting political integration within the ARENA gineiro was personally delegated by Castelo Branco to two federal deputies of the largest ex-parties, Guilherme Machado (UDM) and Levído Ozanan Coelho, PSD. An elaborate set of political "criteria" were

established which structured integration within ARENA in terms of the composition of slates for the upcoming November, 1966, elections, prerogative of patronage and prestige at the municipal levels, and other political contingencies.⁷¹

The criteria notwithstanding, the ex-PSD bloc within the ARENA attained a wide plurality position in the 1966 elections for state deputy, to the detriment of the ex-UDM and the minor party groups. As in previous elections, the fortunes of the ex-PR closely paralleled those of the ex-PSD. (See Figure 3.4.)

The MDB was mainly organized around elements of the ex-PTB (although some petebistas joined the ARENA), plus some politicians from the other ex-parties. Although gaining a larger contingent of seats than two of the ARENA blocs, the MDB returned only 21.5 percent. During the ensuing Pinheiro administration many ex-UDM deputies were to complain that their MDB colleagues were more favorably treated (in terms of patronage and prestige) by the ARENA executive branch, than they were.

Pinheiro had joined the ARENA in hopes of protecting himself from potential intervention by the federal government, and enjoyed less than cordial relations with the national executive. Highly visible public works projects in the "ritmo de Brasília" (pace of Brasília [construction]), were undertaken, but with little support from the federal government and a diminished tax base, the administration floundered and development became constricted.

These problems became acute in 1968 and 1969 and discontentment widened, especially among the state bureaucracy whose wages were withheld, up to 12 months in some cases, in an effort to buy time and stave off fiscal chaos. In January, 1970, the national government brought decisive

pressure to resign and forced Pinheiro to "renovate" his cabinet (including Federal), approved technicians in the key posts of Finance and Security secretary, thus ending the governo do saudade (nostalgic cabinet).⁷²

Pinheiro was not considered one of its pre-1964 elite representation at the federal level in terms of the mesas of the Camera and Senate, party leadership, and the vice Presidency. Both Castelo Branco and his successor Artur Costa e Silva had mineiro vice-presidents, Jose Maria de Almeida and Pedro Aleixo, respectively. However, in December 1968, Costa e Silva closed the congress, and the following September suffered an incapacitating stroke. Aleixo was impeded by the military from assuming the presidency, and a new military president and vice-president installed two months later--Gen. Emilio G. Medici and Adm. Augusto Rademaker, respectively. When Medici reopened the congress in April, 1970, he chose two mineiros as ARENA national chairman and president of the Chamber of Deputies--Rondon Pacheco and Geraldo Freire da Silva, respectively. Both were from the ranks of the ex-JDN.

The 1967 constitution established the indirect election of governors by a majority vote of the state assembly, a task falling to ARENA in all states with the exception of Guanabara. To Pacheco, the national chairman, fell the difficult task of coordinating political consultation with the uneasy ARENA coalitions in each state to ascertain who should be the party's nominees in each situation. The field thus narrowed, the nominations were the prerogative of the party's national leader, i.e., President Medici, who by late July, 1970, completed his choices for the 21 states.

ARENA's nominee for Minas was the last chosen and there was great speculation, as candidates chosen in other states were divided among

technicians and politicians. The adentistas long suffering support and participation in ARE A was vindicated as Rondon Pacheco was the president's choice. The "cr terms" were maintained to the extent that ex-peseuista Celso Machado was the nominee for vice-governor.

The trend of electoral advantage in subsequent legislative elections accruing to the incumbent governor's party, as witnessed in 1962 and 1966, was again in evidence in the November, 1970, elections. However, this time the effect was attenuated by the fact that although Pacheco was "elected" by the state assembly in October, one month prior to the general elections, Pinheiro remained in office until March 15, 1971. These opposing influences operated to effect a slight decline and sharp increase in the ex-PSD and ex-DU respective proportions in the state assembly, resulting in approximate equality between the two factions.

Partisan aspirations among the more adentista were frustrated as Pacheco followed Médici's instructions for recruitment of technicians and politicians from an integrated ARE A. Pacheco's cabinet reflected this desire; of the eleven positions, eight were technicians, and three politicians--one each from the ex-DU, ex-PSD and ex-PR.

In the months following its inauguration, the new Pacheco government has found that recuperation of the state's finances and economic development efforts will be difficult tasks indeed--ones requiring both the skills of the young corps of technicians and close cooperation of the national government.

March also saw the first steps for the organization of a third political party in Brazil, the Partido Republicano Democrático (PRD). These efforts were being articulated by ex-vice-president, Pedro Aleixo

NOTES - CHAPTER 3

¹Under the Empire Brazil functioned with a unitary system of government. The emperor appointed the province (state) chief executives. In his discretion, he could also remove any "obedient" member and dissolve the national and state police and bodies, and by effectively using the centrally controlled judicial authorities in the various provinces, electoral majorities were systematically alternated between the Conservative and Liberal parties.

²Of the 12 presidents of Brazil from 1890 through 1930, 3 were mineiros and 4 were paulistas.

³See Figure 3.2 for the regional division of Minas Gerais used herein.

⁴Created in 1959, the Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE), is a federal agency of ministerial rank charged with the overall planning and coordination of the social and economic development of Brazil's Northeast.

⁵For a more thorough analysis of the economic geography of Minas Gerais, see Washington Albino, "Perspectivas Atuais da Economia Mineira," in Segundo Seminário de Estudos Mineiros pelo Horizonte (Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1966), pp. 100-111. See also the div. vol. study commissioned by the Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais, Diagnóstico da Economia Mineira (Belo Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, 1966). For a more political interpretation of the state's economy, see Aurilio Paulino Tada de, Reforma e Revolução: uma interpretação político-econômica da crise mineira (Belo Horizonte: Editora G. Italian, 1970).

⁶Hélio Lobo, A Revolução da República, Fernando Lobo (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1937), p. 37.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 40. Cesário Alvim was Deodoro's Minister of Interior.

¹⁰O Farol, August 2, 1890.

¹¹O Farol, August 17, 1890.

¹²O Farol, September 9, 1890.

¹³Ibid

¹⁴Lobo, op. cit., p. 51. This took the form of dismissals of public servants and the swift let on of "official" elements.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 61. Not or passed by the Constituent Assembly in Rio de Janeiro on January 12, 1891.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷The text of which was published in O Paiz, January 25, 1891.

¹⁸Lobo, op. cit., p. 66. Lobo states that only 200 out of 1,897 eligible in Juiz de Fora went to the polls.

¹⁹Jornal do Comércio, December 4 and 23, 1891.

²⁰Lobo, op. cit., p. 109.

²¹This is clearly seen in examining the deputies reelected to the II legislature, most were "mildly" dissident in 1890 at the convention in Juiz de Fora.

²²This transformation or divergence will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

²³Another reason for this "stabilization" was the intensive concentration of political and economic resources in the construction of Belo Horizonte. Perhaps this might be compared to the period sixty years later, when another mineiro based his economic and political program around the construction of a national capital.

²⁴Aires da Mata Machado Filho, "A vida e a política de Francisco Sales," RBEP, XVIII (January, 1965), 72.

²⁵Ibid., p. 120.

²⁶Francisco de Assis Barbosa, Jacselino Subitichet: uma revisão na Política Brasileira Rio de Janeiro: José Mafuso, 1960), p. 169.

²⁷João Camilo de Oliveira Torres, Estratificação social no Brasil (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1961), p. 107.

²⁸Barbosa, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

²⁹Machado Filho, op. cit., pp. 122-23.

³⁰Barbosa, op. cit., pp. 171-72.

³¹The word Tarasca means a marionette of a monstrous animal paraded during pentecostal celebrations in Tarasca and other cities in southern France," or more commonly a monster. Conto do Duende de Hollanda Ferreira and José Baptista de Luz, Fernando Dicionário das Lendas da Língua Portuguesa (10th ed., Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1961), p. 1147.

³²Levindo Coelho, "Depoimento de um velho político mineiro," RBEF, 2 (July, 1957), p. 20. Coelho retired from the federal Senate in 1954 after forty years of activity in mining politics. He was brought into the Tarasca as a substitute for Getul Soares in 1914, and as a permanent member with the death of the latter in 1924.

³³Barbosa, op. cit., p. 259.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Paulo Lora, Remanesce o estadista de Minas na República (São Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1964), p. 42.

³⁶Barbosa, op. cit., p. 255.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Daniel de Carvalho, "Cisões no P.R.M.," Diário de Notícias, March 15, 1959.

³⁹Machado Filho, op. cit., p. 127.

⁴⁰Interview with Assis Chateaubriand, cited in Barbosa, op. cit., p. 293, nn. 26.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 311.

⁴²A Gazeta, (São Paulo), September 9, 1925, cited in Barbosa, Ibid., p. 313, nn. 28.

⁴³There is some indication that a sizable proportion of middle echelon public servants were drawn from the intellectual ranks, and that certain of these were at times given to political action. See Cyro dos Anjos, O Aracajuense Belmiro Lisboa (Livros do Brasil, 1954).

⁴⁴Interview with Dnar Mendes Ferreira (Federal Deputy), Brasília, August 25, 1970, who was a law student and active participant, at the time, and indicated that the governor's son, Fábio, was also a participant. One of the newly elected council members was Pedro Alencar.

⁴⁵Manifesto issued by Artúlio Farias, May 30, 1930. Reprinted in Paulo Rogério Filho, Idéias e lutas de um burguês progressista o Partido Democrático e a Revolução de 1930 (São Paulo: Editora Arnenhof, 1958), Vol. II, 718-720.

⁴⁶With the 1930 Revolution, all legislative bodies were closed.

⁴⁷For Valladares' personal account of the episode, see Benedito Valladares Ribeiro, Tempos Idos e Vividos (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1966), pp. 37-59. For an account of this decision from the perspective of one of the two leading aspirants, Virgílio de Melo Franco, see Carolina Rebouço, A Vida de Virgílio de Melo

Franco (Rio de Janeiro, José Alípio, 1962, pp. 82-92. One of those "passed over" in 1943 was interim interventor, Gustavo Caponega, who had been secretary of finance in the Vargas government. Thirty-seven years later, the failures had "passed over" by his political party, in his bid for reelection at federal senator, the nomination and subsequent election being this time to Caparena.

⁴⁸For an account of the student agitations were handled during this period, see Valladares, op. cit., pp. 220-222. Certain veiled forms of protest were permitted, however. Among these were arguments before Juries, student meetings and debating societies and election of officers of the Minas branch of the Associação Brasileira dos Advogados (ABA). The "opposition" to the elected political system, candidacy of Milton Campos for president of the UG was very effective in mobilizing opinion among professional groups in the state.

⁴⁹For a full text of the manifesto and a list of the signators, see Paulo Amora, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

⁵⁰This is recorded in Valladares, op. cit., pp. 226-227. José Magalhães Pinto, for example, was forced to resign as president of the state chamber of commerce. Interview with José Magalhães Pinto, Rio de Janeiro, March 12, 1971.

⁵¹Five other minor parties also offered slates of candidates.

⁵²In 1939 and 1943, 99 and 28 (respectively) new municipalities were "emancipated," i.e., dismembered from existing municipalities. In recruiting persons for the new positions of appointed mayor, Valladares selected many seniors and recent graduates of the Belo law school and other faculties, who were political activists. This was quite effective in co-opting student leadership into the system and into positions at a distance from the state capital.

Confirmed in interviews with Leovindo O. Coelho, Belo Horizonte, January 12, 1971; and Uziel R. Alvim, Rio de Janeiro, March 11, 1971.

⁵³Valladares, op. cit., pp. 249-252.

⁵⁴See Appendix VII for a complete listing of those elected in the 1945 and subsequent cohorts.

⁵⁵Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 49.

⁵⁶Related by the director of the state public archives, Dr. João Gomes Teixeira, and his assistant, Dr. Francisco R. Andrade.

⁵⁷Írisio Batista de Oliveira, Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, was the first interventor named by his federal counterpart, José Linhares, who headed the caretaker government installed by the military after Vargas' ouster on October 29, 1945. His brief three-month tenure came to be known as the "governo dos magistrados," as the judiciary attempted to institute certain reforms while in control of the executive branch. Interview with Dr. Antônio Martins Vilas Boas, Brasília, August 23, 1970.

⁵⁸William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). For a discussion of the size principle and instability of overwinning majorities, see pp. 33-66.

⁵⁹A situation reminiscent of the selection of Dionário Maciel in 1930. Brás was a past state governor and president of Brazil (1910-1914). In 1947 he was 78 years old. Important activities and subsequent events were related in a number of interviews. Most notable were those with Leivado O. Coelho, Belo Horizonte, January 12, 1971; Manoel Costa, Belo Horizonte, July 27, 1971; and José Maria de Alkmim, Belo Horizonte, February 17, 1971.

⁶⁰This was the case in the município of Lavras as related in an interview with Dr. Sílvio Mamucucci, Lavras, June 6 and 7, 1970. For an active political discussion of these events of 1946 and 1947, see Nabuco, loc. cit., pp. 210-20.

⁶¹Bias Forte was subsequently named Vargas' Interior Minister in 1951, and Valladares elected federal senator in 1954.

⁶²Clóvis Salgado was the nominee for vice governor. In 1947 the "dissident" PSD group had received this slot in the person of José Ribeiro Pena.

⁶³Virgílio de Melo Franco foresaw this problem and resigned his position as UDN president in Minas because of his "divergent" and more fiercely partisan concept of how the political game had to be played, in contrast to Campos' "apolitical" style. Nabuco, loc. cit., pp. 219-20.

⁶⁴Christiano Monteiro Machado, also federal deputy with cabinet service during the Valladares epoch and pre-1933 regimes.

⁶⁵For a more ample discussion of the evolution of the state's party system, see Orlando H. Carvalho, "Os partidos políticos em Minas Gerais," in *Segundo Seminário de Estudos Mineiros* (Belo Horizonte: Ed. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 1956), pp. 23-42.

⁶⁶This occurred near Pedra Azul on September 9, 1955.

⁶⁷His campaign symbol was a broom he carried with him at most rallies.

⁶⁸The terms "positive" and "negative" left were first used by Prime Minister Francisco Clementino Santiago Dentas. Cited in Skidmore, op. cit., p. 218, n. 23. For a more extensive discussion of these terms and their meaning in the Brazilian context, see Hélio Jaguaribe, "Brazilian Nationalism and the Dynamics of its Political Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 2:4 (1966), 65.

⁶⁹Interviews with José Monteiro de Castro, Belo Horizonte, November 24, 1970, and Oscar Dias Corrêa, Rio de Janeiro, March 11 and 12, 1971.

⁷⁰In their interviews ex-combatants consistently referred to ARETA as an extension of the D and the C that they were the "authentic" members of the new pro-revolution party.

⁷¹Interview with Leonardo L. Coelho, Belo Horizonte, January 12, 1971. In 1966 the PSD demanded the stringent set of "criteria" to protect state against the ~~transfer~~ over power of the governorship. However, in 1970, with one of "bureaus" chosen as governor-elect and with an improved position in the state assembly, the PSD conveniently "forgot" that any criteria had ever existed when the ex-PSD mentioned updating or revising them to fit the new circumstances.

⁷²This termed because various secretaries were durable politicians who had held cabinet positions in pre-1967 governments, as had Práximo. Minas was the last state to feel such federal pressure, e.g., the last state to receive a federally sanctioned army colonel as Public Safety Secretary.

PART II

LEGISLATIVE RECRUITMENT

CHAPTER 4

THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY (PRE-1945)

In this part recruitment to state wide legislative office will be examined. During the First Republic period, four state wide offices existed: state deputy and senator, and federal deputy and senator. Tenure data was collected for the state legislature during this period, but scant biographical and political career data were available. Therefore, only turnover data for the state legislature will be presented later in this chapter, for comparative purposes.

In that the federal senators served six and nine year terms and were considerably fewer in number, this chapter will concentrate on office of federal deputy.

The Constituent Assembly met in Rio in November, 1890, to draw up the Republican Constitution. When this task was completed on February 26, 1891, the Congress transformed itself into the first regular congress of the Republic.¹ In this capacity it reconvened on June 15, 1891, with the substitution of five deputies in the original *bançada direita*. Thus the first regular three-year term was completed on September 26, 1893. Although this first legislature actually had a longer term, it will be considered a three-year term to simplify the analysis. The regular three year term continued through 1930, so that when the October revolution occurred the fourteenth legislature had been in session only six months. The national constituent Assembly reconvened on November 15, 1931, and

rendered a new constitution the following year. New elections were held in 1935 for a legislature which subsequently was closed two years later with the advent of the Estado Novo. These latter two legislatures (the 1934 Constituent Assembly and the 1935 legislature) will be termed the fifteenth and sixteenth legislatures, respectively. The latter may be considered a transitional period, and are appended to the pre-1930 period for the purpose of comparison, and in the following chapter will be linked to the post-1945 period.

Roman numerals will henceforth be used to denote the sixteen legislative terms in the following fashion:

I	1890-1893	IX	1915-1917
II	1894-1896	X	1918-1920
III	1897-1899	XI	1921-1923
IV	1900-1902	XII	1924-1926
V	1903-1905	XIII	1927-1929
VI	1906-1908	XIV	1930
VII	1909-1911	XV	1933-1935
VIII	1912-1914	XVI	1935-1937

Occupation

Occupational distributions for the 16 legislatures are detailed in Table 4.1.² The proportions for agriculture, finance and banking, and industry and commerce are minimal throughout the full period. The latter group exceeds the overall mean, however, in the XIII, XV and XVI legislatures.

The legal professions³ were noted as the most numerous group except for the II, III, and VIII legislatures, and after the XIII legislature,

Table 4.3. Prices and quantities, by region, 1990-95
 Federal Reserve, 1997-98, Table 4.3.1 (continued)

Description	1990-95															
	Q	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Q	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Q	1990
Industry and Commerce	1.0	8.1	8.1	7.1	7.6	8.2	7.8	0.0	2.2	2.6	3.2	3.7	3.7	4.1	0.0	0.0
Agribus' share	7.5	7.8	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.4	8.6	2.9	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
gov. & professionals	40.8	40.7	40.7	41.4	42.1	43.0	43.0	86.7	86.8	87.1	87.4	87.8	88.0	88.1	88.1	88.1
teachers	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
other professionals	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0	33.0
Gov. Fed. & all other	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
prices and exchange	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
index (1990=100)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Reallocation	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

When this were surpassed by deputies from other professions.⁴ The ascendancy of these other professions in 1927 can be seen as a significant change, because the legal professions in particular are often seen as important to political career development, both in terms of pre-career political socialization and regards bringing "law-making" skills to the legislative arena.⁵

Teachers became a sizable proportion of the bancada in the 1921-1930 period, and paralleled the trend of the other professionals.

As may be recalled from Chapter 3, Artur Bernardes and the "renovators" attempted to curtail recruitment from the bureaucracy in an attempt to break the mutual support arrangement operating within the compromisso coronelista. This seems to have had an effect on the above trends, and on the decrease in the proportion of public servants elected to the Câmara after 1918; i.e., after quite high proportions in the 1906-1918 period. This will be seen more clearly in the cohort analysis below.

An examination of some recruitment variables in Table 4.2 shows that deputies who were in finance and banking, and who came from the bureaucracy began their political careers at the earliest ages, with the professionals, and industry and commerce groups being somewhat older. Teachers and those from legal professions had the "longest" pre-Câmara political careers, in terms of a combination of number of positions held and length of pre-career. Deputies from the bureaucracy had "long" pre-careers in terms of number of positions, but careers that were "short" in duration, and entered the Câmara at the earliest mean age of any group.

Deputies from the agricultural group entered the Câmara at significantly older ages. This was probably due to a career pattern of

Table 4.2 Principal Occupation vs. Age at First Position, Career Time, Number of Positions Held, Age at Career Entry, Education, Family Size, and Geographic Mobility.
Federal Deputies (1892-1937, years and percents)

Occupation	n	Age at First Position	Pre-CO Career Time	No. of Positions Held	Age at Career Entry	Years of Education	Family Size	% of Career Mobility
Industry and Commerce	31	28.34	5.8	2.83	41.4	14.9	3.8	2.3
Agriculture	11	16.10	1.43	1.20	13.60	5.3	3.8	3.8
Legal Professions	14	20.07	12.36	1.20	28.69	16.4	3.8	10.0
Teachers	19	21.90	6.84	2.72	38.87	15.0	4.2	7.4
Other Professions	67	27.43	0.99	1.1	41.60	22.1	4.8	3.4
Lower Public Services	9	23.75	9.44	1.56	34.39	88.9	37.3	10.0
Finance and Banking	6	17.00	9.33	1.50	39.00	10.0	0.9	7.0
Average for all Federal Deputies		26.87	11.6	2.50	40.70	85.8	32.6	37
(n)	209	144	1923	1,14	67	181	69	100

establishing oneself occupationally, prior to recruitment into politics, or a lateral movement. This might have been the case with the professionals and those in industry and commerce.

Regionalism

As discussed in Chapter 5, Minas Gerais provides a model for regional analysis.⁶ In terms of representation, the state was divided into 12 multi-member election districts for the II through V legislature, and into 7 districts through 1930.⁷ From 1933 through the present, deputies are elected state wide with a proportional representation system.

District of first election provides the operational basis for determining region of political support in Table 4.3. In certain cases deputies were temporarily "switched" by the party executive committee to accommodate certain regional chiefs, and "stood" for election in districts completely alien to them, subsequently returning to stand in the district encompassing their home base area.

The Mata, Metalingica and South account for the large bulk of the state's population and economic resources, but during the first republic, the proportions were changing. The Metalingica region, which received the impetus of the new state capital (inaugurated in 1898), and the growing siderurgical industry after the turn of the century, had the highest percentage representation, except for the XII and XIII legislatures. The Mata's representation was fairly consistent, while the South exhibited an early decline and posterior increase after the XIII legislature.

Region of political support is not a wholly adequate variable to analyze regional recruitment patterns, in that it tends to be an

Table 4.3 - Region of Political Interest, by sex, state, County, 1980-1997 (in percent)

Region	Male								Female									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16		
North	2.1	0.4	17.6	16.2	7.5	18.0	9.5	10.5	5.1	5.7	3	8.1	8	8	4.3	7.6		
Southwest	4.8	5	3.3	4.7	7.5	7.5	7.4	8	5	8.7	4.5	2.0		0.7	2	16		
West Coast	3.4	7.6	6.0	4.7	6.9	8.0	7.4	7.8	4	7.2	7.4	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	0	
Midwest	4.3	10.5	12.5	18.5	17.5	17.5	18.8	16.3	11.5	11.1	14.4	16.7	10.4	7.0	15.3	10.0		
Southcentral	18.8	15.6	18.0	30.2	17.8	12.1	13.5	18.8	18.2	16.7	19	16.7	11.0	13.7	9.3	16.4		
South	23.8	11.0	12.2	14.0	7.6	7.4	11.1	10.4	11.7	7.6	9.5	8.9	11.3	11.7	11.7			
West	1.9	10.4	7.8	7.5	11.0	7.5	4.0	2.8	4	6.4	7	8.1	2.7	2.7	6.7	5.7		
Midwest	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	6.8	2.8	1.4	2.2	2.4	0.0	2.7	1.7	0.0	0.0		
Region not known	7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0		
By State	10.0	100.0	00.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
TOTAL, 19	67	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	

ex post facto situation, (i.e., posterior to the pre-Câmara career in this case), and an arbitrary apportionment rigidly set by district boundaries and manipulated by the PRM executive committee. Taken together with the variable region of birth, it may yield more valuable insights in terms of the geographic mobility of politicians of the period. This will be done below by cohort.

The two sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas of the north and Jequitinhonha remained fairly stable in their proportions of the bancada, after the former's decline in the 1st legislature. These two regions were represented by deputies who entered politics at significantly older ages, some six years above the mean, as is seen in Table 4.4. Deputies from the Mata and Triângulo tended to enter politics at earlier ages. The pre-Câmara career "length" differentials had smaller variables by region than by occupation; however, the variance of age at Câmara entry was greater by region than by occupation. Deputies from the Rio Doce, Jequitinhonha and West entered the Câmara at older mean ages, but those from the North (who tended to enter politics some six years above the mean), entered the Câmara three years below the mean, thus indicating a higher proportion with little or no prior political career.

Institutionalization

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 summarize changes over time for seven variables related to the recruitment process, by legislature and cohort group, respectively.

Examination of changes in current mean age of legislatures can begin to illuminate certain trends in the recruitment process. Although there was a very high turnover (56.7) in the 11 legislature, the positive

Table 4.4--Region of Political Support vs. Age at First Position, Career Time, Number of Pre-positions, Age at Career Entry, Education, Family Ties, and Geographic Mobility
Federal Deputies 1800-1907 (Means and Percentages)

Region	N	Age at First Position	Pre-C. B. Career Time	No. of Pre-C. B. Positions	Age at Career Entry	Elementary Education	High School	College
North	188	32.13	1.77	2.2	37.78	66.7	23.3	29.0
Southwest	91	33.14	1.76	2.1	44.66	72.0	59.2	30.3
Midwest	71	29.80	1.29	1.14	46.33	57.2	50.7	47.9
West	158	24.06	1.92	1.98	40.89	72.4	44.4	16.4
Southwest	171	26.22	1.35	1.49	38.68	64.9	44.0	11.0
South	146	28.38	0.76	1.54	40.25	71.8	53.1	31.0
West	114	27.35	2.87	1.13	44.68	87.4	30.7	20.9
Triangle	15	24.20	1.40	1.60	41.00	80.0	60.0	40.0
Mean for all Federal Deputies		26.11	1.54	1.50	40.70	69.9	51.8	37.0
(N)	232	145	214	226	1679	2230	1230	420

Table 4.8--Summary of Changes over Time by Legislature,
Federal Statutes, 1980-1997 (Counts and Percentages)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Annual Total Revisions^a Percent	20.00	20.50	18.10	27.20	14.42	28.40	17.48	27.50	20.70	28.78	29.20	29.30	27.50	20.00	18.87	27.00		
Repealing Conser- vative Changes	4.87	5.37	3.27	9.00	2.50	4.80	3.90	3.84	2.97	3.20	3.40	4.24	3.50	2.77	3.4	5.20		
No. of pro-Conservative Provisions Added	1.80	1.57	1.00	2.00	1.40	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.07	0.7	1.40	1.00	1.20	1.00	1.00	2.40		
Current Age	39.00	42.20	46.18	50.00	53.30	56.00	57.50	58.00	58.80	59.00	59.44	60.00	60.2	60.50	61.0	61.00		
% with Deferral by Extension	85.0	79	76.8	71.4	70.0	70.8	69.4	70.4	67.8	68	66.5	68.2	65.2	60	55.0	67		
% with Deferral by Emergency Clause	13.4	16.0	19.3	27.4	20.7	20.1	20.2	24.9	26.0	27.2	27.4	30	33.4	30.0	33.2	34.0		
% with Deferral by Noting	21.6	23.0	41.0	34	30.0	30.1	30.1	35.6	30.5	30.4	47.2	44.1	41.2	30.2	31.0	30.4		

Table A.6—Summary of Stamp year class, by cohort.
Federal Depository, 1890-1917 (Income and percentage)^a

	1890		1891		1892		1893		1894		1895		1896		1897		Total 1890- 1917
	C	%	C	%	C	%	C	%	C	%	C	%	C	%	C	%	
Age at first declear position	38.08	37.67	34.59	34.65	33.74	34.64	34.28	32.58	34.27	32.52	35.89	32.78	32.58	35.77	35.52	34.54	34.54
Age-Classes (years from 1890)	4.57	4.18	5.59	5.17	6.15	6.07	6.59	7.00	7.50	7.91	8.50	9.00	9.50	10.00	10.50	11.00	11
No. of pre-declar- ing classes	1.42	.37	2.33	1.74	3.28	3.00	4.20	3.50	5.00	4.57	6.29	5.78	6.74	7.71	8.71	9.71	10
Age at first class entry	39.08	37.88	35.00	35.45	35.28	35.85	36.58	38.00	38.80	40.00	41.80	42.77	43.43	44.23	45.67	47.07	45.7
Length in service position	38.0	37.8	38.0	37.7	38.4	37.7	38.0	37.3	38.5	37.7	38.0	37.6	37.9	38.1	38.7	39.7	38.8
Length of full- service	34.8	34.4	35.0	34.4	33.9	34.1	33.8	33.4	33.8	33.4	34.1	33.8	33.7	33.9	34.5	35.5	34.8
Length in highest position	25.2	25.4	25.0	25.4	25.4	25.5	25.0	24.8	25.1	24.7	25.3	25.1	25.0	25.1	25.2	25.5	25

^a Columns 13 and 15C are blank and due to a re-computed mean.

change in mean age indicates that the ages of the new deputies closely paralleled those outgoing deputies they replaced. Had this trend continued into legislature .II, a mean age near 47.00 would have been expected. But as Table 4.5 demonstrates, a negative change occurred. The cause of this change is found in the III cohort (Table 4.6), which exhibited the lowest mean age at Câmara entry of any cohort--32.00 years. This portends things to come.

The prior political careers of both legislatures and cohorts I through III, did not change greatly. However, a drastic change occurs in the IV cohort. New deputies entering the Câmara in 1900 were recruited from prior political careers of double the length, and nearly double the number of positions, relative to cohort III. This is a sudden change to recruitment from among a cadre of politicians who have done longer political apprenticeships, come up through the ranks (sargentado), and had more institutionalized political careers.

Examination of these cohorts by occupation in Table 4.7, shows an increase in the proportions of legal professions, public servants, and teachers, at the expense of the other professions in cohorts III and IV.

The Role of the P.R.M. and Coronelismo

This institutionalization of recruitment seems to have resulted from the establishment of the state's dominant and single party, the Partido Republicano Mineiro (P.R.M.), in 1890. Among those present at the conclave in the new state capital to establish the new party grouping were Elias Fortes, Francisco Bressane, Bernardo Pinto Monteiro, Julião Bueno Brandão, Delfim Moreira, Wenceslau Brás, Silviano Brandão, Francisco Sales, Henrique Diniz and Francisco Ferreira Alves.⁸

Table 4.3—Industry/occupation description, by sector
 Federal Government (1990-1992) (in percent)*

Description	Sector														Total N=25	
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14		
Industry and Commerce	7.9	3.0	0.0	5.9	0.0	9.1	10.1	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	17.5	7.1	1.9	16.7	6.6
Agri/cul/fore	7.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.9
Health Professions	40.0	20.0	40.0	42.9	50.4	36.3	40.0	20.0	41.7	25.0	20.0	25.0	44.5	3.0	18.7	4.0
Teachers	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	1.0
Other Professionals	30.0	50.0	40.0	17.5	0.0	27.3	40.0	40.0	41.7	27.5	25.0	2.5	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Health Services	7.9	0.0	1.3	1.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Arts and Entert.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
NOTE: (a)	400	300	350	275	275	400	250	250	400	300	400	400	400	250	250	400
In caption to Table 4.1	12	12	120	120	12	120	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12

* Columns 01 through 14 are unrounded data; all are percentages.

The P R M became the most important recruitment structure throughout the first republic, with its elite Comissão Executiva, or Tarasca as it was commonly called,⁹ functioning as a select party council or caucus for electing candidates. It was an "official slate" chosen within the Tarasca. Lyndeo Coelho describes the process for us:

The committee met initially in the Palace [de Liberdade] with the President of the state. The chief of the government, who was also a member of the P R M, would suggest the number or names of the candidates. The President was careful, in choosing the names of political candidates in the state, to organize a list of these names and, in the meeting he analyzed them one by one, taking into account not only their political value, but especially their experience, level of education [culture], moral qualities, services rendered, and activities accomplished for the real public good. Then members of the executive committee would leave and meet again at the party headquarters, where they proceeded to make an exacting evaluation of the indicated names, and to elect candidates for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Deputies were chosen, almost unanimously. The minutes of the meeting and the names of the candidates could then be published in the P R M newspaper, the Diário de Minas.¹⁰

For all practical purposes three men dominated the Tarasca during its first twenty years: Sylviano Brandão, Bias Fortes and Francisco Sales. In discussing the difference between doutores and coronéis during the period, Francisco de Assis Barbosa describes the latter three as typical representatives of political coronelismo.¹¹ Joao Camillo de Oliveira Torres conceptualized coronelismo as a "political system dominated by a mutual obligation relationship between decadent private power and strengthened public power."¹²

The compromissos coronelista functioned in the following manner: "the President of the state attended the requests for appointments to the bureaucracy or for state forces from the local chiefs--and the latter made [sic] the elections in accordance with the chief executive."¹³

Torres provides further insight as to how the recruitment of politicians, to both appointed and elected positions, was distributed among the various P.R.M. factions by the Tarascos:

given an electoral law of five deputies per district [after 1906], the following scheme was adopted: some candidates, men of the land, combatants of the local political chiefs represented the regional interests-- while others, indicated by the government men of letters and culture, but without local electoral prestige made up the slates.¹⁴

Thus, it is observed that certain politicians with excellent professional and intellectual qualifications, but no political base or traditional social backgrounds (except for service in the bureaucracy) such as João Pandiá Calógeras, David Campista, Carlos Peixoto, Afrânio de Melo Franco and Gastão da Cunha, were recruited into the state assembly and federal Câmara directly and at very early ages. In this manner the intellectual leaders of the bancada mineira were able to dominate the Câmara in Rio, in 1901, the President of the Câmara was a mineiro throughout the entire First Republic, and mineiros chaired many of the important committees.¹⁵

Although these intellectuals served the state well in the national Legislature, as state cabinet secretaries, and even as federal ministers, they were never chosen as governor. Gontijo de Carvalho laments the specific case of David Campista:

In 1909, Rui Barbosa, in a letter to Afonso Pena, said of David Campista only, "a young man of talent and future," without the "experience, maturity, authority" to exercise the functions of President. To support this, he argued that his [Campista's] last election was not liquid [sic] and was recognized by the Câmara with some difficulty.

Adopting this criterion, any country coronel, a credential in Brazil, would be greater than Pandiá Calógeras and Carlos Peixoto, always elected with difficulty. Francisco Campos, the finest of our jurists, was defeated in his own home town, when he ran extra chapa for a seat as federal deputy.¹⁶

Education--The Hallmark of the Elite

As seen in the above discussion of selection criteria, formal education was an important background variable during this period, as 85.8% of the deputies with known data had completed a university degree. Comparing Tables 7.2 and 4.7, level of educational achievement is found to vary more by occupation than by region, as might be expected. Over time, deputies with university educations appear in higher proportions after the X legislature (Table 4.5). However, the proportions by cohort (Table 4.6) fluctuate to a greater extent, but tend to decrease from the VIII to the XI cohorts.

Political Family Ties

In a previous study, this variable was found to contribute significantly to the explained variance (in the multiple regression equation) in age at Câmara entry for deputies with no prior political career.¹⁷ This indicates that having ties with important political families helped accelerate one's political career towards the position of deputy, especially when the career route was more direct and non-institutionalized. By occupation (Table 4.2) agriculture, and finance and banking show the lowest proportions, while legal professions and teachers, the highest. Regionally, the North and West have the lowest degree of family ties, and the Rio Doce, Triangle, and Jequitinhonha, the highest, (Table 4.4)

At the município level the principal structure involved in the selection process was the extended kin group. Usually each município had two or more party factions organized around rival local families.¹⁸

The P R M usually remained aloof from such competition and after each local election accepted the winning family group as the "official" party faction, a *situação local*. Thus the selection of local officials was performed by the local family faction currently in control of the *situação*, and that of state civil servants for posts in the *município* was formalized by the appropriate cabinet secretariat in Belo Horizonte, with the approval of the local chief.

The extended regional family even played a substantial role in the recruitment to the central bureaucracy in the state capital. Using data compiled by Cid Rabelo Horta on the period's most important political families,¹⁹ Moema Miranda de Siqueira catalogued 87 derivative kin groups. Of the 584 public functionaries residing in Belo Horizonte in 1900, 38% were identified with the above political family lines. By 1913 the proportion had decreased to 21% of 4,096,²⁰ which perhaps indicates the declining role of the family in recruitment to the bureaucracy in the state capital.

Geographic Mobility

As discussed above, this is a way of refining the analysis of regionalism. Geographic mobility is defined as being born in a region (or state) different from that where the individual's political base of support was finally established. Finance and banking, public servants and teachers appear as the most mobile in Table 4.2. This is as it might be expected, as opportunities in these professions are often available to those willing to accept inter-regional migration. By comparison, agriculture, and industry and commerce tend to be somewhat more localized.

In a more precise analysis of the mobility phenomenon over time, Table 4.8 compares region of birth with region of political support, by cohort. By subtracting the percent of the cohort born in the region from the percent with political support in the same region, the regions may be compared in terms of "inflows" and "outflows" of future deputies. A positive percent indicates that more deputies (in that cohort) have made their political base in the region than were born there, and thus the region may be called an "importer" or "attractor" of political aspirants. A negative percent indicates that the reverse is true, and the region may be called an "exporter" of future deputies who will make their political base in other regions.

The sparsely populated and underdeveloped regions of the North and Jequitinhonha, although varying somewhat, tended to be exporters, as was the Rio Doce area. The Triangle, being an area of colonization and development during this period was only intermittently represented in the Câmara, but when it was, the region was an importer. The west, having been colonized and developed at an earlier stage, was also sparsely represented, and tended to alternate the exporter and importer roles.

The most interesting changes involved the three most populated and developed regions. Once the new capital and mining activities were established (after the III cohort), the Metalúrgica was a consistent and large net importer of future deputies. The Mata became less attractive after the II cohort, when the capital was moved to Belo Horizonte, and became an exporter until 1915, when Artur Bernardes became governor. From the X cohort on it became an importer.

Table 4.8—Inter-regional Migration, Net by ethnic group, 1980-1991^a

Region	Net Migration													
	1980-84	1985-89	1990-91	1980-91	1980-84	1985-89	1990-91	1980-91	1980-84	1985-89	1990-91	1980-91	1980-84	1985-89
North	+0	(3.1)	+3.1	+6.1	+7.7	+8.8	(22.2)	+3.1	+4	+8	+7.7	0.0	3.9	3.4
West Midlands	+0.0	(0.0)	1.0	+5.3	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Midlands	-0.2	+4.8	+4	0.0	7.7	0.0	+0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	+3.0
East	+7.3	+16.7	3	0.0	0.0	+7.3	3.1	3.2	1.2	+17.3	+10.0	+11.5	+2.8	+3.8
West of England	+0.2	5.8	+20.8	+15.8	+15.4	+27.1	+20.0	+16.7	+1.7	+8.2	+7.9	+20.0	+7.8	+7.2
London	5.0	7.1	3.8	5.2	7.7	(20.9)	-2.2	10.0	-1.7	48.1	+15.1	0.0	+28.4	3.8
East of England	+7.7	7	+6.8	+6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	+7.7	0.0	7.8	3.4
Yorkshire	0.0	+6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	+6.0	0.0	+6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

^a - Note that:
 +0 = a net inflow of migrants from an ethnic region.
 -0 = a net outflow of migrants to other regions.
 0.00 = zero, unless given as not null.
 * * = migration and net outflow are both 0.0

-Signs in all are all are given due to data rounding.

The case of the South is also interesting. A densely populated and productive agricultural region, the South seems to have produced more deputies than any other region (20% born in the region), but the local opportunity structure was not able to offer careers to all its political aspirants. Also, the region's economy and proximity to the universities in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro probably facilitated achievements in those areas, thus favoring the acquisition of the preferred background characteristics. Both the South and the Mata regions were well represented on the P.R.M. Tarasca.

Turnover and Cohort Longevity

Turnover of legislators was briefly discussed above in connection with institutionalization. Figure 4.1 plots the rates of turnover for federal deputies, and state deputies and senators over time. While elections for federal deputy were held every three years, state legislative elections were held every four years; the full Câmara and half the Senate standing for every election. Thus, these three elections coincided only at twelve-year intervals, 1902, 1914, and 1926, (remembering that legislators took office the year following elections).

The eight-year term of state senators notwithstanding, turnover rates for the three groups are remarkably parallel, with the exception of the X federal legislature, elected in 1917, and the federal legislature elected in 1935. The latter should not be compared to its state counterpart which was only the first post 1930 election at the state level.

Figure 4 1--Turnover of Legislators, by Legislature, 1894-1935
 Turnover = percent of new legislators elected per term.



Despite the differentials of size, district boundaries, and election year, turnover rates were quite parallel over time, which indicates that the causes were having a very even-handed effect on the recruitment process within the P.R.M. Executive Committee during the period. The I, III, and V cohorts present the most continuous and sustained longevity in the Federal Câmara, as is seen in Table 4.9.


The durability of the cohort groups can also be expressed in a manner similar to the way physicists calculate the durability of radiation in radioactive isotopes, in "half-lives."²¹ Figure 4.2 plots the "third-lives" of the cohorts in terms of legislative terms served, (i.e., the number of terms elapsed until only one-third of the original cohort remains).

The close parallel among the three groups in terms of turnover might be expected in a dominant one-party situation, with recruitment centralized in the party executive committee, but the cohort longevity figures are quite unexpected. Although the parallel is not as close as with turnover, the longevity plots by cohort for the three legislative groups are quite similar. This excepting the large aberration of the VI and VII federal cohorts. This means both turnover rates over time and legislative career patterns had very even-handed effects on the cohorts' longevity in all three groups. This might mean that the opportunity structures of the three positions were closely interrelated. If political career data were available for the state legislators, verification of such a comparative hypothesis would be possible.

Table 4-9- Percent of Cohorts Reentering at Successive Legislatures Federal Deposit Ins. 1850-1937

Legislature of First Election	Legislative Intervals in which reentered after 1 st legislature															Cohort's initial number
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
I	41	24	27	12	10	12	12	7	6	6	2	2	0	0	0	42
II	48	32	18	9	14	9	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0		22
III	54	47	23	27	23	13	33	13	7	7	7	13	0			15
IV	58	42	24	14	11		0	0	11	3	11	7				19
V	64	46	36	37	23	23	23	15	15	8	8					13
VI	82	64	55	55	35	35	18	0	0	0						11
VII	80	60	50	40	20	20	10	20	20							10
VIII	50	37	0	0	0	0	5	5								5
IX	61	38	38	22	14	15	8									13
X	45	35	27	18	9	0										11
XI	85	72	35	0	7											14
XII	100	0	0	0												2
XIII	72	43	23													7
XIV	18	24														17
XV	45															19

Figure 4 2--Legislative Longevity, in terms of "third-terms,"
by cohort (1890-1930)



Career Advancement Patterns

Political career sequences prior to entering the Câmara are diagrammed in Figure 4.3 for the Embalsam Period. For those known to have held prior offices, 46 percent frequently held "portal" positions--state legislature, state bureaucracy, and state cabinet, in that order. Considerable circulation is noted between the state legislature and bureaucracy, state and federal bureaucracies, and the municipal executive and state legislature. It is apparent that some followed a straight elective route--vereador, mayor, state legislator, and federal deputy, others, a straight bureaucratic route--municipal, state and federal bureaucracies, and then federal deputy, while others followed an alternating route--municipal bureaucracy, mayor, state legislature, state bureaucracy, state cabinet, and federal deputy, for example. Theoretically, this alternating career pattern would be more in line with the compromisso coronelista discussed above, whereby the political aspirant negotiates future electoral support with the regional chiefs while currently occupying an administrative position within the state bureaucracy or cabinet.²²

The importance of the state legislature and bureaucracy for pre-Câmara careers during this period is seen in Table 4.10, together they constitute nearly one half of the total positions held by future deputies, while positions in local government total about one third.

Figure 4-3- Career Advancement Patterns, Federal Deputies, 1970-1972 (Continued) (Percentages)




Table 4.10--Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming
Federal Deputy, 1890-1937 (N=241)

Positions	Positions held		% of Federal Deputies
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	47	8.3	19.5
State Legislature	141	24.9	58.4
State Cabinet	45	8.0	18.7
State Bureaucracy	131	23.1	54.2
Mayor or Vice Mayor	61	10.8	25.3
Veredior	43	7.6	17.8
Municipal Bureaucracy	80	14.1	33.2
National Legislature (pre-1889)	18	3.2	5.0
No Prior Office	(28)	---	11.6
Prior Career Not Known	(24)	---	10.0
Total (%)	---	100.0	---
TOTAL (N)	(560)	(560)	(241)

Mean Number of positions held = 2.58

Summary

Perhaps the most interesting finding presented in this chapter concerned the evidence of recruitment of federal deputies from more institutional political careers from 1900 on. This was seen as an effect of the P.R.M. and particularly the Tupac Katari taking control of the process.

Data on occupation over time, evidenced the effect of Raúl Bernardes short lived "renovation" during the 1918-24 period when attempts were made to curtail recruitment from the bureaucracy, thus breaking the cycle of the compromisso coronelista.

Changes in the state's regional economy were reflected in the data on inter-regional geographic mobility of future federal deputies. The attraction of the Metalúrgica region after 1900, migration from the South, and fluctuations in the Mata were the most significant.

Both a university education and political family ties were found related to early entry into politics and to the Câmara.

The positions of mayor and the local bureaucracy were the most frequently held initial positions by future deputies. The state bureaucracy and legislature were the most frequent portals to Câmara entry. Circulation between the latter was noted as further evidence of the functioning of the compromisso coronelista.

Finally, the consistent role of the P.R.M. in recruitment to state-wide legislative office was reflected in the remarkably parallel turnover rates for the three groups of legislators.

NOTES--CHAPTER 4

¹By virtue of Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the Dispositivos Transitorios of the Constitution (Branches, op. cit.,

²Many deputies had multiple occupations. Table 4.1 reports principal occupation, in terms of economic livelihood. Thus, a deputy who was a "teacher" but whose main activity had been normal school teaching was coded a "teacher."

Missing data is observed to increase from the XI through the XIV Legislatures (as it did for other variables). This is because there are no bibliographic reference works available for the 1918-30 (post-Abranches) period. Percentages are calculated for "total known" to standardize comparison within and among elite groups with varying degrees of missing data.

³For example, lawyers, judges and prosecutors.

⁴For example, engineers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, etc.

⁵See especially Heinz Eulau and John Sprague, Lawyers in Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964); Schlesinger, "Lawyers in Politics," Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, 6, 70-79, 91-98; and Matthews, The Social Background of, 30-32.

⁶See Figure 5.2.

⁷See Appendices IIA and IIB, respectively. In addition to the changed district boundaries, it is interesting to note that various regional "poles" were maintained as district capitals, e.g., Leopoldina, Barbacena and Uberaba (while in the South, for example, the centers changed from Beaufort and Camama to Lavras and Pouso Alegre). It is also noted that the South and the data always had the largest representation in the Camera (through 1930).

⁸Levindo Coelho, op. cit., 116-117.

⁹The word Tarasca means "a mannequin of a monstrous animal paraded during pentecostal celebrations in Tarascon and other cities in southern France," or more commonly, a monster. Aurélio Buarque de Hollanda Ferreira and José Baptista da Luz, Pequeno Dicionário Brasileiro da Língua Portuguesa (10th ed., Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1967), 1147.

¹⁰Coelho, op. cit., 117-118.

¹¹Barbosa, op. cit., 169.

¹²Torres, op. cit., 133.

¹³Ibid., 107.

¹⁴Ibid., 106.

¹⁵While the intellectuals made the speeches and participated in committee deliberations, the others just voted, but both contingents were termed a "Flock of sheep" (relative to the directives of the state government) by the opposition press. Ibid., 107.

¹⁶Antônio Gontijo de Carvalho, Uma Conspiração Contra a Inteligência. A da obra de David Campista (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Artenova, 1968), 110-116.

¹⁷Fleischer, op. cit., 62-69.

¹⁸See Orlando Carvalho, "Os Partidos Políticos," 27-29, Barbosa, op. cit., 170; José Murilo de Carvalho, "Barbacena," 154-159, and João Camillo de Oliveira Torres, História do Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte: Difusão Pan Americana do Livro, 1962), 7, 1266-1277.

¹⁹Cid Rebeloorta, "Famílias Governamentais de Minas Gerais," in Segundo Seminário de Estudos Mineiros (Belo Horizonte: Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1956), 43-91.

²⁰Moema Miranda de Siqueira, "Elites Políticas em Minas Gerais," RBEF, 29 (July, 1970), 179.

²¹Frey, op. cit., 216-217.

²²For a fictionalized version of such negotiations (between Coronel Chico Belo and Doutor Carvalho de Azevedes, the Interior Secretary), see Mário Paiva, A Via dos Confins (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1960), 159-189. Another example of coronelismo and its relations to local politics is found in Oscar Das Carrêas, Brasília (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Gráfica Record, 1968).

CHAPTER 5

THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY (1946-1971)

Following the deposition of the Estado Novo in October, 1945, elections for the national constituent assembly were held as scheduled on December 2, of the same year. As with the Constituent Assembly of 1890, having finished the new Constitution, the 1946 Assemb. transformed itself into the first (post-1945) legislature which served through 1951. The new Constitution provided for legislative elections every four years, which have been held regularly from 1950 through 1970. The seven legislative terms presented in this chapter are

1945 - 1951	1963 - 1967
1951 - 1955	1967 - 1971
1955 - 1959	1971 - 1975
1959 - 1963	

The terms are denoted by the year of the first session 8.0. In 1955 Legislature, serving from 1955 to 1959. When appropriate, data from the 1933 legislature is also presented for comparison.

During the First Republic the bancada mineira remained a constant 37 deputies. However, the 1946 Constitution provided for a Câmara of open-ended size based on population, and to be updated following each decennial census. Thus, the bancada, which began at 35 in 1946, increased to 39 (following the 1950 census), and to 48 (following the 1960 census). The present constitution written in 1967 and revised in

1969) provides for representation based on the number of registered voters in the state. On this basis, the bancada was reduced to 35 for the 1970 elections. Such changes further necessitate calculating any percentage distributions over the "total known," for standardized comparison.

Two additional systemic changes distinguish the post 1945 period from the First Republic: legislative elections on the basis of proportional representation, and the growth of a multi-party system.

Different criteria were used for the inclusion of deputies for analysis purposes. During the First Republic substitution was on a permanent basis; i.e., when a deputy was nominated for state cabinet secretary or federal minister, he would resign his seat and a substitute was chosen, either in a by election or from the ranks of the "runner-ups" in his election district. In Chapter 4, all deputies known to have served (including the substitutes) were included in the analysis,¹ and cohort group was determined by legislature of first service.

With the suplente system adopted in the post-1945 period, substitution was on a temporary basis,² i.e., a deputy leaving the Cámara for service in the executive or for any other reason, went on temporary leave, and thus could re-assume his seat at anytime and replace his suplente.³

Although complete substitution data were collected for the bancada, such data were very incomplete for the state assembly. Thus, because such substitutions are not exactly comparable with the First Republic system; because inclusion of the suplentes would distort the recruitment picture somewhat; and because of the impossible situation

in the state assembly,--only deputies elected in their own right are included in Chapters 5 and 6. (Port group was determined by legislation of first election. The latter totaled 143 and 302 Federal and state deputies, respectively.⁴

Occupation

The distribution of Federal deputies by principal occupation is found in Table 5.1. The most notable changes from the 1933 legislature were in the proportions for industry and commerce, legal professions, other professionals, and finance and banking. Considering these changes, the 1946 bancada may be seen as having proportions similar to the pre-1920 period.

With regards change over time, industry and commerce double after 1963, after an initial increase in 1955, agriculture increases again in 1967; legal professions decline somewhat after 1959, teachers reach highs in 1963 and 1967; other professionals fluctuate from a high in 1946 to a low in 1971; other public servants, and finance and banking remain fairly constant, except for the former in 1967 and 1971. The elections of 1950 and 1962 seem to have wrought the most changes in the occupational distribution.

Comparing the overall means for the two periods (Tables 4.7 and 5.1), the principal changes are increases in the proportions for industry and commerce, and finance and banking, and a decrease for other professionals. In terms of political development, the increases in the former two categories may mean increased representation of modernizing elements in the economic sector.

Table 5.1 Principles' Occupation of Federal Deputies by Legislature
(% Percent)

Occupation	LEGISLATURE								
	83	84	1981	1982	1983	86	87	88	1989
Industry and Commerce	3.4	5.9	13.5	7.4	8.1	6.7	8.0	11.0	10.6
Agriculture	4.3	2.9	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.4	10.7	23.0	8.8
Legal Professions	28.3	30.0	40.0	44.7	37.8	35.4	34.3	28.3	23.6
Teachers	4.3	0.0	8.1	5.3	8.1	10.4	12.5	5.0	7.3
Other Professions	39.0	26.5	6.2	8.4	21.6	18.7	4.4	8.8	20.4
Other Public Servants	6.6	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.1	6.0	0.0	5.5
Finance and Banking	0.0	1.8	0.8	0.5	10.9	8.3	14.4	1.8	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (%)	46	34	137	130	127	46	148	131	127
Occupation B.A. (%)		33	13	1	2	0	0	1	6

In terms of the recruitment variables displayed in Table 5 2, deputies elected during the post-1945 period appear to have entered politics at about the same mean age, but followed longer pre-Câmara careers, and entered the Câmara a bit older than deputies serving during the First Republic (see Table 4 2). This is as might be expected in relation to the development of the political system and the society in general.

Legal professions, teachers and public servants again show the longest pre-careers. Although more of the post-1945 deputies had university training, again the industry and commerce, agriculture, and finance and banking categories presented the lowest levels. Teachers again had the highest level of geographic mobility.

Regionalism

Comparing the regional distribution in Table 5 3, with that for the First Republic (Table 4 3), the Jequitinhonha, Rio Doce, West, and Triangle regions were found to have increased representation in the post-1945 period. The former two were probably slighted during the early period, while the latter two regions had real increases in population during the 1930's and 1940's, due to migration to these developing areas.

By comparing Tables 4 3, with 5 3, it is observed that in 1946 the Mata regained what it had lost in 1933, while the reverse was true for the Metalúrgica, and the South continued to decline. In 1951 representation was more widely distributed among the regions. By this time the new parties were organized on a more state-wide basis, thus necessitating competition in all regions which favored broader representation,

Table B 2--Principal Occupation vs. Age at First Position, Career Time, Number of Positions, Age at Career Entry, Education, Family Size, and Geographic Mobility: Federal Judges, 1944-1971 (means and percent)

Occupation	N	Age at First Position	Pre-Occ. Career Time	No. of Pre-Occ. Positions	Age at Career Entry	Years of Higher Education	Family Size	Urban Mobility
Industry and Commerce	121	28.34	14.86	2.30	45.19	79.0	41.3	43.9
Agriculture	172	27.32	16.29	3.46	46.11	63.3	44.3	40
Legal Professions	66	27.03	6.46	4.52	48.33	69.5	37	41.4
Teachers	10	26.97	14.5	4.60	44.36	66.0	77.8	60.0
Other Professionals	76	3.85	16.85	2.7	48.06	80.0	46.7	54.0
Other Public Servants	2	19.61	32.0	1.60	51.3	81.0	100.0	50.0
Peace and Banking	146	27.87	16.94	3.46	43.4	65.7	100.0	37.6
Mean for all Federal Judges		27.94	17.57	3.72	46.37	69.9	42.2	43.8
(sd)	156	10.71	10.68	7.46	10.85	13.21	19	13.7

Table 5.3--Region of Political Support in Urban Areas: Senate by Year, 1933-1971 (in percents)

Region	L. E. G. J. S. J. A. T. W. R. E.								RCA
	1933	1940	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
North	4.3	3.0	8.4	6.8	5.3	6.4	8.5	8.4	0.6
Appalachian	2.2	3.0	3.0	0	13.2	6.4	8.1	11.4	2.6
Piedmont	4.3	3.0	3.8	6.1	1.3	6.4	6.4	17	0
Rural	19.8	33.3	16.6	0.8	5.4	7.0	20.4	11.4	4.9
Metropolitan	37.0	74.3	77.2	24.4	28.0	40.4	40.4	25.7	10.1
South	21.7	12.2	2	3.5	7.7	8.5	8.5	14.3	1.6
West	0.7	16.7	3.8	16.2	13.2	12.8	14.5	5.7	0.3
Triangle	0.0	0	6.4	8.1	7.9	0	2.2	5.7	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
RCA (N)	145	137	136	127	130	146	147	135	120
Region (N)		47	127	2	11	0	3	12	

and election districts were no longer a constraining factor. A concentration was noted for the Paraíba region in 1963 and 1967, indicating the importance of the trends of industrialization and urbanization in the region. In 1955 the West became the second region in terms of representation in the Câmara, surpassing both the South and Mata. The 1970 elections effected a return to a broad distribution of deputies by region of political support. As shall be seen below, 1970 was a highly competitive election, under a better organized two-party system (relative to 1966).

As can be seen in Table 5.4, future deputies based in the Triangle, Jequitinhonha, and Mata regions entered politics at later ages. This is a different pattern than the one found in Table 4.4 for the first period, where the positions of the Mata and South were reversed.

The Mata and West had longer pre-careers, and the Triangle the shortest. The latter two regions were consistent with the first period, whereas, the Mata was not.

The Mata region also shows the most significant change in mean age at Câmara entry, being the oldest contingent in the post-1945 period. On the same variable Rio Doce moves from the oldest group in the First Republic to the second youngest in the later period. Career patterns are obviously changing on the regional dimension.

Regarding geographic mobility, only the North and South regions show higher rates in the second period, against the general trend of less inter-regional mobility.

Table 5.4--Region of Political Support vs. Age at First Position, Career Time, Number of Positions Held, Age at Career Entry, Education, Family Size, and Geographic Mobility by Federal Division, 1940-1971 (means and percentages)

Region	N	Age at First Position	Pre-C. E. Career Time	No. of Pre-C. E. Positions	Age at Career Entry	% with University Education	Family Size	% with Geographic Mobility
North	(9)	27.87	17.39	3.1	46.79	77.8	2.6	44.4
Southwest	(3)	29.49	6.93	1.77	46.03	100.0	2.3	0
Midwest	(11)	26.07	17	3.09	42.23	100.0	2.09	0
Total	(27)	26.99	20.00	3.16	45.14	88.0	2.0	37.0
Washington	39	27.03	17.64	3.18	45.46	9.9	2.6	44.6
South	16	25.43	19.66	1.3	45.72	67.5	1.3	44.4
West	(14)	26.43	17.74	4.59	44.19	92.9	1.94	23.3
Washington's	7	31.14	10	2.57	43.26	80.0	2.0	42.9
Mean for all Federal Divisions		27.26	17.57	3.23	46.32	9.9	2.2	41.8
	(N)	(M)	(SD)	(SE)	(M)	(SE)	(M)	(SE)

Institutionalization

Although found to be a significant result of party development at the turn of the century, first institutionalization of political careers did not evidence the same pattern in the post-1945 period. For legislatures 1951 through 1971 (in Table 5.5) length of pre-Cárdenas political careers, both in terms of duration and number of positions, closely paralleled the last years of the First Republic (Table 4.5). The 1946 legislature can be seen as an aberration caused by the eight-year interruption of the normal political process during the *Estado Novo* period (many deputies elected to the 1946 legislature had political careers, which were started in the late 1920s and 1930s, which were prolonged during the Vargas period), and held executive and judicial office from 1937 through 1945.

The data by cohort of first election (Table 5.6) show the 1959 cohort to be well institutionalized (even more so than the 1959 legislature), and the 1967 cohort to be short on political experience (i.e., less institutionalized).

The latter two extremes merit further scrutiny. Although both the 1959 and 1967 cohorts evidence reduced proportions of university graduates, the former is higher in terms of new recruits from the legal and other professions, and includes many migrants into the Matamoros region (Table 5.8). The 1967 cohort, on the other hand, is characterized by larger proportions of deputies from industry and commerce, agriculture, and finance and banking, plus migrants outward from the Jiquilpan region. These extreme cases also may have been influenced by the fact that the 1958 elections included a sizable increase in the number of registered voters (due to an extension of the franchise); i.e., changes in the electorate

Table S 5--Summary of Change over time by legislators, Federal Dept. of
1933-1971 (means and percentiles)

	L E G I S L A T O R S								1971
	1933	1946	1955	1955	1963	1967	1971	1971	
Age at First Political Position	27.47	26.12	25.72	26.74	25.92	25.98	26.74	26.6	27.3
Pre-Congress Career Time (Years)	5.47	27.43	17.29	7.13	17.46	7.97	10.69	15.56	7.7
No. of Pre-Congress Political Offices Held	2.95	4.32	3.32	3.19	3.36	3.29	3.17	2.94	3.33
Current Age	47.56	48.74	45.53	48.97	48.26	48.47	47.03	50.29	51.00
% with University Education	95.6	97	92.1	94.7	89.7	95.7	88.4	85.5	97
% with Political Family Ties	29.2	35.7	30.0	30.0	36.6	47.2	36.0	44.0	32.2
% with Geographic Mobility	25.8	29.4	29.7	42.1	30.0	27.4	25.5	28.0	33.8

Table 5.6: Summary of Change over time by cohort, Federal Deposits
 1933-1971 (means and percentiles)

	C O H O R T									HOW	
	1933	1946	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	1946-1971	1971	
Age at First Political Position	25.77	26.32	27.89	29.53	32.08	35.98	39.71	39.35	17.58	39.35	
Pre-Clearance Career Time (Years)	6.11	22.42	16.87	14.85	19.76	17.76	11.01	16.28	7.17	16.28	
No. of Pre-Clearance Positions Held	2.41	4.32	2.45	3.23	3.27	3.50	3.07	2.15	3.66	2.15	
Age at Clearance Entry	41.50	45.74	44.3	47.41	47.07	46.28	43.52	46.09	4.59	46.09	
% with No work by Education	13.1	17.1	33.5	37.7	37.5	100.0	76.9	92.9	79.8	92.9	
% with Political Party Ties	10.1	25.7	100.0	100.0	97.7	76.5	91.7	92.3	82.2	92.3	
% with Geographic Mobility	38.1	39.4	24.0	38.3	31.3	38.8	35.7	26.7	13.6	26.7	

Whereas, the 1966 elections were the first held after the 1964 revolution, the effects of which may have reduced the new candidacy rate among politicians with more "institutional" and political careers, thus obliging the two new parties to recruit individuals with less political experience (This appears to be born out in Table 5.11, below.)

Geographic Mobility

Perhaps the most interesting aspect evident in Table 5.8, is the decline of the Metalúrgica region as a net "importer" of future federal deputies, in the first three legislatures of the post-1945 period. The region, a strong importer after 1897, only regains this position in 1959. The basis of these changes are difficult to fathom. The patterns are sporadic: the Mata as importer in 1946, the South and Rio Doce in 1951, and the North and West in 1955. For some reason the political careers of deputies entering the Câmara in these first three cohorts involved smaller magnitudes of geographic mobility than their predecessors in the First Republic. Perhaps the new political system and party system favored more localized careers, or perhaps the Metalúrgica region, although continuing to attract occupational mobiles, became less attractive to potential political mobiles.

The Role of Party

In terms of the occupational backgrounds of deputies, the PSD presents the broadest recruitment pattern (Table 5.9); and the PTB and MDB, the narrowest. The UDN is high in legal professions, and the PTB in teachers and other professionals.⁵

Table 5 7--Percent of Occupation of Federal deputies, by cohort
1933-1971 (in percents)

Occupation	C O H O R T								Total 1933-1971
	1933	1945	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
Industry and Commerce	7.2	5.9	15.0	7.7	20.0	27.3	25.7	4.3	6.4
Agriculture	6.9	2.9	0.0	20.3	6.7	4.5	21.4	21.3	9.3
Legal Professions	21.0	50.0	40.0	30.5	20.0	27.3	7	0.0	14
Teachers	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	3.3	13.6	14.3	0.0	7.3
Other Professions	41.4	25.5	20.0	23.1	33.3	12.6	7	4.4	20.5
Other Public Services	3.4	2.3	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5
Finance and Banking	0.0	8	0.0	7.7	6.7	13.6	14.3	2.4	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	278	34	126	113	114	121	141	141	37
Occupation N/A (%)	10	13	11	0	1	10	10		8

Table 5 B--In- and Out-Migration and Geographic Mobility of Federal Deposit Institutions
 (Based on data by cohort, 1933-1979)^a

Region	Year							
	1933	1940	1951	1965	1969	1973	1977	1979
North	-3.4	0.0	+8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
South	3.4	2.6	-8.3	0.0	0.0	+5.0	4.7	0.0
West	+3.4	0.0	+4.6	* *	* *	* *	0.0	+7.6
Northwest	+3.4	+2.4	7	16.7	+6.3	0.0	3.7	1.0
Northwest	+7.7	0.0	-3	+6.3	+16.8	+20.3	+2.4	+3.3
South	3.4	5.3	+4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-6.7
West	-2.6	-2.4	-3.4	+6.4	* *	-4.3	0.0	* *
Triangle	* *	+5.0	+4.2	* *	0.0	* *	* *	-6.7

^aNotes: (a) + or - indicates net inflow or outflow of deposit institutions from or to other regions.
 (b) + or - indicates net outflow or inflow of deposits to other regions.
 (c) 0.0 = net inflow same as net outflow.
 (d) * * = net inflow and net outflow are both 0.0.

Table 5 9--Principal Occupations by Party of First Service,
Federal Deposits, 1946-1971 (In percents)

Occupation	P A R T Y O F F I R S T S E R V I C E						OVER- ALL -CP*
	PSD	DEM	PR	PRO	REPUB	IND	
Industry and Commerce	5.7	7.4	23.5	14.3	25.0	25.0	16.4
Agriculture	7.0	3.7	11.8	0.0	25.0	0.0	1.0
Legal Professions	33.3	29.3	29.4	4.3	20.0	25.0	27.0
Teachers	0.0	14.8	0.0	27.4	5.0	2.5	7.4
Other Professions	27.6	11.0	15.3	26.7	0.0	37.5	26.4
Other Public Functions	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Finance and Banking	15.7	3.7	0.0	14.3	25.0	0.0	11.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
REPUBLICAN	513	227	1,179	114	1,200	48	2,291
Occupations - 4 (CP)		10	127	1		10	148

For the post 1961 period the ARENA is somewhat more broadly based occupationally than the PSD; the former being high in finance and banking and agriculture, with the latter high on teachers and the professions. In that ARENA was to a large extent an aggregation of the PSD, UDK and PR, it might be expected to recruit new candidates (for the 1966 and 1970 elections) from an equally broad base. The same is true for the MDB which drew most of its organizational strength from the PTB, and parallels its recruitment pattern.⁶

Regionally the PSD and the UDK are the broadest based, Table 3.10. This is as it should be, for the two were the most competitive participants in the multi-party system, and had diretórios in almost every município of the state.⁷ The PR was somewhat less of a state-wide party, concentrating on the Mata, Jequitinhonha, North and Rio Doce areas. The PTB was the narrowest ex party, concentrating on the densely populated Mata, and industrializing Metalúrgica regions.

The post-1964 trends are similar to those found in the occupational pattern: a broad based ARENA and a narrow MDB, (localized and paralleling the PTB).

Turning now to recruitment patterns of the parties, in Table 5.11, the PSD and the PR are found to be the most institutionalized, in terms of the pre-Câmara careers. This supports the content on that the PSD was a true "escola política" in the sense of providing ample "training" in politics for its members.⁸ The PR's style was quite similar (apart from Bernardes' personal "leadership"), and deputies from both parties entered the Câmara at older ages. Udenistas and Petebistas had shorter careers and entered at earlier ages. ARENA deputies also had short

Table 5. D--Region of Political Support by Party of First Service,
Federal Counties, 1948-1971

Region	PARTY OF FIRST SERVICE						DIF- FERENCE
	PSD	DEM	REP	OTD	ADSW	APP	
North	6.0	3.7	11.1	0.0	14.3	0.0	5.0
Upper Piedmont	0.0	7.4	22.2	0.0	4.3	0.0	0
Blue Ridge	4.0	3.7	11.1	0.0	23.8	12.5	0.1
Plate	22.0	16.5	27.8	30.0	6.8	12.5	19.8
Mountain Region	39.0	22.2	22.2	53.8	4.8	25.0	26.0
South	14.0	14.8	5.0	7.7	14.3	0.0	11.8
West	12.0	16.5	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	10.3
Triangle	4.0	7.4	0.0	7.7	9.5	0.0	5.3
Total (10)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	60.0
TOTAL (10)	50	56	10	13	21	6	3
Region N.A. (1)	12	11	12	12	0	0	7

Table 5: Party of First Service vs. Age at First Position, Cancer Type, Number of Positions, Age at Career Entry, Education, Family Size, and Geographic Mobility, Federal Deputies, 1946-1971 (means and percents)

Party of First Service	N	Age at First Position	Pre-C/D Cancer Type	Age at Pre-C/D Position	Age at Career Entry	Years of Education by Family Size	Family Size	Geographic Mobility
PSD	152	28.63	19.80	4.21	48.90	94.0	23.9	66.1
SDA	271	27.25	14.95	2.98	40.99	90.3	2.3	9
DP	1201	28.84	21.89	3.20	46.88	94.7	22.0	22.1
MP	413	28.48	15.64	2.87	42.81	84.5	14.7	46.1
ASDA	121	29.42	13.83	2.62	43.91	85.0	18.0	11.3
MS	181	32.92	12.28	1.50	46.64	82.6	18.0	74.2
Mean for all Federal Deputies		27.94	17.87	2.29	46.32	78.7	12.2	13.8
(s)	83	100	109	140	130	113	85	35

careers and entered at earlier ages, thus not parallel to the PSD-UDM PR aggregation (except for the UDM's advantage at Cãmara entry), thus indicating the problem of reduced institutionalized recruitment discussed above (regarding Table 5.6)

The MDB seemed to recruit persons at later stages of their careers, perhaps an effect of lateral recruitment from the professions (per Table 5.9).

The role of party in recruitment is further examined in Table 5.12, which examines recruitment of whole party slates, instead of only those elected, as in previous tables. The parties are evaluated in terms of their recruitment of new candidates and "party label switchers" in the various elections.⁹

The PSD evidenced constant levels of approximately one-fourth of its slates being new candidates, and low levels of switchers. The UDM attracted high levels of both new candidates and switchers in 1950, when it was the situaçãõ under Milton Campos' administration. Its attractiveness to new candidates for federal deputy ebbed until it was again the situaçãõ (with Magalhães Pinto as governor) during the 1962 elections. In 1954 it accepted a high level of switchers, but none in 1958. In both 1954 and 1958 the PR attracted more switchers than new candidates. Overall, the PTB attracted the highest proportions of both new candidates and switchers for its slates. This was accentuated in 1950 and 1962.

The ARENA did not reflect the aggregation of its predecessors' patterns and attracted low levels of new candidates. The MDB based more of its recruitment on new candidacies, and both of the post-1964 parties had higher levels in 1970 than in 1966.

Table 5.12: Recruitment of Candidates for Federal Deputy, by party, 1950-1970
 (% of new candidates, % of previous candidates recruited from other parties)

Party	1950		1954		1958		1962		1966		1970	
	% New Candidates	% Other Party	% New Candidates	% Other Party	% New Candidates	% Other Party	% New Candidates	% Other Party	% New Candidates	% Other Party	% New Candidates	% Other Party
PSD	23.7	6.9	23.2	3.3	26.6	7.4	29.0	3.7			26.2	5.3
UDU	38.6	0.4	3.2	1.1	6.3	0.0	27.0	5.3			26.2	4.6
PI	34.7	3.3	2.5	4.3	25.1	42.9	22.7	7.2			24.2	22.2
PTB	77.9	2.5	17.8	7.7	40.0	11.2	47.8	68.2			60	34.7
PPP			73.8	66.7							73.8	66.7
ARENA									16.4	19.2	13.7	
MDJ									33.3	48.2	36.3	
OVERALL	44.2	9.2	33.6	2.5	22.6	6.7	33.8	22.0	23.9	25.8	3.4	5.2

Nearly one third of all candidates were by new aspirants, while the "switchers" accounted for only 15.2% of all candidates for federal deputy.

Turnover

Turnover data for both state and federal deputies in the post-1945 period is presented in Figure 5.1.¹⁰ The data are similar to that presented in Figure 4.1 for the First Republic, a general declining trend through 1912. The recent period does not have the highly fluctuating turnover rates of the historic period. Except for the 1951 and 1971 legislatures, rates for state and federal deputies run fairly parallel.

Career Advancement Patterns

Comparing Figures 5.2 and 4.3, less "circulation" between elective and appointive positions was noted in the recent period, i.e., and only between the state legislature and cabinet. This may be an indication of a lessening or near absence of the *compramisso coronelista* pattern described in Chapter 4. Additional positions were added to Figure 5.2, (relative to Figure 4.3), to accommodate a changed situation, but this did not alter the pattern.

Clearly more future federal deputies follow career channels leading through the state legislature, and those passing through this office came proportionately more from local elective office than from positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, the predominant career pattern for those with considerable prior political experience is more of a sequential route through elective offices. This is probably due to the more highly

Figure 5 -- Turnover of legislators, by legislature, 1945-67
 (Turnover = percent of new legislators elected per term)





Figure 5.2: Career Advancement Patterns, Federal Textiles, 1946-1971 (Annual Frequency of Migration)



competitive electoral system in the post-1945 period, and the resulting value placed on prestigious electoral, (proven vote-getting ability).

Comparing the distribution of positions held for the two groups of federal deputies, (in Table 4.10 and 5.13) approximately the same proportions of positions were held in state government, and less in municipal government during the recent period. However, excepting these differences, which are not of great order of magnitude, the distributions are somewhat similar.

Summary

This chapter has analyzed background and political career data of 143 federal deputies elected to the seven post-1945 legislatures, and compared this group with the 241 deputies serving from 1890 to 1937.

Observations of the greatest import were the absence of a "re-institutionalization" period similar to that occurring at the outset of the First Republic, i.e., deputies from institutionalized political careers continued to be recruited, the marked decline of the Metalurgica region's attractiveness in terms of geographic mobility; the lessening or near absence of the compromisso coronelista pattern in pre-Câmara political careers, with more "purely" elective or bureaucratic career sequences, and the effects of the new electoral system and competitive, multi-party system on the recruitment process.

Recruitment tendencies of the ARENA were found to closely parallel those of its progenitors--the PSD, UDN and PR, while the same was observed for the MDB with regards the PTB.

Table 5.13--Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming
Federal Deputy, 1946-1971 (N=141)

Positions	Positions Held		% of Federal Deputies
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	50	10.5	35.0
State Legislature	106	22.2	74.1
State Cabinet	42	8.8	29.4
High State Bureaucracy	73	15.3	51.0
Low State Bureaucracy	60	12.6	42.0
Mayor or Vice Mayor	43	9.0	30.1
Vereador	45	9.6	31.5
Municipal Bureaucracy	16	3.4	11.2
Party Office	6	1.3	4.2
Office in Other State	10	2.1	7.0
Candidate (not-elected)	(32)	---	22.4
Pre-1945 Legislator	25	5.3	17.5
No Prior Office	19	---	13.3
Total (%)	--	100.0	---
TOTAL (N)	(476)	(476)	(143)

Mean Number of Positions Held = 3.33

The thesis of the PSD as an escola politinga was partially confirmed, as this broad-based and highly competitive party has a lengthy training period (sargentapelo) for testing and selecting its recruits.

The new parties organized following the 1964 revolution were both obliged to recruit candidates from less institutionalized political careers, with the ARENA fielding slates with reduced proportions of new candidates, and the MDB using higher proportions of new candidates. Thus it appeared that, the process was generally less attractive to aspirants with more political experience, the ARENA attracted a larger proportion of returning candidates, and because of this the MDB had to rely on a high proportion of new candidates to fill its slates.

The 1970 elections were highly competitive¹¹ and were held under revised "game rules," and were found to have effected a broadened geographical and occupational distribution of the bancada.

NOTES--CHAPTER 5

¹Substitution rates were relatively small during the First Republic. See Appendix VI for a listing of substitutions by legislature.

²Under the current (1969) constitution, federal deputies can be granted temporary leave on 2 on the basis of being appointed federal minister, or for health or personal reasons. To accept any other executive office, a deputy must permanently resign his seat for the remainder of the legislative term.

³Under the proportional representation system used, each party slate of candidates is ranked according to total votes won. The 48 seats (in 1963, for example) would be awarded to the top 48 candidates on the list. The 49th would become the first suplente of his party, and thus eligible for the first temporary vacancy occurring within his party. In the case of a permanent vacancy, due to death or a resignation, the suplente becomes efetivado, or the permanent occupant of that seat for the remainder of that term.

⁴See Appendix VII for a list of the federal deputies on which this chapter is based.

⁵This tends to substantiate testimony of various ex-petebistas interviewed, as to the diverse and non-ideological composition of the PTB mineiro.

⁶Note that the distributions for the ARENA and MDB in Tables 5.9 through 5.12 refer on 2 to deputies elected to first Câmara service in 1966 and 1970, deputies who subsequently served as ARENA or MDB deputies from 1967 through 1971, are not included.

⁷For a discussion of this competition and its effects on the party system, and the role of local rival family groups, see Orlando Carvalho, "Ensaio de Sociologia Eleitoral. . ." and his "Partidos Políticos. . ."

⁸Related in numerous interviews, and by various observers of the state political scene.

⁹The 1945 and 1947 elections are not included, as 1950 was the first election permitting a full cycle of party switching. Previous candidacies for state deputy are also included in this analysis.

¹⁰Note that the data are not standardized to account for changes in the size of the federal bancaad and state assembly.

¹¹In the sense that candidates were competing for a reduced number of seats among a larger electorate, i.e., that the electoral quotients for state and federal deputy were greatly increased from 1566

CHAPTER 6

THE OFFICE OF STATE DEPUTY (1947-1971)

Although the National Constituent Assembly was elected in December, 1945, and took office the following January, the state Constituent Assembly was only elected a year later, (while Kinas was governed by a series of interventores, see Chapter 3), and took office on March 21, 1947.¹ The new state Constitution also provided for legislative elections every four years, coincident with those for the federal legislature.² Seven terms of legislators have been regularly elected.

During the First Republic the legislature elected 48 deputies and 24 senators. In the post-1945, the size of the unicameral state legislature was also determined on the open-ended basis of population. So that the Assembly began with 72 members in 1947, increased to 74 after the 1950 census, and to 82 with the 1960 census. With the advent of the new criteria established in the 1969 Constitution, the Assembly was reduced to 59 members.

As with the federal deputies of the same period (Chapter 5), only those persons elected state deputy in their own right, and not those serving as sapientes, are included in the foregoing analysis. For this period, 302 deputies were elected.³

The foregoing analysis will compare the recruitment of the state Assembly with that of the bancada federal for the post-1945 period. As will be noted by the tables in this chapter, the levels of missing

data for state deputies are considerably higher than for their federal counterparts. This problem is discussed in Appendix I, and as might be expected, the proportions are highest for the earlier legislature.

Occupation

Although no data were collected for the 1935 Assembly, it is conceivable that the 1947 legislature was an "aberration," in terms of being "high" on legal professions, and "low" for agriculture and public servants, as all three categories show reversed proportions in 1951, (in Table 6.1).

Both agriculture and public servants tend to increase over time (from 1951), only to decline with the 1967 legislature.

Overall, comparing the composition of the Assembly with the federal bancada, the former had more in agriculture and public servants, and less in legal professions, and banking and finance. This might indicate that the Assembly was composed of fewer elements from the modernizing sectors of the economy than the bancada in 1967, whereas the proportion from agriculture, and finance and banking increased in the bancada; it decreased within the state Assembly.

The case of the public servants is interesting. Although the proportions were reduced for both groups of deputies in 1967, in 1951 recruitment from the bureaucracy equaled the previous high (in 1951) for the state deputies, while the bancada remained at zero. All this may indicate that a compromisso coronelista type pattern may have persisted in the Assembly in the post-1945 period.

Table 6.1 Principal Occupations of State Deputies, by Legislature, 1947-1971

Occupation	LEGISLATURE							MEAN (1947-1971)
	1947	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
Industry and Commerce	9.4	8.7	6.0	17.2	3.2	23.1	17.4	9.0
Agriculture	7.3	10.6	10.0	17.2	10	15.8	15.2	11.6
Legal Professions	13.9	12.0	14.0	25.1	23.5	29.4	25	20.2
Teachers	4.9	6.5	6.0	4.7	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.3
Other Professions	24.4	26.1	28.0	21.9	17.4	14.0	15.2	20.9
Other Public Services	4.9	5.2	0.0	12.5	10.3	7.0	5.2	6.7
Finance and Banking	4.9	0.0	4.0	1.4	7.4	5.1	2.2	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median (%)	(48)	(46)	(50)	(24)	(68)	(57)	(46)	0%
Occupation & % (N)	(23)	(26)	(24)	(1-0)	(14)	(23)	(3)	(8)

The state deputies generally entered politics at slightly later ages, had shorter political careers and entered the Assembly at younger ages than their federal counterparts, (as seen from the overall means in Tables 5.2 and 6.2).

State deputies in the public servant and agriculture categories had the most pre-Assembly political experience; and finance and banking, and teachers, the least.

Agriculture and other professionals tended to enter the Assembly at later ages, and finance and banking, and legal professions, the youngest.

These trends are somewhat similar to those observed for the federal deputies, with the teachers being an exception.

Regionalism

Comparing the overall regional distribution of state and federal deputies (in Tables 6.3 and 5.3), the singular observation is evident for the Metalúrgica region. This region appears in a much reduced position among the state deputies, (being slightly surpassed by the Mata , with the proportional difference quite equally distributed among the other seven regions.

The broadening of regional representation, which was so evident among federal deputies in 1971, (although also occurring to a lesser extent among state deputies), seems to have occurred for the state deputies in 1963.

No *révanche* of the Metalúrgica region occurs among the state deputies in the 1963 and 1967 legislatures, as is observed for the federal deputies.

Table 4-2: White men Occupation vs. Age at First Position, Career Time, Number of Positions, Age at Assembly Entry, Education, Family Size, and Geographic Mobility.
 Slave Input vs. 1947-1977 (Means and Percentages)

Occupation	(N)	Age at First Position	Pre-As. Career Time	No. of Pre-As. Positions	Age at Assembly Entry	% with 12 or more years of Education	% with Family Size	% with Geographic Mobility
Industry and Commerce	(24)	28.70	12.62	1.79	46.33	57.1	66.0	68.0
Agriculture	(28)	28.4	4.65	2.45	43.36	70.4	82.3	74.3
Legal Profession	(58)	27.31	10.42	.70	37.05	100.0	76.5	3.0
Teachers	(17)	28.08	3.7	2.05	37.54	94.1	76.9	20.0
Other Professions	(43)	32.04	12.42	2.1	44.89	93.0	83.3	29.4
Other Public Services	(13)	25.08	17.08	3.75	42.08	87.5	62.4	14.3
Finance and Banking	(11)	24.07	9.94	1.31	35.97	80.0	37.8	20.0
Mean for all Slave Input vs.		24.27	12.32	2	40.78	86.3	79.0	42.0
(sd)	(70)	40,	(49)	(103)	(203)	(1.99)	69	(.75)

Table B 3--Region of Political Support within Missions by Legislators,
State Deputies, 1947-1971 (in percentage)

Region	L E G I S L A T I V E							TOTAL
	1947	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
North	7.8	7.3	8.9	8.1	8.1	8.2	8.3	7.3
Apurimac	7.5	14.6	15.6	14.3	11.3	6.9	2	0.5
Rio Taca	12.5	2.4	4.4	10.2	9.7	12.3	6.3	8.4
Meta	22.4	19.5	24.4	22.4	14.5	27.5	25.0	20.9
Meta Oriental	7.5	9.5	17.8	22.4	17.7	5.4	29.8	9.4
South	2.5	14.6	13.3	12.2	16.1	5.4	6.7	14
West	5.0	17.3	11.1	10.2	10.1	2.3	0.4	13
Trompeter	5.0	4.9	4.4	2.0	6.5	7.7	10.4	6.3
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(40)	(41)	(45)	(48)	(52)	(55)	(48)	(111)
Region N 4. (N)	(32)	(37)	(29)	(28)	(20)	(7)	(1)	(9)

For the post revolution period, a decline is noted for the Jequitinhonha region, and increases for the Triangle and Mata

Variance in the four recruitment variables by region (in Table 6.4) is less than by occupation (in Table 6.2). The reverse was true for the federal deputies (comparing Tables 5.4 and 5.2).

State deputies from the Mata and Jequitinhonha tended to enter politics at later ages, while those from the North and West at younger ages. Those from the Triangle had the longest pre-Assembly careers, from the West, the longest.

Deputies from the Rio Doce entered the Assembly at the youngest ages; those from the Mata, the oldest.

Variance in level of education was higher by occupation, for family ties and geographic mobility, the variance was higher by region.

Institutionalization

In terms of duration of pre-Assembly political career, a slightly increasing trend is noted for the first four legislatures (in Table 6.5). The 1946 federal bancada was seen as an aberration on this variable (Table 5.5), due to the effects of the Estado Novo period, and the carry over of deputies having served in pre-1945 legislatures. As is seen in Figure 5.1, carryover (the inverse of turnover) was very small from the 1935 to the 1947 state legislature. This indicated that the Estado Novo period probably had a lesser effect on the career patterns of future state deputies than their federal counterparts.⁴

Comparing the recruitment of cohorts in Table 6.6, the 1951 cohort was quite similar (with regards the variables in Table 6.5) to that

Table 6.4--Region of Political Support vs. Age at First Position, Career vs. Junior Staff, Sex, Education, Family Type, Language Proficiency
 (N = 1,000; 98% CI) (Means and Percent)

Region	N	Age at First Position	Age at Career Time	% of Career	Age at Access Entry	Age at Staff Entry	Sex	Education	Family Type	Language Proficiency
North	4	26.43	32.95	2.4	40.20	31.6	M	High	Married	High
West Midlands	14	27.64	27.22	1.27	40.62	26.4	M	High	Married	High
Mid East	16	26.87	27.26	1.1	39.13	26.7	M	High	Married	High
South	6	27.17	27.92	1.0	42.25	26.6	M	High	Married	High
Midlands East	13	29.69	30.3	2.99	35.43	25.4	M	High	Married	High
South	12	27.33	31.34	1.28	45.83	27.5	M	High	Married	High
West	11	26.27	33.25	2.23	38.99	26.2	M	High	Married	High
Triangular	2	27.44	31.89	1.1	36.75	26.5	M	High	Married	High
London and Greater London	28	27.77	27.32	2.1	40.70	26.4	M	High	Married	High
Total	94	27	31.2	1.71	37.5	26	M	High	Married	High

Table 6.5- Summary of Change over Time by legislators, State Deputies,
1967-1971 (means and percents)

	LEGISLATURE							DEPTS	
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1967	1971
Age at First Political Position	27.34	28.14	28.67	28.76	28.52	28.78	27.64	28.27	
Pre-Assembly Career Years (years)	12.2	14.37	14.40	13.24	14.58	13.74	11.8		
No. of Pre-Assembly Political Offices Held	2.25	2.8	3.40	2.68	3.6	3.0	2.6		
Current Age	44.40	44.34	44.17	43.84	42.52	43.54	41.83		
% with University Education	95	91.3	82.7	88.9	83.3	84	79.4		80.3
% with Political Party Affiliation	99.4	88.4	85.1	84.0	82.5	80.0	69.1		74.4
% with College Education	28.7	26.5	9.6	9.2	8.6	9.4	13.3		12.4

Table B-6--Summary of Change over Time by Cohort, State Specific,
1947-1997 (means and percent)

	C O H O R T							%	p
	1947	56	65	74	83	92	97		
Age at First Political Participation	27.25	27.93	28.80	28.80	29.28	29.24			
Pre-Assembly Career (Years)	12.2	14.04	2.23	62	0.56	0.74	1.14	3	
No. of Pre-Assembly Political Offices	2.25	2.07	2.04	2.17	2	1.93	1.98		
Age at Assembly Entry	41.40	41.47	42.75	39.98	39.37	40.82	42.16	1	
% with University Education	95	93.3	78.4	90.4	82.8	77	67		
% with Post-Secondary Education	97.4	95.2	84.8	87.8	77.4	66.4	52.4	2	
% with Geographic Mobility	28.2	28	29.8	31	22.8	20	18.4	22.4	

recruited in 1955, and also similar to the overall 1951 legislature. This indicates a continuing recruitment pattern.

Recruitment into the legislature should include the recruitment of young men from outside political careers. This trend continued into the subsequent voluntary period, with the 1967 cohort, but with the 1971 cohort recruitment became "re-institutionalized." The differences are more marked between cohorts and legislatures (1965 through 1968) probably because most deputies "carried over" came from longer career channels, and those "shaken out," from shorter ones. Also the Kubitschek administration (1951-1955) may have had an effect on the 1955 cohort.

This trend is observed to a lesser extent among federal deputies (Table 5.6), but the "re-institutionalization" occurs earlier with the 1959 cohort.

The change in the 1955 (state) cohort appears to have been coincident with reductions in proportions with university educations and having geographic mobility. The changes observed for the 1971 cohort, on the other hand, were associated with reductions in the proportions with university educations and with family ties, but a marked increase in the proportion with geographic mobility.

In terms of distribution by occupation, (as seen in Table 5.7), the 1955 cohort showed increases in industry and commerce, agriculture, and finance and banking, and reductions of public servants and other professionals. The 1971 cohort was particularly marked by a reversal of agriculture and public servants, thus indicating that the latter cohort might be considered a return to a more traditional pattern of recruitment

Table 6 7--Previous Occupation of State Deputies, by cohort
1947-1971 (in percents)

Occupation	Cohort							Total
	1947	195	1955	1959	1963	1967	71	
Industry and Commerce	9.8	6.5	25.0	6	3.2	13.6	5.7	11.4
Agriculture	7.3	9.7	4.3	9.4	23.1	4.5	20.2	11.6
Legal Professions	43.9	29.0	25.0	22.6	2.1	27.3	29.7	25.1
Teachers	4.9	5.8	7.1	8.5	12.7	1.8	3.3	7.5
Other Professionals	24.4	29.0	17.9	6	2	9.3	3.1	20.9
Other Public Services	4.9	9.4	3.4	18	0.0	3.4	20.0	8
Finance and Banking	4.6	0.0	7	3.2	0.5	4.5	5.9	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Unemployed	1.4	0.0	2.8	3	3.1	2.2	1	2.0
Missing in R.A. (N)	1.3	2.6	1.9	1.6	0	0	1	1.4

Geographic Mobility

The two traditionally "winning" northern regions, the Delta and Potlatchas, began to experience a steady decline in state deputees, excepting the latter as members in the 1946 and 1947 cohorts. This is a sharp difference from the usual influences by the federal deputies (compare Tables 5.8 and 5.8).

The 1947 cohort was characterized by the outward mobility from the above two regions, and the inward mobility of future deputies to five more remote regions.⁵ This did not occur for the federal deputies in their first (1946) cohort, and indicates that the state Assembly began the post-1945 period on a note of centrifugal geographic mobility, and regionalism.

After the 1947 cohort the pattern becomes sporadic and other specific trends are not apparent.

The Role of Party

With regards occupational background by party, as found in Table 6.9, all parties, with the exception of the ARPA recruited sizable proportions of their state deputies from the legal and other professions (more than half in each case). This is similar to the pattern for federal deputies (Table 5.9).⁶

The PSD, DM and PR appear to be quite broadly based, occupationally, with the DM having a slight edge, in spite of being high for agriculture. The PTB is quite narrowly based, drawing 71.4% of its recruits from industry and commerce, and other professions. The minor parties fall somewhat in between, being more broadly based than the PTB. The former

Table 3.5--Inter regional¹ Geographic Mobility of State Drives with a
Hines Census, by cohort, 1947- 1974

Region	1947-1974						
	1947	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971
North	+2.4	+2.0	1.7	1.0	4	0.3	
North Atlantic	1.5	2	0.0	1.0	0.0	+7.1	1
Piedmont	+5.2	0.0	+0.2	+0.4	-2.7	+3.2	* *
West	-4.3	-3.7	0.0	-11.2	0.0	0.0	-10.3
Mountain	-0.6	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.4	1	1
South	+0.5	+0.5	0.0	-0.0	0.0	+2.0	+7.0
West	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-2.7	-0.1	0.0
Triangle	+2.0	* *	0.0	-0.0	+2.7	+2.0	+7.0

- ¹ Note that:
 + = a net inflow of population from other regions
 - = a net outflow of population to other regions
 0.0 = net inflow same as net outflow
 * * = net inflow and net outflow are both 0-0%

Table 4.6. Political Occupations by Party of First Service, State Deputies, 1947-1971 (in percent)

Occupation	P A R T Y D I F F E R E N C E						Total	1947-1971
	PSD	DEM	REP	PRO	Minor Parties	None		
Industry and Commerce	4.0	7.3	10.0	38.1	6.7	29.9	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	40.0	29.4	4.0	0.0	3.1	23.5	100.0	100.0
Legal Professions	32.0	25.8	20.0	19.0	3.1	0.1	100.0	100.0
Teachers	2.0	9.0	7.4	9.5	3.1	47.0	100.0	100.0
Other Professions	22.0	4.6	22.6	33.3	1.1	16.4	100.0	100.0
Other Public Servant	3.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	87.0	100.0	100.0
Finance and Banking	4.0	7.3	3.7	0.0	2.0	83.0	100.0	100.0
Total	43.0	40.0	17.0	40.0	10.0	20.0	100.0	100.0
Total	50	47	27	21	70	24	100	100
Percent of N.A. (N)	(22)	(15)	(1)	(7)	(19)	(3)	(100)	(8)

are high in finance and banking and teachers, and low in the industry and commerce, and agriculture categories.

In the post-revolutionary period, the ARENA is somewhat widely based, but presents particular weaknesses relative to the overall needs for teachers and public servants. ARENA's recruitment of federal deputies during the sub-period was more narrowly based. The MDB is the most narrowly distributed party by occupation, as it was in the case of the federal deputies. These trends reflect the distributions of the respective progenitor parties.

Regionally, the PSD is slightly more evenly distributed than the UDN, the former being high for the Jequitinhonha, and the latter being high for the west, (see Table 6.10). The minor parties concentrated their recruitment in three regions (70.8%), while the PTE evidenced the narrowest regional base, concentrating its recruitment in two regions (70.6%).

Comparing Tables 5.10 and 6.10, it is evident that recruitment of federal deputies by the four ex-parties was heavily concentrated in two regions, *Metalúrgica* and *Mata* whereas, the five party groupings recruiting state deputies for the same period evidenced a much more dispersed pattern, which could be termed a "bellwether" pattern. Different parties appear to concentrate in different regions. Apart from the more populated and competitive *Mata* and *Metalúrgica* regions, only the west presents a concentration of more than three party groupings.⁷

The ARENA seems to be somewhat more concentrated in its recruitment of state deputies than the MDB, which is the reverse of the case of the federal deputies.

Table 6.10- Region of Political Support by Party of First Service,
State Deputies, 1947- 978 (in percents)

Region	P A R T Y							OVER- ALL
	PSD	LDL	PR	PTD	Pa- rties	Others	Un- kn.	
North	8.3	7.7	18.8	8.9	4.2	7.1	7.7	7.3
Central-North	23.3	7.7	7.4	4	1			1
Mid-South	7.0	10.3	14.0	5.0	4.2	7.1	7.7	8.4
West	23.3	2.0	20.2	21.4	4.7			
North-Central	9.3	5.4	20.2	41.2	12.4	27.0	24.4	
South	4.0	5.4	7.4	5.0	25.0	7.4		
West	20.0	40.0	7.4	8.9	12.5	7.1	15.4	13.1
Triangle	9.3	5.1	0.0	0.0	8.3	7.1	15.4	8.3
Total	90.0	90.0	100.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0	90.0
Total (a)	443	30	274	17	24	25	13	0
Reg. on N.A. (a)	129	17	30	10	14	15	10	0

Examining the breakdown of the recruitment variables by party grouping in Table 6.11, the PSD, UDN and PTB adhere to the traditional pattern of older ages, and the state deputies, with the PSD and PR the longest (the PSD has the longest, UDN and PTB the shortest). The ARENA and PR entered the assembly at older ages, the UDN, the youngest. Only the PR presents a significant pattern for the regional deputies in Table 5.11.

Variance on all four variables was greater for federal than state deputies.

The role of the PSD as an escola política is so evident in the recruitment pattern for state deputies.

Variance by party was higher for state deputies on level of education and family ties, and higher for federal deputies on geographic mobility.

For the state deputies, specifically, taking highs on university education and family ties, and lows on geographic mobility, as a "traditional" pattern, the PSD, UDN and PR could be termed "traditional" in their recruitment patterns. The PTB and minor parties, are observed to be less "traditional" (if the latter's high on education is excepted).

If a traditional pattern is defined by similar criteria for federal deputies, such conclusions cannot be inferred from Table 5.11.

The recruitment of party slates of candidates for state deputy is examined in Table 6.12. In this instance, the grouping "minor parties" is broken down into individual party slates.

The four major parties (PSD, UDN, PR and PTB) were generally below the overall means of percent new candidates and percent of returning

Table 6.11--Party of First Service vs. Age at First Post-Election, Pre-Assembly Career Time, Number of Pre-Assembly Positions, Age at Assembly Entry, Education Level, Salary at Entry, with and without Ties, and 2 with Geographic Location, State, and Sex, 1977-1997

Party of First Service	Age at First Position	Pre-Assembly Career Time	Age at Assembly Entry	Education Level	Salary at Entry	with Ties	without Ties
DEM	27	23-29	33-36	4-7	40-63	9-8	4-4
REP	26	27-63	40-6	8	27-35	10-6	1-1
IND	46	26-47	28-37	2-3	4-23	5-6	4-1
OTH	28	29-29	0-20	5	40-63	6	4-3
Non-Partisan	(77)	25-40	2-56	2-21	30-9	10	10-2
OTH	(37)	29-67	13-68	2-26	42-72	22-0	7-4
UB	28	28-27	1-25	3	37-68	7-9	10-9
Sum for all 210 Positions	28-27	2-32	2-7	40-70	8-3	19-3	
N	302	143	52	66	1208	204	104

Table 5. 2--Party break of candidates for State Deputy, by party (1950-1970)
 (% of 1950 candidates = % of previous candidates recruited from other parties)

Party	1950		1954		1958		1962		1966	1970	1974	
	% Cons	% Other Party	% Cons	% Other Party	% Cons	% Other Party	% Cons	% Other Party			% Cons	% Other Party
POD	44.4	16.4	45.6	16.8	49.9	7.5	44.4				7.4	4.4
JOB	6.1	21.4	16.3	16.1	52.5	15.8	56.2	18.5			16.4	4.8
OP	45.1	9.5	47.7	29.1	31.9	7.3	55.4	22.2			16.4	4.1
PTB	70.8	9.5	52.5	1.4	47.9	16.0	48.0	23			66	4
PTL	70.5	25.6	64.2	0.0	73.1	71.4					73.2	4.8
PDC	68.2	58.6	57	22.2	55.4	62.5	78.6	33.3			71	4.3
POH	70.2	92.9	44.4	0.0	72.6	0.0	62.5	8.3			64.4	8
POF	64.6	68.0	78.6	72.2	78.0	73.3	68.2	54.3			72.1	68.8
PST	85.2	88.0	42.3	100.0							47.5	98.4
ALL							58.3				82.4	
ADINA									89.1	35.8	8	
POB									68.0	48.2	69.8	
DIVISAL	68.5	43.3	71.8	24.2	53.5	24	64.0	28.4	48	35	7	10.4

candidates drawn from lower parties, with the exception of the PTB in 1950). Generally the winners of these elections were above the means with the notable exception of the first election in 1950 and 1958 drawing returning candidates from previous elections. The changes noted for the 1974 federal states in 1954 and 1974 were not evident at the state level, however, the same upsurge of candidates' "attractiveness" in 1962 was observed.


Career Advancement Patterns

Career patterns for state deputies differ somewhat from their federal counterparts (compare figures 6.1 and 6.2), in that, a certain amount of compréhension is observed among the former. This circulation or alternation between elective and appointive offices was only apparent between the state bureaucracy and "unsuccessful candidacy for elective office," and thus not exactly equivalent of the phenomenon observed during the First Republic.

Although the office of state deputy has less elected offices hierarchically prior to it, state deputies used elective offices as direct portal to the Assembly in higher proportions than did federal deputies, 57% and 48%, respectively.⁸ This supports the contention raised in the previous chapter regarding the importance of prestige électoral in the selection of candidates, and their eventual success at the polls, in the more open and competitive political system in the post-1945 period. Such would appear to have been even more the case for the state deputies.

As might be expected, (being at a higher "level" and generally reflecting longer career patterns), state government accounts for a higher proportion of pre-career offices held by federal than state

Figure 6: *Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: State Budgets, 1997-1997* (using Figure 4) (continued)



deputies, 58.9% and 40.3%, respectively, in Tables 5.13 and 6.13) however, the opposite is true in the non-federal environment, which accounts for 43.9% and 21.9% of the career offices held by state and federal deputies, respectively.

Thus, the pre-career patterns for legislative offices may be differentiated, in that, the state deputies tend to follow more localized political careers based on elected offices, with a certain amount of alternation of office through the state bureaucracy.

Summary

This chapter has compared the backgrounds and career patterns of federal and state deputies elected during the post-1945 period.

Both in terms of occupational distribution and career advancement patterns, the group of post-1945 state deputies were observed to have more of a *compromisso coronelista* pattern than their federal counterparts. The Assembly was observed to have drawn fewer elements from the "modernizing" sectors of the economy.

The Assembly, with its larger size and more local orientation, exhibited a broader and more regional base of representation. The position of the Mataungica and Mata regions was considerably reduced from that observed for both groups of federal deputies. These regions presented no *revarche* in 1963 and 1971, as was the case for the federal deputies.

The Estado Novo period did not appear to affect the pre-career patterns of the state deputies. The cohort recruited in 1955 evidenced a changed pattern, younger freshmen deputies with less political

Table 1 - Distribution of Positions Held Prior to becoming
State Deputy, 1947-1971 (N=302)

Positions	Positions Held		% of State Deputies
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	31	7.9	10.3
State Cabinet	7	1.8	2.3
High State Bureaucracy	72	18.4	23.8
Low State Bureaucracy	80	20.3	26.5
Mayor or Vice Mayor	69	17.6	22.8
Vendor	72	18.4	23.8
Municipal Bureaucracy	31	7.9	10.3
Party Office	16	4.1	5.3
Office in Other State	4	1.0	1.3
Candidate (not-elected)	(77)	---	25.5
Pre-1945 Legislator	10	2.6	3.3
No Prior Office	(20)	---	6.6
Prior Career Not Known	(99)	---	32.8
Total (X)	---	100.0	---
TOTAL (N)	(392)	(392)	(302)

Mean Number of Positions held = 2.11

experience. In 1971, this trend was directly reflected and a "de institutionalization" was observed.

The PSD, PTB and PR were again to be the broadest based occupations ally, although a large percentage concentrated the recruitment among legal and other professions (over 50%).

As was observed for the federal deputies, both the PSD and UDR were the broadest based occupationally. However, "back" pattern of competition was noted for all parties away from the more densely populated and highly competitive Mato Grosso and Alta regions.

In terms of background variables, the PSD, UDR and PR presented a more "traditional" recruitment style, and the PTB and minor parties, less so.

Circulation between the state bureaucracy and electoral candidacy, and an increased value placed on prestigio eleitoral characterized the career advancement patterns of state deputies. The latter evidenced a higher proportion of political experience within local government, than did federal deputies.

The general observation is, that the office of state deputy reflected a more localized and broader representation base within the state than did the federal deputies.

NOTES--CHAPTER 6

¹This coincided with the inauguration of the newly elected governor, Milton Campos. Elections were held in two states in January and March of 1947. The latter was a "simultaneous" election, but enough times were involved to rearrange the results in two cases. One, previously elected deputies were surpassed by newcomers and became newcomers themselves. This led to some confusion in the election statistics as two editions were published by the TSE, the first excluding, and the second including the March election.

²However, the state legislature remained unicameral, a change established in 1935.

³This is a higher overall turnover rate (election to 1.61 terms) than for the federal deputies of the same period (2.00 terms). This is reflected in Figure 5.1.

⁴This with regards the first three post-1945 legislatures, primarily.

⁵Remote from the state capital and centrally located Metropolitan region.

⁶Note that the PDC, PTN, PPP, PSP, PCB, PST, and ALY are aggregated into a "minor parties" category to facilitate the analysis.

⁷The above conclusions were deduced by examining the top three concentrations for each party grouping.

⁸Calculated for those deputies with political career data "known," i.e., 99 state deputies were thus excluded.

PART III
RECRUITMENT TO
EXECUTIVE POSITIONS

CHAPTER 7
STATE CABINET SECRETARIES

In [2] fields like politics, a position within the governor's cabinet has been both a highly sought after political plum, and an effective means of training (and testing) aspirants from the higher echelons of the elite cadre for more important political roles.

During the First Republic, with its one-party system, cabinet service was the most frequent base office for the governorship, and in particular the position of Interior Secretary.¹ This of course is quite consistent with the operation of the compramisista coronelista, and the alternation between elected and administrative positions discussed in Chapter 4. It is interesting to note (in Figure 8.2) that cabinet service was not a portal to the vice governorship.

Following the demise of the one-party system, in the post-1945 multi-party period, the cabinet became an effective means of participating the various factions in the administration of governors elected by coalition building. Operationally, such participation took various forms: at times the governor respected the parties' choices of secretariat, but chose the individual without consulting the party leaders;² on other occasions, the governor maintained a strict political agreement, respecting the parties' choices of secretariat and individual,³ and in other cases, the governor operated under a combination of the latter two styles, only to do his own way upon replacement of his initial cabinet.⁴

The first step was to compile a complete enumeration of cabinet secretaries serving during the full historical period. Two sources were used: the state government's *Journal of Names* (Anais), and the files of the *Secretaria de Pessoal*.⁴ A listing of all cabinet secretaries and their dates of service is found in Appendix A. Next, biographical data were collected for as many of the secretaries as possible. The procedures and problems involved are outlined in Appendix I.

Patterns by Secretariat

Thirteen cabinet positions are broken down by recruitment and background variables in Table 2.1. As may be seen from the numeric distributions, certain secretariats list larger numbers of secretaries, hence cover a longer historical period. The "old line" secretariats, dating from the First Republic are Interior, Finance, Agriculture, Public Safety,⁵ Government,⁷ Printing Office and Mayor of Belo Horizonte.⁸ Education was added under Cleopato Maciel, Public Works under Valladares, Health under Caspos, and the remainder (Administration, Labor and Economic Development) under Rangel Haes Pretz.

Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Public Safety had the longest pre-careers in terms of offices held. Whereas, Administration, Finance, Health and Education were longer in terms of duration of pre-career. These offices evidence occupants from relatively more institutionalized career channels, and have been traditionally considered the more "political" cabinet positions.⁹

Table 7.1 State Cabinet Secretariat vs. Age at First Position, Career Type, Number of Dependents, Age Became Secretary, Districts, Family Size, and Geography (of State Cabinet Secretariat in 1990-1997 - counts and percent)

Secretariat	(n)	Age at First Position	Pre-Sec Career Type	% of Pre-Sec Position	Age became Sec	Number of Dependents	Age became Secretary	District	Family Size	Geography
Public Works	23	27.65	7.54	3.31	47.37	26.3	1987	1	1	1
Environment	8	27.63	29.88	3.81	43.75	100.0	1987	1	1	1
Education	73	29.64	18.8	2.61	43.76	56.7	1987	1	1	1
Public Safety	4	25.69	17.87	3.61	44.25	52.3	1987	1	1	1
Insurance	6	28.08	6.83	4.44	41.13	49.0	1987	1	1	1
Health	17	31.91	15.49	2.3	48.53	75.0	1987	1	1	1
Water	71	34.48	11.53	1.49	52.07	100.0	1987	1	1	1
Finance	61	23.56	9.23	4.32	43.74	25.0	1987	1	1	1
Consumer Aff	8	37.75	2.77	1.1	46.87	7.5	1987	1	1	1
Administration	45	28.34	5.33	1.73	43.80	20.0	1987	1	1	1
Professional	14	29.79	2.32	1.44	35.71	88.3	1987	1	1	1
Printing Office	19	26.19	13.92	2.74	39.89	10.0	1987	1	1	1
Water & Sewer	29	24.59	15.17	1.6	39.69	48.9	1987	1	1	1
Public Safety	27	27.26	2.27	1.13	44.58	26.7	1987	1	1	1
All	1,499	31	9.1	10.1	44	1,093	1,987	1	1	1

The three equations for 41 cabinet ministers used to estimate in the state bureaucracy, were the same for 111 cabinet ministers in Ontario and 111 cabinet ministers in the provinces of Quebec and Alberta.

The positions of cabinet ministers of Economic Development (although covering quite different ministerial periods) were proportionately low in terms of family ties. This reflects the fact that persons recruited to these positions tend to be engineers and technically trained persons, and as such not dependent on the more traditional criteria of recruitment.

Significantly, the positions of Administration and Government Secretary evidenced persons with no geographic mobility, indicative of strong and continuing political ties to their regions of birth.


Patterns by Administration

Because the various administrations are too numerous to treat in table form, data in this section will be presented in graphic form. The breakdown by administration is of course a chronological sequence, and as such may be used to represent changing recruitment patterns over time in a manner similar to the analysis by legislature and cabinet presented in Part II.

Figure 7.1 plots age and career patterns of the secretaries over time. The general trend during the first Republic is toward older cabinets, especially after 1909. Ages of post-1915 cabinets continued to increase, but at a much slower rate.

Comparing the length of pre-cabinet career (in terms of number of offices held) with current age, a fairly close parallel is observed

Figure 7.1 - Current Age (Age 65+) and Number of Prior Petitions Filed (All 70+) by Number of Years Since Last Score of 80 or Below



between the two time series (with the exception of the 1894 cabinet of Dias Fernandes, which included younger secretaries with more political experience). The post-1945 cabinets were observed to be older but exhibited less political experience.¹⁰

It is interesting to note that contrary to the allusions to "renovation" by Artur Bernardes (1910-1922), in Chapters 3 and 4, his cabinet was the oldest and most institutionalized of all pre-1930 cabinets. "Renovation" in these terms was actually effected by Antônio Carlos in 1926.

Concerning age time series for secretaries with deputies in Figure 7.2, it is observed that except for the older hold-over (and short-tenured) interim cabinet of Gustavo Capanema in 1933, the federal banca tended to be older than the cabinets during the total First Republic period. The opposite trend appeared during the post-1945 period with one exception. It is noted that the two groups were much closer in terms of current age during the latter period. The time series for state deputies more closely paralleled that of the secretaries than did the federal deputies in the more recent period.

Cabinet turnover is calculated over time in Figure 7.3. Because of varying tenures of administrations, turnover was standardized relative to length of administration by the following equation:

$$[1.00 - (\text{Mean Tenure of Secretaries} / \text{Tenure of Administration})] \times 100$$

Thus, the Index of Relative Turnover, plotted in Figure 7.3 varies from 0 (no Cabinet substitutions during the Administration) to a high 88 (the highest rate of turnover observed).

Figure 2. Current Age Series for Cabinet Secretaries, and State and Federal Deputies, 1860-1971 (years)





Figure 7.3: Turnover of Coal and Subsidies by Administration
 (in terms of average of transfer of the 100% share of current Administration)



The going rates observed here for six months in gubernatorial administrations. The highest rates of turnover were noted for the 1890s and 1910s, and in particular during the 1890s. The turnover exceeded an extraordinary rate of 100 percent in the case of the governorship during a gubernatorial administration in the 1890s. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 1890s and 1910s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 1920s and 1930s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 1940s and 1950s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 1960s and 1970s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 1980s and 1990s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 2000s and 2010s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office. The turnover rate for cabinet members during the 2020s and 2030s was also high, but not as high as for the gubernatorial office.

Career Advancement Patterns

Pre-cabinet political careers are diagrammed in Figure 7.4. Paths to first cabinet service tend slightly toward non-elected vs. elected positions, 90 and 79 respectively. Relatively few secretaries moved directly from local politics to cabinet position.

Pre-cabinet alternation patterns are noted (unsuccessful candidate high state bureaucracy, high state bureaucracy-federal legislator, and low state bureaucracy state legislator), but to a lesser degree than in the case of the pre-1945 federal deputies (Figure 4.3). This pattern was about the same as that for post-1945 federal deputies (Figure 5.2) and more frequent than that of the state deputies (Figure 6.1). As might be expected, elected offices were more frequently held by federal and state deputies than secretaries (comparing Table 7.2 with Tables 4.30 and 5.13, and Table 6.13, respectively). As noted in Figure 7.4, positions in local government were less frequently held by cabinet secretaries.

Table J 2--Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming
State Cabinet Secretary, 1890-1971 (N=265)

Positions	Positions held		% of Cabinet Secretaries
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	65	10.3	24.5
Federal Legislature	56	8.9	21.1
State Legislature	121	19.2	45.7
High State Bureaucracy	112	17.8	42.3
Low State Bureaucracy	130	20.6	49.1
Mayor or Vice Mayor	30	4.8	11.3
Vereador	65	8.7	20.8
Municipal Bureaucracy	32	5.1	12.1
Party Office	22	3.5	8.3
Office in Other State	7	1.1	2.6
Candidate (not-elected)	(37)	---	14.0
No Prior Office	(19)	---	3.4
Prior Career Not Known	(67)	---	25.3
Total (%)	--	100.0	--
TOTAL (N)	630	630	266

Mean Number of Positions held = 3.18

Other background variables of political career characteristics for cabinet members will be presented in chronological prospect in cabinet members, vice-governors and deputies in Chapter 8.

Summary

Cabinet positions were seen as an important career office for the government, especially during the First Republic, which was consistent with the corporatista coronelista. In the post-1947 period, the cabinet became an effective means of "dividing the spoils" among parties in the governor's coalition. Regarding the latter, three styles of recruitment were observed:

Six secretariats, reputed to be more "political" in nature, evidenced more institutionalized pre-cabinet (political) career patterns. The positions of Mayor of Belo Horizonte and Secretary of Economic Development tended to be technicians, and were observed to be recruited from less political background patterns. Younger and less experienced political aspirants were recruited as Government and Administration Secretaries, but were observed to have strong regional political ties.

Generally, cabinet secretaries were younger during the First Republic period. A close parallel between the two series for age and pre-career were noted. Arthur Bernardes, an alleged "revolver" cabinet, was the oldest and most institutionalized of the historical period.

During the First Republic federal deputies tended to be older than cabinet secretaries, with the reverse being true after 1945.

In terms of representatives of the *Ministère des Travaux* administration was a entirely as a result of the basic turnover rate. Increase in turnover rates in the 1930's and early 1940's, perhaps indicative of increasing instability.

Non-elected offices were similarly used as immediate predecessors to first cabinet positions, from elected office. Turning with to the 1930's, 84% of all prior positions held were within the state bureaucracy. Alternation following the *compromisso* *governalista* model was approximately equal to that for First Republic Federal Deputies, but more than for post-1945 deputies.

NOTES--CHAPTER 7

¹Correa, *Os Governadores do Estado de São Paulo* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1958), 60-67. Especially Table 1B and Figure 6. For a discussion of the "cabinet" style, see Chapter 8 of the current study, especially Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1.

²Interview with Flávio Campos Moraes, Departamento, March 4, 1971. Campos moralized the cabinet prior to the Serenata (Serena) when the cabinet was announced on inauguration day.

³Interview with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Rio de Janeiro, March 13, 1971. Governor José Francisco das Neves (1946-1951), was reported to have utilized a similar style, by interviewees serving in his cabinet.

⁴Interview with José de Magalhães Pinto, Rio de Janeiro, March 12, 1971.

⁵Regarding the former, the first two post-1890 administrations of Casário Alvim and João Cerqueira were not reported, as the journal had a more abbreviated format prior to 1892. After 1947, editorial policy changed and cabinet institutions were reported in a different fashion, making research on the journal nearly impossible. However, in most cases, the secretariat files are quite complete for the post-1945, with some of the "old line" secretariats reporting from 1930.

⁶This position was initially termed Chefe de Gabinete.

⁷Previous to 1965 this position was the Governor's Chefe de Gabinete.

⁸Because of their political importance during the 1947 period, the Director of the Department of Police and the Chief of Police Horizonte are considered one of the highest ranks. In 1947, the latter became direct police chief, to now become an appointed position following the 1954 revolution, and the former declined in relative political importance.

⁹With the exception of Public Safety, recruitment to which tended to come more from within the tenured bureaucracy, thus the longer career Government and Administration Secretaries were more political positions, but younger and less experienced aspirants tended to be recruited.

¹⁰However, the same is true in terms of duration of non-attent career (i.e. hours) for first period secretaries (i.e. during the post-1975, but prior to the 1980s) than for those who were in the post-1975 period. This perhaps indicates a more rigid and less flexible opportunity structure in the latter period.

CHAPTER 8 GOVERNORS AND VICE GOVERNORS

In this chapter we shall analyze the career advancement patterns of governors and vice governors. Then, within a comparative perspective, additional characteristics of the latter will be contrasted with those for the secretaries and deputies.

Career Advancement Patterns

Governors

Career advancement patterns are diagrammed for governors in Figure 8-1. A diversified pattern for intermediate position to first service as governor is observed.¹ Principal portal positions are divided among the federal and state legislatures, and the state cabinet, the latter being the most frequently used.

Considerable circulation is observed between federal and state bureaucracy, state and federal legislature,² federal legislature and bureaucracy, state legislature and cabinet,³ and state cabinet and bureaucracy. In addition, circulation between elected and non-elected offices is quite frequent. These observations attest to the operation of the compromissu compromissu in a more vivid and complete pattern than has been previously observed (for deputies and secretaries).

The governorship is the cúpula position of the state political elite. As such, aspirants to the position would have to use the




Figure D - Career Advancer
10 Governors, 10

governors in an effective fashion to cement relations with the regional chiefs to insure future election as governor.

Turning to Table 7, the federal legislature and state government are important national experience leading to the governorship. Also, governors were observed to have had considerable experience in local politics.

Vice Governor

A quite different career advancement pattern is observed for the vice governors in Figure 8.2. Many used the cabinet as a portal position, and only 3 passed through this position. The important portal position was the state legislature, during the First Republic this tended to be more the State Senate.

Some circulation and alternation is apparent, but occurring to a lesser extent than for the governors. A possible conclusion here is that there tended to be a certain balancing of states for governor vice governor. At least through the administration of Milton Campos (1947-1951), vice governors tended to be recruited from the leadership of the state legislature, reflecting a conscious effort to co-opt leaders who had already mobilized the support of a majority of state's regional representatives very few of whom (only the two mentioned in note 1) were able to achieve the governorship in their own right.

Recruitment of governors (excluding succession from vice governor), on the other hand, tended to center on individuals who had effectively used the compromisso coronelista and established a firm mutual support relationship with regional political chiefs.

Table B 7--Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming Governor, 1890-1971 (N=30)

Positions	Positions held		% of Governors
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	12	6.7	40.0
Federal Legislature	31	17.3	100.0*
State Legislature	35	19.7	100.0
State Cabinet	26	14.5	86.7
State Bureaucracy	33	18.4	100.0
Mayor	11	6.1	36.7
Vereador	11	6.1	36.7
Municipal Bureaucracy	7	3.9	23.4
Vice Governor	5	2.8	16.7
Federal Minister	8	4.5	26.7
Total (%)	--	100.0	----
TOTAL (N)	(179)	(179)	(30)

Mean Number of Positions Held = 5.97

*--All governors served at least once in this position

Figure 8.7. Curricular placement patterns for 17-year-old students (1990-91)




Table 8 2--Distribution of Positions Held prior to becoming
Vice Governor, 1890-1971 (N=17)

Positions	Positions held		% of vice Governors
	N	%	
Federal Bureaucracy	4	5.9	23.5
Federal Legislature	9	13.2	53.0
State Legislature	21	30.9	100.0
State Cabinet	3	4.4	17.7
State Bureaucracy	12	17.6	70.8
Mayor or Vice Mayor	7	10.3	40.2
Wardward	8	11.8	47.0
Municipal Bureaucracy	4	5.9	23.5
Total (%)	--	100.0	----
TOTAL (N)	(68)	(68)	(17)

Mean Number of Positions Held = 4.06

During the First Republic (1861-11), this would seem to be a more, unbreakable or at least more institutionalized convention. However, in the more competitive environment of the 1940s and 1950s, the political parties for government were dominated by the state and federal legislatures and served the local interests of the political parties in the post-1945 epoch.

Comparative Perspective

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to comparison of the six political positions presented in Parts II and III.

Institutionalization

Excepting the governors, mean ages at entry into politics were approximately the same, the governors entering at slightly younger ages, vice governors and state deputies at slightly older ages, (Table B.3). Governors and vice governors had the most institutionalized political careers, indicating the apex of a hierarchical progression.

The group of secretaries would, then, rank after the governors and vice governors, as having more political experience than the federal deputies, with the state deputies being relatively the least institutionalized group. It is assumed, however, that the post-1945 federal deputies are approximately equal to the cabinet secretaries. The distinction differential, between governors and vice governors, discussed in the preceding section, is perhaps supported here in that the former entered politics earlier, had longer pre-careers, and took office at earlier ages than the latter.

Table B 3 Summary of Background and Political Career Data,
Governors, Vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries,
Federal and State Legislators, 1800-1971 (means and percents)

	Gov. 1890- 1971 N=30	Vice- Gov. 1890 1971 N=17	Cab. Sec. 1890- 1971 N=265	Federal 1890 1937 N=241	Deputy 1937 N=141	State Deputy 1947 1971 N=302
Age at First Pol. Position	24.96	28.24	27.34	26.81	27.94	28.27
Career Time	25.08	24.19	17.27	11.51	17.57	12.32
No. of Pre- Positions	6.32	4.05	3.63	2.58	3.33	2.11
Age Entry	50.24	52.87	44.58	40.89	44.54	40.70
% with Univ. Education	96.7	92.3	96.3	92.5	92.2	86.3
% with Pol. Family Ties	60.0	52.9	70.9	37.5	92.1	79.2
% with Geo. Mobility	20.0	17.6	30.2	37.1	33.8	22.1
% with Legal Studies	76.7	76.5	62.9	66.0	69.0	72.8
% Studied Outside H.G.	63.4	59.8	39.4	75.6	39.1	28.4

Education

All groups were quite high on level of education, except for state deputies. Governors and vice-governors studied law in equal proportions, while the cabinet secretaries—who were drawn from a variety of professional specializations—had the lowest proportion. Given the diversified nature of the Secretariats, an even lower proportion might have been expected.

In that during the Empire and early First Republic periods, few universities were functioning in Minas Gerais, higher proportions of federal deputies serving during this period were educated outside the state. In that a majority of the governors and vice-governors date from the same period, they are also high on this variable.

State deputies represent the most recent period, and had the lowest levels of university education. These two factors appear to have combined to effect the lowest frequency of out-of-state studies.

Regionalism

Distributions by region of political support are found in Table 8.4. Regarding the above discussion of balancing slates of governor/vice-governor, a regional balancing might also tend to operate. Recruitment of governors was concentrated in the Metafísica and South (67.8%), while that of vice-governors is in the Mata and North (60%).

Except for the vice-governors, recruitment has been concentrated from the three most populous and developed regions, Metafísica, Mata and South. The state deputies have the broadest regional distribution, but if the latter and the vice-governors are excluded, the Metafísica predominates.

Table 8.4 Region of Political Support by Governors, vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies, 1890-1971 (in percents)

Region	Gov.	Vice-	Cab.	Federal Deputy		State
	1890- 1971	Gov. 1890- 1971	Sec. 1890- 1971	1890- 1971	1890- 1971	Deputy 1947- 1971
North	0.0	20.0	7.5	7.8	6.6	7.3
Jequitinhonha	0.0	0.0	5.0	3.9	9.6	10.5
Rio Doce	3.6	6.7	3.8	3.0	8.1	8.4
Mata	14.3	40.0	20.0	25.0	19.8	20.9
Metropolitana	42.8	6.7	28.7	31.5	28.6	19.4
South	25.0	13.3	20.0	19.7	11.8	14.1
West	10.7	13.3	13.1	6.9	10.3	13.1
Triangle	3.6	0.0	1.9	2.2	5.2	6.3
TOTAL %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(28)	(15)	(160)	(232)	(136)	(111)
Region N.A. (N)	(2)	(2)	(105)	(9)	(7)	(191)

Referring to Table B 5, it is interesting to note that in terms of geographic mobility, the vice governors, governors and state deputies are the lowest mobility categories showing regional ties, which are particularly significant for the first two regional positions.

Prior Political Careers

The distribution of pre-career positions is presented in Table B 5. As has been previously noted, the vice governors were disproportionately high on elective positions, the reverse of the other offices.

Both the state legislature and bureaucracy seem to be important base offices for all groups.⁴ This trend is even more vividly displayed when the positions are re-grouped by level of government. Except for the state deputies (who have more localized careers), state government accounts for more than half of all positions held for the remaining five groups. The First Republic federal deputies tended to be higher on municipal and lower on federal experience within the above-mentioned five groups. Except for this later observation and the First Republic federal deputies rich in municipal government, their pattern is quite similar to that of their post-1945 successors.

Regarding immediate porta position to first service in the respective offices, again the governors are equally divided between elective and non-elective offices, (Table B 6). The division for vice governors is even more slanted towards elective office than in Table B 5. However, the other four groups (although to a lesser extent also used elective office more frequently than non-elective office as immediate porta).

Table 8.5--Prior Political Positions Held: Governors, Vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Deputies 1890-1971 in percent

Position Held	Gov 1890- 1971	Vice Gov 1890- 1971	Cab Sec 1890- 1971	Federal Secretary		State Deputy 1890- 1971
				1890- 1937	1937- 1971	
GOV. OR VICE GOV. 1890-1900	50.0	33.0	53.9	53.4		5.0
State Cabinet	17.3	4.4	0.0	3.0	-	0.0
Federal Bureaucracy	1.2	3.9	10.3	1.9	0.4	0.0
All State Bureaucracy	18.4	7.6	7.0	23.3	1.1	0.0
10 State Bureaucracy	n.c.	n.c.	20.0	n.c.	1.1	0.0
Non-pa. Bureaucracy	3.9	3.9	5.7	4.4	2.4	0.0
EXECUTIVE POSITIONS	49.2	66.2	47.0	46.4	49.1	40.0
Federal Legislature	7.3	3.2	8.4	7.2*	4.4	0.0
State Legislature	9.7	30.0	9.2	24.9	14.4	10.0
Mayor or Vice Mayor	0	10.3	4.0	10.3	9.0	0.0
Parson	0	0	0.7	7.6	0.0	0.0
OTHER STATE & RAFFER POS.	n	n	4.6	n	3.4	n
FEDERAL	20.5	9.3	9.2	9	15.0	0
STATE	55.4	62.9	50.6	50.0	50.1	40.0
MILITARY	10	20.0	10.0	10.4	21.9	10.0
TOTAL	60.0	60.0	100.0	60.0	60.0	40.0
TOTAL POSITIONS HELD	119	146	630	261	100	10

* n.c. = could not be coded in original period

n.c. = does not apply n.c. = not coded n.c. = data set

Table B-6- Limited and Part-time Positions for Governors, Vice Governors, Cabinet Secretaries, Federal and State Legislators, 1990-1991 (%)

Immediate Position	Gov. 1990- 1991	Vice- Gov. 1990- 1991	Cab. Sec. 1990- 1991	Federal Legis.		State Legis.
				1990- 1991	1991	
GOV. ELECTURE POS. TIME	60.0	1.0	39.2	39.7	-	3.0
State Cabinet	33.0	0.0	66.8	12.0	7.0	2.0
Federal Representative	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0
U.S. State Representative	0.7	0.0	20.1	5.0	-	-
U.S. State Representative	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.4
Part-time Representative	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.7	-	0.0
TOTAL POS. TIME	50.0	60.0	46.7	47.4	4.0	6.0
GOV. POS. TIME	20.7	23.0	50.8	5.9	-	0.0
State Legis. Pos. Time	23.1	16.7	24.9	3.0	7.0	7.4
U.S. State Legis. Pos. Time	0.0	0.0	1.8	5.0	-	0.0
Part-time	0.0	0.0	2.5	2.6	0.0	0.0
POS. PARTY & CAND.	n.c.	n.c.	5.5	n.c.	7.0	2.0
FEDERAL	30.7	35.0	24.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
STATE	63.3	56.0	53.8	6.0	64.0	7.0
STATE (TIME)	0.0	0.0	0.2	12.0	-	10.0
TOTAL	100.0	60.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (TIME)	-	7.0	98.0	77.0	43.0	10.0

n.c. = not coded

0.0 = does not apply

n.c. = not coded

This is the reverse of the observation in Table 8.6; indicating that prior to the portal office non-elective offices were more frequently occupied, but the last office before first service was more frequently elective.

The importance of elective municipal office as portal to the office of state deputy is observed, further confirming their localized recruitment pattern previously noted.

The state legislature's importance is again noted. Regarding the use of a base office, it can now be said that the state bureaucracy would be an "intermediate" base office, with the state legislature as the "portal" base office.

Except for the state deputies, state government was the most frequently used portal "level" of government. However, portal positions at the federal level were more frequent for future governors and vice governors, than for the other offices. The importance of municipal politics for state deputies is again noted. As might be expected, federal deputies used federal offices as portal more frequently than did the state deputies.

NOTES--CHAPTER 8

¹Julio P. de la Cruz and Cleófilo de la Cruz each served twice as governor. The first time because someone else was the governor temporarily (only to do for a few months), a second time elected five years after by the Texas voters (end of the term). Then returning as governor elected in their own right at a later date. Figure 8.1 plots the governors' careers to the point of first service.

²Due in part to the bicameral state legislature prior to 1930.

³Idem., note 2.

⁴Especially the state cabinet for governors, and excepting the state legislature for the state deputies.

PART IV
THE RECRUITMENT
PROCESS

Interviews with Three
Elite Samples (1945-1970)

This Part will contrast the political socialization, initial recruitment to first political office, and subsequent career advancement to positions within the elite sector. This for three samples of federal and state deputies, and cabinet secretaries. An attempt will be made to approximate the sequential model presented in Chapter 2, linking the above three stages in a chronological progression.

CHAPTER 9
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In the first of our studies we demonstrated that no single period in the lives of men can state legislators stands out as the epoch when they initially became interested in politics.¹ In their comparative study of American and Canadian legislators, Longberg and Thomas found childhood, adolescence and adult periods recalled as socialization phases.² In his study of Michigan state legislators, Soule found epoch and agent of initial socialization significantly associated -- family during childhood, school during adolescence, and events and occupational group during adulthood.³

In the current study, data on initial socialization were ascertained by asking the open-ended question "How did you initially become interested in politics?" (No. 0136). No attempt was made to focus the respondent, and therefore some recalled adult and experiences coincident with or even subsequent to their first political office. To a certain extent the respondents' interpretation of this question depended on individual interpretations of "interested in politics." It is apparent that the latter group became interested in politics during the adult period in terms of their own personal interest generated by entry into their first political office.

Table 9-1 presents the distributions of specific motivations involved in initial political socialization for the three elite samples. The

Table 9.1 Specific Motivations Involved in Initial Political Socialization, three samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Family	25.0	22.0	17.4	21.1
Publicly Involved	37.5	34.2	36.1	35.6
General Interest	20.8	23.2	27.6	24.2
Student Activities	16.7	20.6	18.9	19.1
Total Responses (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses (N)	(48)	(82)	(69)	(199)
Total Responding (N)	(24)	(47)	(36)	(107)

Table 9.2--General Agent Involved in Initial Political Socialization, three samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Self-Passive	12.5	10.6	10.8	11.1
Self-Active	25.0	34.0	32.4	31.4
By Others	37.5	36.2	32.4	35.2
Events and Other	25.0	19.1	24.3	22.3
Total Responses (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responding (N)	(24)	(47)	(37)	(108)

original nine code format has been collapsed into four general categories. Approximately one-third of each group recalled their own public involvement as the prime socialization experience.⁴ Family socializes more than deputies cited family members. Generally, student activities⁵ were cited with the least frequency.⁶

A more general coding scheme is reported in Table 9.2, broken down by autonomous involvement, other persons as agent, and events and other. The sample of federal deputies evidenced the lowest level of autonomous involvement, while their state counterparts the lowest incidence of events and other as socialization agent.

Table 9.3 breaks down five independent variables⁷ according to prime socialization motivation.⁸ Those respondents recalling family or student activities as prime motivational factors, were socialized and entered first office at earlier ages. Those recalling their own public involvement or general interest in politics were socialized and entered first office at later ages. The same trend appears for family political participation, father in politics and student political activities.⁹

With regards the general socialization agent, in Table 9.4, those socialized through passive autonomy, or by other persons evidenced the earliest ages, while those recalling active autonomy or events and other had the latest ages. As suggested by Soule's Michigan data, age appears to be related to type of initial socialization, as seen in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.¹⁰ Except for the autonomous activities in terms of student political activities (which would be expected), the same trends observed in Table 9.4 continue for the three variables of political participation.

Table 9.3--Prime Motivation Involved in Initial Political Socialization by Five Independent Variables (means and percents) All Samples N=123

	Family	Publicly Involved	General Interest	Student Activities	Over All
Age at Pol. Soc.	22.09	26.10	24.12	22.88	23.86
Age at First Office	25.04	26.62	27.55	23.20	26.41
Index Family Pol. Particp.	2.50	1.74	1.23	2.31	1.94
Father in Politics? %	82.4	58.1	53.8	75.0	67.3
Student Pol. Activities? %	64.7	41.9	61.5	100.0	62.6

Table 9.4--General Agent Involved in Initial Political Socialization by Five Independent Variables (means and percents) All Samples N=123

	Self-Passive	Self-Active	by Others	Events & Other	Over All
Age at Pol. Soc.	21.60	24.24	23.13	26.13	23.96
Age at First Office	24.50	26.86	24.84	29.18	24.46
Index Family Pol. Particp.	2.25	1.77	2.11	1.75	1.94
Father in Politics? %	66.7	58.8	76.3	62.5	66.7
Student Pol. Activities? %	75.0	67.6	60.5	54.2	63.0

Table 9 4 presents data on epoch of political socialization. Recalling the background data discussed in Chapter 6, carryover of state deputies into the post-1945 period was very small, hence the low proportion receiving their socialization in the pre-1945 period. In that the same group is relatively younger than the other two groups, it was to be expected that a larger proportion would be socialized in the post-1945 epoch. Federal deputies and cabinet secretaries are somewhat more evenly distributed.

The final variable involved in initial political socialization is age (Table 9 6). Again the youth of the state deputies appears, having the lowest mean age at socialization. The sample of cabinet secretaries present the oldest ages.

Association Among Variables

Table 9 7 summarizes the bi-variate relationships among the seven variables involved in political socialization, in terms of probability of association (chi-square), and strength of association (Cramer's λ). Only chi-squares with probabilities less than 0.05 are considered significant.

Those with fathers active in politics or themselves active in student politics were socialized at earlier ages. As might be expected, epoch was significantly related to age of political socialization. Table 9 8 clearly shows a trend towards socialization at later ages in more recent epochs. This perhaps is due to a general lengthening of pre-adulthood and completing one's formal schooling at later ages in the more recent epochs. However, it is quite significant that nearly one-half of those

Table 9.5--Epoch of Political Socialization, three samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Pre-1930	21.4	22.0	26.2	18.2
1930 through 1944	42.9	39.2	33.3	38.1
Post-1945	35.7	51.0	40.5	43.7
Total Responding (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responding (N)	(28)	(51)	(42)	(121)

Table 9.6--Age at Initial Political Socialization, three samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Under 20	32.1	37.3	21.4	30.5
20 through 29	32.1	43.1	47.6	42.2
Over 30	35.7	19.6	31.0	27.3
Total Responses (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Age	26.25	24.24	27.64	25.88
Total Responding (N)	(28)	(51)	(42)	(121)

Table 9 7--Probability of Association (Chi-Square), and Strength of Association (Cramer's V), among variables of Political Socialization Summary for the Total Sample (N=123)

	Specific Motive Pol. Soc.	General Agent Type A Pol. Soc.	General Agent Type B Pol. Soc.	Epoch of Pol. Soc.	Age at Pol. Soc.
Spec. Motive Pol. Soc.	**	$p < 0.001$ 0.432	$p < 0.001$ 0.392	**	**
Agent A Pol. Soc.	**	**	**	**	**
Agent B Pol. Soc.	**	**	**	**	**
Epoch Pol. Soc.	N 0	N 0	N 0	**	$p < 0.001$ 0.320
Age at Pol. Soc.	N 0	N 0	N 0	**	**
Father in Politics?	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0	$p < 0.05$ 0.241
Student Active?	$p < 0.01$ 0.378	N 0	N 0	N 0	$p < 0.02$ 0.270

* **--Relationship not considered

N 0--Not significant at the 0.05 level

Table 9 B- Epoch of Political Socialization by Age Group,
three samples $n=123$ (in percents)

Age (Group) at Political Socialization	Epoch of Political Socialization		
	Pre-1930	1930-1944	Post-1945
under 20	45.6	30.4	24.5
20 through 29	60.0	56.5	26.4
Over 30	4.5	13.0	49.1
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(22)	(46)	(53)

$$\chi^2 = 24.720$$

$$d.f. = 4$$

$$p < 0.001$$

$$\text{Cramer's } V = 0.320$$

$$\text{Contingency Coefficient} = 0.412$$

socialized prior to 1930 were under 20, while the same proportion of those socialized in the post 1945 epoch were over 30.

General agent of socialization was found to be significantly associated with prime motivational factor involved in initial socialization, in Table 9.9. As might be expected for the autonomous agent, the most common factors were public involvement and student activities. For those socialized by other people, the important factor was influence of family. Under the events and other category, family and the interviewees' own public involvement were the most commonly mentioned factors.

Finally, the dichotomy student political activities (yes-no) was also associated with specific motivational factors. Those with student political participation most commonly cited student activities and family influence as specific motivational factors.

Summary

Agent of initial political socialization appeared to be associated with the specific motivation recalled. Those citing passive autonomy and other persons as agent were socialized at earlier ages, while those citing events and active autonomy evidenced older ages.

A trend towards earlier socialization was evident for the pre 1930 epoch, and at later ages in the more recent periods, perhaps indicating an evolution of the society towards maturation at later ages.

Highs on both family political involvement and student political activities were associated with socialization at earlier ages. Student political activity was found to be associated with type of specific motivation involved in initial socialization.

Table 9.9--General Socialization Agent by Prime Motivational Factor, three samples N=123 (in percents)

Prime Motivational Factor	General Agent		
	Self	By Other People	Events & Other
Family Influence	4.4	57.9	41.7
Public Involvement	44.4	7.9	33.3
General Interest	22.2	26.3	25.0
Student Activities	28.9	7.9	0.0
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(45)	(38)	(24)

$$\chi^2 = 40.026$$

$$d.f. = 6$$

$$p < 0.001$$

$$\text{Cramer's } V = 0.432$$

$$\text{Contingency Coefficient} = 0.522$$

NOTES--CHAPTER 9

¹Mahike et al., op. cit., 80-82

²Allan Ornberg and Norman Thomas, "The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites in the United States and Canada," *JP*, 44:4 (November, 1963), 761-775

³Soule, op. cit., 71-73, (especially Table 2.1).

⁴Such experiences ranged from the non-political (public, professional and economic activities, recreation, class, sport or religious activities, to more political activities (campaigns and political movements). Many of the former "non-political" activities were within the "boundaries" of the political system, in the form of involvement with interest articulation structures. Table 4. is a summation of multiple response categories.

⁵Includes secondary and university levels, according to the first socialization experience recalled.

⁶It is interesting to note that although approximately two thirds of the total sample had fathers active in politics, and were themselves student activists (Table 9.3), only 21% and 19% of the responses referred to the family and student activities, respectively, as being involved in initial political socialization. This may have been due to the fact that the question dealt with "interest in politics." It is possible that many of the deputies had contact with politics and first experiences through their families, but did not recall this as having aroused their first "interest."

⁷Although age at first office is an "independent" variable, it can not be considered an independent variable involved in political socialization. It is included only for the purpose of comparison with age at political socialization.

⁸Prime motivation is that appearing to be the most important component in the respondents' recall of first socialization experiences.

⁹These latter two were operationalized as "yes-no" dichotomies, while the index of family political participation was computed giving 2 points for an active father, and one point for each active maternal or paternal uncle (or aunt).

¹⁰Soule, op. cit., 71-72.

CHAPTER 10
INITIAL SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT

This chapter deals with the motives and mechanisms involved in selection and recruitment to first political office. Of the 123 individuals interviewed as part of the over time samples, 20 held no public office prior to either first candidacy as deputy or first service as cabinet secretary, and are thus excluded from the analysis presented in this chapter.

The preceding chapter examined earliest recalled experiences involving socialization to politics in general. Selection and recruitment to first political office may be viewed as the individual's first experience in a formal political role. As was seen in the analysis of career patterns, in Parts II and III, successful performance within these roles may affect subsequent career advancement patterns, especially within a system placing a positive value on *serpentazgo*, or political apprenticeship. The relationship between socialization and initial recruitment will also be examined.

In that differing mechanisms and motivations were thought to be involved in initial recruitment to elected and nominated first positions, responses were coded in separate schemes. Upon ascertaining the type of first office held, (in question 01.46), the interviewer was instructed to ask either "How did you decide to become a candidate for this office?" (01.54A), or "How did you come to be nominated (or selected) for this first administrative position?" (01.54B).

Table 10.1 shows the predominance of non-elected first positions in all three sub-samples. Table 10.2 indicates higher proportions of positions in local government among future cabinet secretaries and state deputies, and conversely, higher proportions of federal positions among future federal deputies. This closely parallels the data presented in Parts II and III, and helps substantiate the representativeness of the samples.¹

As in the case of political socialization, the larger proportion of the sample occupied their first office in the post-1945 epoch (Table 10.3). Fewer state deputies held first office in the First Republic, while proportionately more state deputies (than federal deputies and cabinet secretaries) entered public life during the Vargas-Valladares period.

The age data also parallel those for socialization, in Table 10.4. Again the state deputies present the youngest entry age, however, the three groups vary less around the overall mean than was the case for age at socialization.

Elected First Office

The multiple responses regarding motivations involved in recruitment to first office (elected) are displayed in Table 10.5. More federal deputies recalled being asked to run (by others), while they had the lowest frequency for political career motives and prior political participation and public activities. The federal deputies also had the highest frequency of responses involving the projected achievement of specific objectives. The response patterns of future state deputies

Table 10.1--Type of First Political Office, three samples
(in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec	Total Sample
Elected Office	25.0	22.0	29.5	25.3
Nominated Position	75.0	78.0	70.5	74.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responding	(28)	(41)	(34)	(103)

Table 10.2--Level of First Political Office, three samples,
(in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec	Total Sample
Federal	21.5	4.8	11.8	11.6
State	46.5	53.7	47.1	49.5
Municipal	32.0	41.5	41.2	39.9
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number Responding	(28)	(41)	(34)	(103)

Table 10.3--Epoch of First Political Office, three samples
(in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Pre-1930	21.4	7.3	20.6	15.5
1930 through 1944	35.7	36.6	29.5	34.0
Post-1945	42.9	56.1	50.0	50.5
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responding	(28)	(41)	(34)	(103)

Table 10.4--Age at First Political Office, three samples
(in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Under 20	28.6	12.2	11.8	16.5
From 20 through 29	35.7	60.9	47.1	49.5
Over 30	35.7	26.9	41.2	34.0
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Age	27.43	25.62	27.69	26.79
Total Responding	(28)	(41)	(34)	(103)

Table 10.5--Motivations Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Elected), three samples (in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
Asked to Run as Cand.	38.1	17.4	25.0	26.5
Achieve Specific Obj.	47.5	39.0	37.5	41.2
Pol. Career Motives	4.8	13.1	16.7	11.8
Pol. Particip. & Activ.	9.5	30.5	20.8	20.5
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses	(21)	(23)	(24)	(68)
Total Responding	(8)	(12)	(10)	(30)

Table 10.6--Prime Motivation Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Elected) by Five Independent Variables (means and percents) three samples N=30

	Asked to Run	Achieve Specific obj.	Pol. Career Motives	Pol. Particip. & Activ.	Over All
Age at Pol. Soc.	30.25	23.50	18.25	23.50	26.40
Age at First Office	35.63	26.83	27.25	28.50	31.80
Index Family Pol. Particip.	1.63	0.83	0.50	2.25	1.40
Father in Politics? %	56.2	33.3	25.0	75.0	50.0
Student Pol. Activities? %	25.0	50.0	100.0	50.0	43.3

and cabinet secretaries were more parallel, except that the latter were higher on being asked to run, and the former were higher in terms of political participation and activities.

In Table 10.6, five independent variables are broken down by motivation to first elected office. Those "asked to run" were socialized and ran for first office at later ages, and were lowest on student political activity. Those citing political career motivations as their prime motivation were socialized at the earliest mean age, entered politics at earlier ages, were the highest on family political participation, and 100% on student political activity. Those motivated to achieve specific objectives evidence a similar pattern, except for lower levels of student political activity. The latter two groups of motivations are both future and achievement oriented (personal and non-personal goals, respectively), and have early entry plus lower levels of family political activity in common. The student political differential is to be expected for the career motivated. Finally, as might also be anticipated, those citing their prior political participation (non-office holding) and public activities as prime motivation showed the highest level of family involvement in politics, but with average student political activities.

Comparing the overall means (Tables 10.5 and 10.8), those following a career sequence beginning with non-elected office were socialized and entered public office at earlier ages, and had higher levels of family and student political participation.

First Office by Nomination

Motivations (or better, mechanisms) involved in recruitment to first political office through nomination are summarized in Table 10.7.² Approximately one half of the total responses indicated nomination by a specific official, while less than 10% mentioned party or student political activities. The three sub-samples were closely parallel, except for the cabinet secretaries being highest on "through friends and relatives" and "through party activities." This may indicate an early tendency for the secretaries to disproportionately use these mechanisms for subsequent career advancement.

The five independent variables are broken down by prime motivation to first non-elected office in Table 10.8.³ Those citing their prior party activities as prime motivation were socialized and entered their first political role at very late ages, had low family activity and were high (100%) on student political activity (yet interestingly enough did not cite the latter as their prime motivation, perhaps because the latter was a secondary part of their party activities). Those naming friends and relatives as prime mechanism in securing their first (nominated) office were socialized at very early ages, and were high on family political activity (as might be expected).

Those indicating the examination route to first office present the phenomenon (identified in the previous chapter) of political socialization subsequent to holding first public office. In the main, this involved holding a part time public job while finishing school, and was generally not mentioned as a socialization experience. Although not citing family

Table 10.7 Motivations Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Nominated), three samples (in percents)

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	Cabinet Sec.	Total Sample
By Examination	23.1	29.7	23.5	25.7
Through Party Activities	0.0	2.7	8.8	4.1
Through Friends and Relatives	15.4	16.2	20.5	17.6
Nominated by "so-and-so"	53.8	48.7	44.2	48.5
By Student Political Activities	7.7	2.7	3.0	4.1
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses	(26)	(37)	(34)	(97)
Total Responding	(19)	(26)	(23)	(68)

Table 10.8--Prime Motivation Involved in Recruitment to First Political Office (Nomination) by Five Independent variables (means and percents), three samples N=68

	By Exam	Through Party Activity	Friends and Relatives	Nom. by So-&-So	Over All
Age at Pol. Soc.	27.96	33.00	19.54	25.86	25.60
Age at First Office	22.00	41.00	24.86	26.04	24.85
Index Family Pol. Particip.	2.33	1.00	2.36	1.75	2.06
Father in Politics? %	70.8	50.0	78.6	67.9	70.6
Student Pol. Activities? %	52.2	100.0	64.3	75.0	65.7

influence as involved in securing first office, this group is high on family political activity, but below the mean on their own student political activities.

Finally, the larger group specifically recalling an official who effected their nomination (not through competitive examinations) were slightly older and slightly lower on family involvement in politics.

Relations Among Variables

Of the variables involved in political socialization, only age is associated with recruitment to both elected and non elected first office as was described in Tables 10.5 and 10.7. Political socialization appears to be most associated with whether the individual actively or passively sought his first political office. This in the sense that those actively seeking first office cited public involvement and were self starting (specific motive and general agent, respectively) in their political socialization. Those with passive recruitment to first office evidenced family influence and other people in their socialization.

Socialization in the post-1945 epoch was associated with the elected office motivations "asked to run" and "achieve specific objectives." Socialization prior to 1930 was associated with political career motives, while that during the 1930-1944 period with political participation and public activities.

Self-active and by other people were the predominant socialization agents for those asked to run for first political position. Those with self starting socialization more frequently evidenced political career motives and prior political and public activities as first elected office motivations.

Table 10.9--Probability of Association (Chi-Square), and Strength of Association (ramer's V) among Variables of Political Socialization and Recruitment to First Political Office Summary for Total Sample (N=123)

	RECRUITMENT TO FIRST POLITICAL OFFICE		1st Office Elected or Nomination	Role Active or Passive
	Motivations Elective	Nominations		
Epoch 1st Office	p<0.001 0.635	p<0.05 0.312	N 0	N 0
Age 1st Office	p<0.05 0.462	p<0.02 0.336	p<0.01 0.278	N 0
Level Gov't. 1st Office	N 0	N 0	p<0.001 0.472	N 0
Spec. Motive Pol. Soc.	N 0	N 0	p<0.01 0.314	p<0.01 0.285
Agent A Pol. Soc.	N 0	N 0	N 0	p<0.01 0.281
Agent B Pol. Soc.	p<0.05 0.480	N 0	N 0	p<0.01 0.309
Epoch Pol. Soc.	p<0.001 0.668	N 0	N 0	p<0.01 0.266
Age at Pol. Soc.	p<0.05 0.469	p<0.05 0.320	N 0	N 0
Father in Politics?	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Student Pol. Activities?	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Occupation	N 0	p<0.01 0.453	p<0.001 0.411	N 0

N 0--Not significant at the 0.05 Level

For those whose first office was elected, the most frequently cited socialization route was public involvement and for non-elected first office, family influence. This is as might be expected, in that the data in Table 10.7 demonstrated family influence as a mechanism involved in recruitment to first non-elected office.

Occupation group was found to be associated with prime motivation involved in recruitment to first (non-elected) office. Those in the legal professions recalled attaining their first office through nomination by a specific official, as did those in the liberal and other professions. Public servants and those engaged in business and finance entered their first position via examination. The only group who recalled party activities as prime motivation were those in transportation and industrial activities.

Changing recruitment patterns are examined over time in Table 10.10 and 10.11. For first office elected, direct invitations to run and the achievement of specific objectives were recalled more predominately in the post-1945 period, while political career motives were more evenly distributed and tending toward the pre-1930 epoch. Political participation and other prior public activities were concentrated in the vaneas period (1930-1944). Due to the nature of the latter period few first elected offices appeared, in that open, elective processes at the state and local level functioned only briefly from 1935 through 1937.

For those whose first office was non-elected (Table 10.11) the examination route was equally distributed for the three periods. Those recalling their party activities and motivation through friends and relatives were concentrated in the post-1945 period. Those recalling

Table 10.10--Prime Motivation by Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Elected) Three Samples N=30 (in percents)

Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Elected)	Prime Motivation			
	Asked to Run	Achieve Specific Objectives	Political Career Motives	Political Particip./Activities
Pre-1930	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0
1930 through 1944	6.3	16.7	25.0	75.0
Post-1945	93.8	83.3	25.0	25.0
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(16)	(6)	(4)	(4)

$$\chi^2 = 24.185 \quad \text{d.f.} = 6 \quad p < 0.001$$

Cramer's $v = 0.635$ Contingency Coefficient = 0.668

Table 10.11--Prime Motivation by Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Nomination) Three Samples N=68 (in percents)

Epoch of Recruitment to First Office (Nominated)	Prime Motivation			
	By Exam	Through Party Activities	Friends and Relatives	Nominated by So-8-So
Pre-1930	34.8	0.0	21.4	7.1
1930 through 1944	34.8	0.0	21.4	57.1
Post-1945	30.4	100.0	57.1	35.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(23)	(2)	(14)	(28)

$$\chi^2 = 13.035 \quad \text{d.f.} = 6 \quad p < 0.05$$

Cramer's $v = 0.312$ Contingency Coefficient = 0.404

nomination by a specific person, are concentrated in the Vargas Valladares epoch, which is consistent with prior findings.

Summary

Examining motivations and mechanisms involved in recruitment to first elected office, those evidencing political career and achievement motivations were socialized and entered first office at the earliest ages, and those asked to run and motivated by prior political activities at elder ages. Generally the elected group evidenced older ages than the non-elected group.

This perhaps indicates that those entering non-elected first office were less dependent on their own efforts and accomplishments. Within the elected group, those more personally and achievement motivated perhaps began their careers earlier due to both their high degree of motivation and lack of family and other key background assets.

However, those mentioning family as the key to securing first office via nomination entered at the earliest ages. The role of family was also intertwined with early recruitment via the examination route. Those citing party activities and direct nomination as mechanisms entered at later ages and with less family involvement, and thus perhaps based on more universalistic criteria.

The individual's political socialization appears to be more closely associated with recruitment to first office (elected), and less with non-elected posts. This specifically revealed socialization by public involvement and family influence, respectively, further substantiating the universalistic, and particularistic-descriptive differentials of the two routes.

Over time, only political career motivations were concentrated in the pre-1930 epoch while other elected office motivations appeared in the later periods.

While ascriptive recruitment to first office via nomination was centered in the post-1945 epoch, the more universalistic (performance) criteria were evenly distributed within all three historical periods

NOTES--CHAPTER 10

¹Note that this was not one of the criteria included in the sampling design.

²In comparing tables 10.5 and 10.7, note that the mean numbers of responses were 2.26 and 1.46, respectively, for those with elected and non-elected first office.

³Note that student political activity was not cited as a "prime" motivation.

CHAPTER 11
RECRUITMENT TO FIRST CANDIDACY AS DEPUTY
AND FIRST CABINET SERVICE

Chapters 9 and 10 have analyzed the total sample of 123 deputies and secretaries. At this juncture, due to a different line of questioning required to distinguish the recruitment mechanisms involved, the sample will be split into two groups--80 state and federal deputies, and 43 cabinet secretaries. The responses of the former involve their first candidacy for deputy (successful or not), whereas the latter involves first cabinet service in the post-1945 epoch.

First Candidacy for Deputy

In terms of residence at the time of first candidacy (Table 11.1), again the localism (or regionalism) of the state deputies is reflected. Two-thirds of the latter resided in the interior of the state, whereas slightly more than one-half of the federal deputies cited residence outside the state capital.

Consistent with the data for socialization and recruitment to first office, the sample of state deputies had a younger mean age at first candidacy.¹

Party Choice

Tables 11.3 and 11.4 present party of first candidacy and the reasons for party choice, respectively, for the two samples. More

Table 11.1--Residence at First Candidacy for Deputy,
two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
Interior of MG	55.2	66.7	62.5
Belo Horizonte	44.8	33.3	37.5
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(29)	(51)	(80)

Table 11.2--Age at First Candidacy for Deputy,
two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
Under 30	13.8	23.5	20.0
30 through 39	37.9	46.1	42.5
Over 40	48.3	31.4	37.5
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Age	39.07	36.18	37.23
TOTAL (N)	(29)	(51)	(80)

Table 11.3--Party of First Candidacy for Deputy, two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
P.S.D.	27.6	25.5	26.2
U.D.N.	31.0	29.5	27.5
P.R.	17.2	15.7	16.3
P.T.S.	10.3	9.8	10.0
Minor Parties	6.9	11.8	10.0
ARENA	6.9	5.9	6.3
M.D.B.	0.0	5.9	3.7
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(29)	(51)	(80)

Table 11.4--First Candidacy for Deputy, Reasons for Party Choice, two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
Friends and Contacts	14.3	6.5	9.5
Ideas and Program	16.3	23.4	20.6
Invited by Party Leader	16.3	14.3	15.1
Prior Party Work & Campaigns	36.8	32.4	34.2
Affiliation of Family	12.2	18.3	15.8
Candidacy Jettied by Other Party	4.1	5.1	4.8
Total Responses (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses (N)	(49)	(77)	(126)
Total Responding (N)	(29)	(51)	(80)

federal deputies cited friends and contacts, and prior party work and campaigns, while more state deputies recalled ideas and programs and their family's affiliation as reasons involved in their choice of party.

The prime reason for party choice was significantly associated with the party chosen for first candidacy (in Table 11.5). The parties are observed to be differentiated in the following manner:

- 1) the UDN, ARENA and MDB have the highest proportions of adherents for programmatic reasons, with the PSD and PR the lowest;
- 2) the PSD and PR showed the highest incidence of family affiliation, prior party and campaign work, and direct invitations by party leaders; and
- 3) the minor parties received a large proportion of their adherents due to prior vetoes of other parties (which appear to have been the PSD and UDN).

Regarding the first observation, the UDN has been repeatedly cited as the most programmatic and idealistic party within the state. Although the PTB in other states tended to be more programmatic and ideological, the "traditionalness" of the PTB mineiro is again clearly evident. It is interesting to note the presence of both the ARENA and MDB in this classification. This was mainly due to respondents citing the programs of their respective parties as support for or opposing the 1964 revolution and its implementation at the national level.

As very similar "traditional" parties the PSD and PR evidenced the influence of family and parentesco observed in Part II. The PR ranked higher in terms of the role of party leaders because of the extremely personalistic control the senior Artur Bernardes exerted over the party.

Table 11.5--Party of First Candidacy for Deputy by Prime Reason for Party Choice, two samples

Prime Reason for Party Choice	Party of First Candidacy				Minor Parties	ABSEN	MIS
	POB	DOB	PC	PTB			
Friends and Contacts	9.5	9.1	9.0	25.0	2.5	0.0	33.3
Ideas and Program	4.8	36.4	9.0	25.0	2.5	60.0	4.7
Inspired by Party Leader	23.8	22.7	30.8	12.5	0.0	0.0	4.0
Prior Party Work and Campaigns	28.6	9.1	36.8	12.5	25.0	20.0	4.0
Affiliation of Family	33.3	22.7	30.8	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Candidacy Verbally Offered by Other Party	0.0	0.0	7.6	2.5	50.0	0.0	0.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	60.0	100.0	60.0	60.0	66.7
TOTAL (N)	2	22	113	33	8	9	47

$$\chi^2 = 60.840 \quad 4 \text{ d.f.} \quad 39 \quad p < 0.001$$

$$\text{Cramer's } \phi = 0.300$$

$$\text{Contingency Coefficient, unc.} = 0.607$$

through the 1954 elections. It is interesting to note that except for its high programmatic and ideological components, the UDA was quite similar to PSD and PR.

The case of recall of party chairs being really one of a "second choice" is interesting. Occasionally a new political aspirant with a sizable political following in his local area would attempt candidacy for deputy. However, if the party already had either an incumbent deputy or strong sub-enter from an adjacent area (who claimed the new aspirant's area) the insurgent generally would not be accepted as a candidate.² The most prone to exercise the veto were the PSD and UDA. As seen in the analysis in Part II these were the most competitive and state-wide parties, and seldom had problems filling their slates for state deputy (especially the PSD). Therefore, they had the problem of intra-regional competition, but were in a position to afford a selection process favoring the older, more established candidates.

Recruitment Mechanisms

The recruitment mechanisms as originally conceptualized by Seligman are presented in Table 1.6, for the two samples.³ Federal deputies were higher on conscription and co-optation, while the state deputies were more frequent self-starters. Agency recruitment was more evenly distributed. The more competitive and resource consuming race for federal deputy reflects the predominance of the conscription and co-optation mechanisms for that office.

In terms of the independent variables broken down by candidacy mechanism (in Table 1.7), those who were co-opted, or with agency

Table 11.6 First Candidacy for Deputy: Recruitment Mechanism,
two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
Conscription	34.5	23.5	27.5
Self-Starting	17.2	33.3	27.5
Self-Starting with Family	10.3	17.6	15.0
Co-optation	27.6	13.7	18.8
Agency Recruitment	10.3	11.8	11.2
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(29)	(51)	(80)

Table 3 2--Recruitment Method as Involved in First Candidacy for Deputy broken down by six independent variables All Deputies #800

	Concession- like	Self- Starting	Self Starting & Family	Co-opted	Agency	Over 41%
Age at Initial Political Office	22 0	24 9	29 31	29 31	30 56	24 35
Age at First Political Office	25 05	25 95	30 1	3 46	25 5	26 34
Age at First Cand. for Deputy	31 32	36 91	33 42	45 11	38 1	37 21
Index of Family Political Participation	2 16	1 14	2 92	1 29	69	64
Father in Politics? %	81 8	40 9	9 7	40 0	88 6	8 7
Student Political Activities? %	66 8	59	97	26 7	46 7	45 0

recruitment were socialized and entered politics at later ages. Co-optation as lateral recruitment of a person established in a non-political career is clearly visible. Persons evidencing this mechanism were also low in terms of family and student political participation.

The most striking mechanism in the self-starter with family influence--the highest on family and student political involvement, and were socialized, entered politics and became a candidate at very early ages. Those conscripted by the party leadership were also high on family and student political participation, and made their first candidacy at the earliest mean age, but were socialized and entered politics at slightly later ages.

Those self-starters who became candidates completely on their own (i.e., without family, party or agency influence) evidenced ages approximately equal to the overall means, but were low on the participation items.

Specific reasons for first candidacy are tabulated in Table 11.8. The two samples are quite parallel, except that the state deputies were somewhat more achievement motivated, while the federal deputies were higher on specific invitations.

The six independent variables are broken down by prime reason for first candidacy in Table 11.9. Those citing family influence were socialized and entered politics at the earliest ages, and became candidates at early ages. Those evidencing achievement motivation got started later but became candidates at the earliest ages. The latter were low on family but high on student participation.

Table 11.8--Specific Reasons Given for Decision to Announce
First Candidacy for State or Federal Deputy,
two samples

	Federal Deputies	State Deputies	All Deputies
Public Experiences & Past Activities	35.2	32.3	34.4
Situational Contingencies	1.4	6.2	4.5
Achievement of Specific Objectives	11.3	17.7	15.4
Invited by Friend or Political Leader	29.5	22.3	24.9
Political Career Motivation	11.3	11.5	11.4
Family Influence	11.3	10.0	10.4
Total Responses (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses (N)	(71)	(130)	(201)
Total Responding (N)	(29)	(61)	(90)

Table 11 5--Prime Reasons Given for Decisions to Announce First Candidacy for Deputy,
 broken down by 9 x 2 independent variables (means and percents)
 All Deputy 60 5-80

	Pub- First Ac-	Exp- 5	Situ- ational Cont- ing- en- ces	Achieve- ment Specif- ic- Subject	Invite- Friend/ Leader	Pol- Career Relieved	Family Inf- er- ence	Over- 4
Age 61								
Pol. Socialization	28.83		29.50	22.57	24.87	24.46	20.00	24.90
Age at First Political Office	27.15		29.33	24.75	27.58	23.64	21.90	26.24
Age at First Cont. for Deputy	42.0		38.50	29.29	37.72	37.77	31.1	37.23
Index of Family Participation	1.60		2.25	1.00	1.94	1.92	2.22	1.64
Father in Politics? Y	45.7		75.0	20.4	55.6	69.2	77.8	61.1
Student Political Activities? Y	60.0		50.0	7.4	62.9	61.5	88.9	65.0

Those with political career motives and those invited by a specific leader or friend had quite parallel patterns, except the latter entered politics a bit later. Deputies recalling their prior public experiences and activities were high on the age variables, low on family participation in politics and about average on their own student participation. This would be expected for persons with parallel non-political (yet public-oriented) careers and activities which figured in their decision to become a candidate for deputy.

Relations among variables

Table 11-10 presents the probability and strength of association among the variables considered in this section.

Three variables of recruitment to first office were found associated with three variables of recruitment to first candidacy as deputy.

Recruitment mechanism was associated with motivation (active or passive) for first political office, in that those conscripted, co-opted and agency recruited had the highest proportions of passive motivation, self-starters were split between actives and passives, and self and family were split between passive and no first office.

Prime reason for first candidacy as deputy was associated with level of first office. Those citing their past experiences and activities in public affairs, invitations by friends and party leaders, and family influence as reason tended to hold first office at the state level; those citing contingencies and achievement of specific objectives were high on local government, while those citing political career motivations were split between local and federal.

Table 11.10--Probability of Association (Chi-Square), and Strength of Association (Cramer's ϕ) among variables of recruitment to First Candidacy for Deputy, Recruitment to First Political Office, and Political Socialization Summary for Total Sample of Deputies (N=80)

	1st Cand. as Deputy Recruitment Mechanism	Prime Reason Party Choice	Prime Reason for First Cand. Dep.	Party 1st Cand. as Dep.	Age at 1st Cand. as Dep.
Party 1st Cand. Dep.	N 0	p<0.001 0.390	N 0	**	**
Residence 1st Cand.	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Age 1st Cand. Dep.	p<0.001 0.497	p<0.01 0.420	p<0.01 0.397	N 0	**
Level Gov't 1st Office	N 0	N 0	p<0.02 0.398	N 0	N 0
1st Office Elt-Non-No	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
1st Office Act.-Pass.	p<0.001 0.418	N 0	N 0	p<0.05 0.367	N 0
Motive A 1st Office	N 0	N 0	p<0.01 0.740	N 0	N 0
Motive B 1st Office	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Spec. Motive Pol. Soc.	p<0.05 0.333	p<0.05 0.363	N 0	N 0	N 0
Father in Politics?	p<0.01 0.439	N 0	N 0	p<0.05 0.430	p<0.01 0.343
Student Active?	p<0.01 0.454	N 0	N 0	N 0	p<0.001 0.460
Inter-Gen. Social Mob.	p<0.01 0.401	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0

*--Relationship not considered

N 0--Not significant at the 0.05 level

Prime credible motivation was even more strongly associated with motivation (A) for elective first office. Nearly half (45.0%) of the deputies whose first office was elected evidenced a consistent pattern having been asked to run for the first office, they were in turn invited by a friend or party leader to make the first candidacy for deputy. The same trend is evident for those citing public activities and experiences, and achievement of specific objectives in both instances.⁴

Party of first candidacy was associated with motivation (active or passive) for first political office. The party ID's most associated with passive motivation were--PSD (94%), PR (90%), PREVA (80%), and UDN (75%), the PTB and the minor parties were split, while for the MDB, no first office was predominant.

The specific motive involved in political socialization was associated with two variables or recruitment as candidate for deputy.

Regarding recruitment mechanism for those conscripted and "self and family," family socialization predominated, self-starters were split between public involvement and general interests; those co-opted were split among public involvement, family, and general interest, and those with agency recruitment were split between socialization by public involvement and student activities.

Regarding prime reason for party choice, those citing friends and contacts, ideas and party program, and family influence recalled socialization by general interest, public involvement and family, respectively, those citing party and campaign activities were split between family and public involvement, those citing party veto were split between public involvement and student activities, and those invited by a specific party leader were equally split among family, general interest and student activities.

Party of first candidacy for deputy was associated with involvement of father in politics. Those party .D's showing highest level of involvement were UDA (77.3%), PSL (75.2%), minor parties .62-53. The MDB (100.0%) and the PTB .75-0, had high degrees of non-involvement, while the PR and ARENA showed a mixed pattern.

Finally, recruitment mechanism was observed to be associated with social mobility. Table 11.11 presents this relationship.

When the self-starters are differentiated by family influence, those without such influence are about evenly divided between upward and downward mobiles. However, those with family influence are predominantly downward mobiles, perhaps indicating family as a countervailing factor.

Those with agency recruitment present a pattern similar to the "pure" self-starters. Those conscripted or co-opted are concentrated in the non- and downward mobile categories, with more conscripted as non-mobiles, and more co-opted as downward mobiles. The distribution for those conscripted might be anticipated; but for those co-opted, a much smaller proportion of downward mobiles was expected.⁵

First Cabinet Service

As can be seen in Table 11.12, more than half of the sample of cabinet secretaries were identified as having more political backgrounds, with only 24.4% having more technical backgrounds.

As might be expected those with technical backgrounds were socialized at later ages, but it is interesting to note that they began their political careers at earlier ages, (Table 11.13).⁶ Also, conforming to the "political" recruitment pattern, those with political backgrounds were

Table 11.11 -Recruitment Mechanism Involved in First Candidacy for Deputy by Inter-Generational Social Mobility, N=80 (in percents)

Inter-Generational Social Mobility	Recruitment Mechanism				
	Co-scrip- tion	Self Starting	Self- Starting & Family	Co-opted	Agency
upward Mobile	22.7	45.5	0.0	20.0	44.4
Non- Mobile	45.5	4.5	8.3	33.3	0.0
Downward Mobile	31.8	50.0	91.7	46.7	55.6
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (N)	(22)	(22)	(12)	(15)	(9)

$$\chi^2 = 25.694 \quad \text{d.f.} = 8$$

$$\text{Cramer's } \phi = 0.401$$

$$p < 0.01$$

$$\text{Contingency Coefficient} = 0.493$$

Table 11.12--Antecedents Prior to Nomination to First Cabinet Service

	N	%
More Political	23	56.1
More Technical	10	24.4
Both Pol and Tech.	8	19.5
Total	41	100.0

Table 11.13--Antecedents Prior to Nomination to First Cabinet Service, broken down by six independent variables

	More Political	Both Pol. & Tech.	More Technical	Over All
Age at Initial Pol. Socialization	22.70	29.00	37.67	27.33
Age at First Political Office	26.56	29.14	23.75	27.52
Age at First Cabinet Service	43.30	43.25	49.60	44.83
Index of Family Pol. Participation	1.96	1.60	1.00	1.63
Father in Politics? %	73.9	62.5	40.0	63.4
Student Political Activities? %	60.9	37.5	44.4	52.5

socialized at the earliest ages and were highest on family and student political activities.

Slightly more than half of the sample recalled a specific invitation by the governor as their reason for accepting first cabinet service (Table 11.14). About a third cited self interest and political motivations, while only 12.2% said they were not really interested in cabinet service and were "forced" to accept the nomination by the governor.

Those who were politically involved with the governor's campaign, were socialized at the earliest ages, and were highest on family and student political activities, Table 11.15. Those "forced" to accept the nomination present the inverted pattern observed for the more technical in Table 11.13, and had first cabinet service at the latest mean age. This group was also the lowest in terms of family and student political activities. Those giving a more "neutral" response had values close to the overall means, except for their high on the index of family political participation.

Regarding specific reasons for first cabinet service, individualistic political career and professional motivations accounted for about one-half the responses in Table 11.16.

Turning to prime reason for first cabinet service in Table 11.17, those naming nomination as their party's choice entered first service at the latest mean age, and were socialized and initially recruited at the oldest ages of any other group. Again those citing professional (technical) reasons have the same inverted pattern referred to above, and become secretary at the youngest ages, but are close to the means on the participation variables. Those participating in the governor's

Table 11.14--Reason Given for Decision to Accept Nomination to First Cabinet Service

	N	%
Self, Interested Governor's Campaign	16	36.6
Invited by Governor and Accepted	21	51.2
Invited by Governor and Forced to Accept	5	12.2
Total	41	100.0

Table 11.15--Reason given for Decision to Accept Nomination to First Cabinet service, broken down by six independent variables

	Self & Gov.'s Campaign	Invited by Gov. & Accepted	Invited Gov. & Forced to Accept	Over All
Age at Initial Pol. Socialization	24.33	27.25	36.60	27.33
Age at First Political Office	27.46	27.31	28.50	27.52
Age at First Cabinet Service	43.33	45.14	48.00	44.83
Index of Family Pol. Participation	1.67	1.71	1.20	1.63
Father in Politics? %	66.7	61.9	60.0	63.4
Student Political Activities? %	66.7	55.0	0.0	62.6

Table 11.16--Specific Reasons for Accepting Nomination to First Cabinet Service

	N	%
Sec'tariat within Prof. Competence	17	20.7
Invite, Confidence, Campaign of Gov.	29	35.4
Selected & Nominated by Party	14	17.1
Political Career Motives	22	26.6
Total Responses	82	100.0
Total Responding	41	

Table 11.17--Prime Reason for Accepting Nomination to First Cabinet Service, broken down by six independent variables

	Sec. within Prof. Competence	Invite Campaign of Gov.	Selected & Nom. by Party	Pol. Career Motives	Over All
Age at Initial Pol. Socialization	30.83	25.60	32.11	23.20	27.33
Age at First Political Office	28.20	26.15	29.33	27.89	27.52
Age at First Cabinet Service	44.33	44.63	46.56	43.90	44.83
Index of Family Pol. Participation	1.67	1.75	1.67	1.40	1.63
Father in Politics? %	66.7	62.5	66.7	60.0	63.4
Student Political Activities? %	50.0	50.0	50.0	60.0	52.5

campaign and subsequently recalling having been invited by him to become secretary dated their involvement in politics from earlier ages, and had the highest political family score. This may again indicate the role of family in electoral politics, as this group has a favored position vis a vis the governor. Those citing personal political career motives, on the other hand, were the lowest on the family variables, but were socialized at the earliest ages and were the highest on student political activities. This may be seen as a "catch up" pattern with definite achievement overtones.

Relations among variables

As can be seen in Table 11.18, the only significant relationship encountered for the sample of cabinet secretaries was between general motivation for acceptance and student political participation. None of those "forced" to accept had student political activities. Those with self-interest and campaign reasons were high with 66.7% participation, while those in the more "neutral" category had 55.0%.

Unfortunately, the data for the sample of secretaries was not able to link the three stages of political socialization and recruitment as well as in the case for the sample of deputies. This may have been due in part to the different coding scheme necessitated by the different recruitment process for cabinet office, but probably is due more to the parallel nature of the recruitment processes, to first political office and first candidacy as deputy.

Table 11 18--Probability of Association (Chi Square), and Strength of Association (Cramer's V) among Variables of Recruitment to First Cabinet Service, Recruitment to First Political Office, and Political Socialization. Summary for 43 Cabinet Secretaries

	Reason Acceptance Nomination	Antecedents Pol.-Tech. -Both	Prior Reason Acceptance Nomination	Situation Prior to Nomination
Antecedents Pol-Tech-Both	N 0	* *	N 0	* *
Prior Situation	N 0	N 0	N 0	* *
Level Gov't. 1st Office	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
1st Office Elt-Non-No	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
1st Office Act.-Pass.	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Motive A 1st Office	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Motive B 1st Office	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Spec. Motive Pol. Soc.	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Father in Politics?	N 0	N 0	N 0	N 0
Student Pol. Activities?	p<0.05 0.412	N 0	N 0	N 0

* *--Relationship not considered
N 0--Not significant at the 0.05 level

Summary

Deputies whose first candidacy was with the UDN explained their choice more frequently in programmatic terms, whereas for the PSD and PR family influence and sargentação were most common. The PTB was viewed as more "traditional" in Minas, and the 1964 revolution was seen responsible for the high proportion of "programmatic/ideological" adherents to the ARENA and MDB. Most of the adherents to the minor parties resulted from vetoes of candidacy by the PSD and UDN.

Type of recruitment mechanism was significantly associated with type of first office motivation (active-passive), specific socialization motive, fathers' political activity, student political activities, and social mobility. This recruitment variable was the most effective in linking the three phases in the socialization and recruitment process for the sample of deputies.

Party of first candidacy was also associated with first office motivation (active-passive), and fathers' political participation. Reason for first party choice was associated with specific socialization motive. The prime reason for first candidacy was associated with motivation to first office elected, and the level of that first office. Data for the secretaries did not effectively link the three phases of socialization and recruitment. However, reason given for acceptance of first cabinet service was associated with student political activities.

NOTES--CHAPTER 11

¹It must be noted that several of those selected in the sample of federal deputies made their first candidacy for the office of state deputy.

²The experience of Dep. Paulino Cicero was the most interesting in this regard. Elected PSD mayor of his hometown during his senior year at the UFPA law school, he filed candidacy for state deputy within the same party four years later (in 1962), only to be vetoed in favor of another candidate within the region. He was, however, readily accepted on the PSP slate (which ended up with a smaller party quotient), and won election with the assistance of his father who was a local PSD chief. The other candidate who had "black-balled" him was defeated within the PSD slate, and Paulino went on to serve two terms in the state assembly, and was elected federal deputy in 1970. Interview with Paulino Cicero de Vasconcelos, Belo Horizonte, May 22, 1970.

³For definition of the various mechanisms, see Chapter 2.

⁴These three consistent patterns accounted for 70% of the deputies whose first office was elected.

⁵In terms of intra-generational social mobility, a large proportion of those co-opted were upward mobiles (53.3%). This may indicate that perhaps those with downward inter-generational mobility in Table 11.11, had fathers with quite high status.

⁶This, then, is the group accounting for the "socialized after first office" pattern in Table 10 B.

PART V

CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Interviews with Current Legislators

This section is based on interviews with 87 deputies who were serving as federal and state deputies during the 1970 session and examines political recruitment from the deputies vantage point. The analysis focuses on changing career perspectives and advancement patterns, and more specifically the recruitment of candidates for the 1970 elections.

CHAPTER 12
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CAREER ADVANCEMENT
AND CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT IN 1970

The analysis presented below is based on data gathered through interviews with 35 federal and 52 state deputies who were serving during the interview period, i.e., the 1970 session. Current deputies were chosen as a basis for this section in that it was thought that many of the individuals in the over time samples would not be as knowledgeable about the current political scene and recruitment process. This because many were no longer active participants in state politics and some resided out of the state. However, the rankings of the political office hierarchy by the latter group are included for comparative purposes.

Career Advancement Patterns

Changes in Hierarchy of Political Offices

The hierarchical rankings of selected political offices within the state was undertaken with two objectives in mind. First, to ascertain the deputies' perception of the hierarchy in two distinct time periods, and second, to evaluate changes in the offices' position within the hierarchy from time one to time two.

Regarding the latter, the two points in time were chosen so as to facilitate evaluation of the effects of the 1964 revolution and its

ensuring machinations, but at the same time be reasonably within the interviewees' recall. The quite distinct periods were chosen: the apogee of the multi-party system with its high subsystem autonomy in 1962/1963, the two calendar years prior to the revolution, and the seventh year of the post-revolution period (1970), embodying a make-shift two-party system and reduced state autonomy.

The interviewees were asked to rank order (with no ties) the seventeen selected offices, in terms of political prestige and importance.¹ During the pre-test the rankings were administered on the two respective sheets. It was ascertained that this strategy was weak in terms of good differentiation of the periods.² An alternative procedure was introduced for the second period whereby the interviewee received a pack of IBM cards, each bearing the name of one of the offices, and instructed to place the cards in the hierarchical order. This greatly improved the differentiation, due to the procedure being such a different activity.³

Table 12.1 presents the relative rank orders of the offices by the five groups for the two periods.⁴ In spite of the effort to maximize differentiation, intra-group correlation is fairly high between the two points in time. These are evaluated in terms of Spearman's Rho at the bottom of Table 12.1. The sample of federal deputies had the highest degree of differentiation, and the 1970 state deputies, the lowest.

Comparing inter-group correlations, within time periods, an interesting trend emerged. Except for the sample of cabinet secretaries vs. the 1970 federal deputies, there was less agreement regarding

Table 12.1--Relative Rank Orders of Political Offices,
for the 1962/1963 and 1970 periods

Office	Samples from 1965-70 Period						Deputies Serving in 1970			
	Federal		State		Cabinet		Federal		State	
	62/3	70	62/3	70	62/3	70	62/3	70	62/3	70
Governor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Vice Governor	10	3	13	7	11	2	11	3	10	7
Sec. Finance	2	4	2	2	3	4	3	4	5	2
Mayor B. Horizonte	4	2	5	3	2	3	4	2	3	6
Sec. Education	3	7	3	5	4	8	2	5	2	3
Sec. Public Safety	6	5	6	4	8	7	6	6	7	5
Sec. Government	11	6	10	8	13	10	10	10	11	8
Director D.E.R.	9	11	7	9	12	14	9	11	8	11
Sec. Interior	12	12	11	13	10	11	13	12	13	15
Sec. Agriculture	14	13	12	12	9	12	12	14	12	13
Federal Senator	5	8	8	10	6	6	5	7	6	9
Federal Deputy	7	14	9	11	7	9	7	8	9	10
President of A.L.	8	10	4	6	5	5	8	9	4	4
Majority Leader A.L.	13	9	14	14	15	13	14	13	14	12
State Deputy	15	16	15	15	14	15	15	15	15	14
Mayor Large City	16	15	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Vereador B. Horizonte	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Spearman's Rho	-----		-----		-----		-----		-----	
	0.774		0.911		0.838		0.894		0.914	

the rankings in the 1970 period, and more agreement for the earlier point in time.⁵ This is quite interesting, in that, one would normally expect less agreement concerning the period 7 or 8 years remote. The perception of the 1970 political environment by the five groups seems to have been differentially affected.

The positions generating the most disagreement were President of the State Assembly (ranked lower by the federal deputies than by the other three groups), Secretary of Education (ranked higher by the current deputies than by the samples), and Cabinet level positions (ranked higher by the sample of cabinet secretaries than the other four groups).

Regarding the Assembly Presidency, it is a prestigious position to those participating in state government, and thus less important in the perception of the federal deputies. The Education Secretary is very much involved in day-to-day patronage distribution and thus ranks higher in the perception of the current deputies.⁶ It might be expected that having served in a cabinet position would enhance the perception of the importance of the cabinet generally.

Tables 12.2 and 12.3 present changes from one time period to the other, in terms of the relative rank orders and means of rankings, respectively. (These are in turn summarized in Table 12.4. As discussed above, the primary cause of such changes is seen resulting from the 1964 revolution and the nature of the two state administrations.

The change for the vice governorship is the most outstanding. Ranked in the bottom third in the 1962/1963 period, the position moves to the top quarter for 1970. As discussed in Chapter 8, the vice

Table 12.2--Change in Relative Rank Orders of Political Offices,
from the 1962/1963 to 1970 periods

Office	Samples from 1945-70 Period			Deputies Serving in 1970	
	Federal Deputies N=29	State Deputies N=51	Cabinet Sec. N=43	Federal N=35	State N=62
Governor	0	0	0	0	0
Vice Governor	+7	+6	+9	+8	+3
Sec. Finance	-2	0	-1	-1	+3
Mayor B. Horizonte	+2	+2	-1	+2	-3
Sec. Education	-4	-2	-4	-3	-1
Sec. Public Safety	+1	+2	+1	0	+2
Sec. Government	+5	+2	+3	0	+3
Director D.E.H.	-2	-2	-2	-2	-3
Sec. Interior	0	-2	-1	+1	+2
Sec. Agriculture	+1	0	-3	-2	-1
Federal Senator	-3	-2	0	-2	-3
Federal Deputy	-7	-2	-2	-1	-1
President of A.L.	-2	-2	0	-1	0
Majority Leader A.L.	+4	0	+2	+1	+2
State Deputy	-1	0	-1	0	+1
Mayor Large City	+1	0	0	0	0
Vereador B. Horizonte	0	0	0	0	0

Table 12.3--Differences between Means of Rankings of Political Offices for the 1962/1963 and 1970 Periods

Office	Samples from 1945-70 Period			Deputies Serving in 1970	
	Federal Deputies N=29	State Deputies N=51	Cabinet Sec N=43	Federal N=35	State N=52
Governor	-0.04	-0.17	0.00	-0.27	-0.13
Vice Governor	+3.51	+2.61	+4.83	+4.34	+1.36
Sec. Finance	-1.02	-0.16	-0.75	-1.22	+1.26
Mayor B. Horizonte	+0.35	+0.40	+0.13	+0.83	-0.90
Sec. Education	-1.73	-1.40	-2.06	-1.12	-0.63
Sec. Public Safety	+0.99	+0.72	+0.64	-0.13	+0.36
Sec. Government	+1.73	+1.47	+1.85	+0.38	+1.43
Director D.E.R.	-2.03	-0.79	-1.69	-1.23	-1.50
Sec. Interior	-0.56	+0.85	-0.70	0.00	-0.84
Sec. Agriculture	+0.50	-0.76	-1.55	-1.59	-0.41
Federal Senator	-0.50	-0.87	-0.82	-0.71	-0.81
Federal Deputy	-2.65	-0.52	-0.71	-1.10	-0.81
President of A.L.	-0.30	-1.29	-0.93	+0.04	+0.08
Majority Leader A.L.	+2.36	-0.21	+0.66	-0.41	+0.91
State Deputy	-0.64	-0.07	-0.85	+0.49	-0.50
Mayor Large City	+1.26	+1.30	+1.06	-0.24	+0.36
Vereador B. Horizonte	-0.04	-0.13	+0.15	-0.14	-0.28

Table 12.4 Changes in Relative and Mean Rankings of Political Office from the 1962/1963 periods, averages for the five groups interviewed

Office	Relative Rankings			Mean Rankings		
	Average Rankings		Change	Average of Means		Change
	62/3	70		62/3	70	
Governor	1	1	0	1.02	1.14	-0.12
Vice Governor	10.5	4	+6.5	9.67	6.33	+3.34
Sec. Finance	3	2.5	+0.5	5.72	6.10	-0.38
Mayor B. Horizonte	4	2.5	+1.5	6.14	6.02	+0.12
Sec. Education	2	6	-4	5.56	7.05	-1.49
Sec. Public Safety	7	5	+2	7.53	7.01	+0.52
Sec. Government	10.5	9	+1.5	9.71	8.33	+1.38
Director D.E.R.	9	11	-2	8.88	10.13	-1.25
Sec. Interior	11.5	13.5	-2	10.09	10.69	-0.60
Sec. Agriculture	11.5	13.5	-2	10.02	10.76	-0.74
Federal Senator	6	8	-2	7.40	8.39	-0.99
Federal Deputy	8	10	-2	8.20	9.36	-1.16
President of A.L.	5	7	-2	7.31	7.79	-0.48
Majority Leader A.L.	14	12	+2	11.16	10.50	+0.66
State Deputy	15	15	0	11.81	12.19	+0.38
Mayor Large City	16	16	0	14.11	13.36	+0.75
Vereador B. Horizonte	17	17	0	16.39	16.48	-0.09

governorship had tended to be merely another position available to the gubernatorial candidate to utilize in mobilizing an electoral coalition, and once elected, an office with very few responsibilities. This was especially true of the Magalhães Pinto administration.⁷ In the subsequent Israel Pinheiro government, the vice governor was given an active role in political coordination and even became acting-governor during Pinheiro's trip to Japan. However, the most important factor apparently affecting the interviewees' perception was the fact that the vice-governorship had come to be elected indirectly by the state assembly with the 1967 and 1969 constitutions. In 1970 all were aware of the fact that both the governor and the vice governor would be hand picked by the President of the Republic in his role as "national leader" of the ARENA party. Thus the office accrued more prestige through the more direct tie with the national executive.⁸ It is interesting to note that the current state deputies perceived less change, relative to the federal deputies.⁹

A similar phenomenon is observed in the case of the assembly majority leader. Against a general decline in the rankings over time for legislative positions, this position increases. In the 1962/1963 period the position was more purely "legislative" in that selection was made within the majority party caucus. In the 1970 period, however, the majority leader was selected directly by the governor, and became his representative in the assembly. Thus this position was perceived more as an executive office close to the governorship, accruing prestige within the general tendency favoring the executive.

Continuing the discussion of legislative offices, it is interesting to note the differential between state and federal deputy. The latter lost more prestige than the former, and both were perceived to decline more by the samples than by the current deputies. The federal deputies (sample and current) both saw the office of state deputy as declining less than their own office, indicating the perigee of prestige of the national legislature.¹⁰ Interestingly enough, the office of assembly president was seen as losing more prestige relative to that of state deputy, especially by the samples.

Turning to executive offices, the Secretaries of Government and Public Safety were perceived as increasing in prestige by all groups except the 1970 federal deputies. The former due in part to its centralized role in patronage and political coordination, and the latter being filled by an army officer approved by the President of the Republic in the 1970 period, and civilian politicians in the 1962/1963 epoch.

The Secretary of Education suffered the sharpest decline of any office. This was due in part to personality differentials between the two periods, but mostly to the greatly reduced distribution capacity in the later period.¹¹ The Directorship of the D.E.R. (State Highway Department) declined for similar reasons. The Secretary of Finance declined to a lesser extent due in part to the positive change accorded this office by the 1970 state deputies, who were more directly involved in day-to-day bargaining on behalf of their constituencies with this secretariat (relative to other cabinet offices).

The mayor of the state capital parallels the change for the vice governorship and assembly majority leader, in that this office which was popularly elected in the prior period came to be appointed directly by the governor, thus acquiring executive status equivalent to senior cabinet rank.

Base Office for Legislative Recruitment

Tables 12.5 and 12.6 summarize the responses to questions 03.24 and 13.33, respectively, regarding the best positions (politically speaking) from which to launch a new candidacy for the offices of state and federal deputy.¹²

For state deputy, nearly one half of the first choices were for local mayor, this was clearly the most preferred base office, both in terms of simple and weighted frequency totals. Cabinet secretary was second and showed a similar first-second-third choice pattern. A state functionary was the third most frequently mentioned, but tended to be mentioned as a second or third choice. Outstanding leaders and local vereador also presented a pattern of second and third choices.

Turning to base offices for federal deputy (Table 12.6), state deputy replaces local mayor as the most frequently cited position, while cabinet office remains in second rank, but more preferred as second or third choice. Mayor drops to third rank but is most frequently cited as second choice base office, and equals local vereador for third choice.

The deputies' perception of base office is compared with the findings for the two offices (in terms of career background) in Table 12.7.¹³ Taking the four most frequently cited base offices for state deputy, the

Table 12.5--Positions Ranked First, Second and Third Best from which to Launch a New Candidacy for State Deputy, 87 State and Federal Deputies Serving in 1970 (in percents)

Office Cited	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice	Simple Total	Weighted Total
Mayor or Vice-Mayor	48.0	18.8	8.2	29.2	34.6
Cabinet Secretary	27.3	17.5	5.6	19.2	22.0
in State Func.	11.7	26.1	25.0	19.8	17.8
Outstanding Leader	3.9	15.9	22.2	12.1	9.6
Vereador (Local)	2.6	17.5	22.2	12.1	9.4
Vereador SH	2.6	0.0	5.6	2.2	2.0
Party Office	1.3	1.4	2.8	1.6	1.5
Family-\$-Qualities	1.3	1.4	0.0	1.1	1.2
Federal Func.	1.3	0.0	2.8	1.1	1.0
State Func. Interior	0.0	1.4	2.8	1.1	0.7
Justice of the Peace	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.8	0.2
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses	(77)	(69)	(36)	(182)*	(405)**

*--A simple summation of the choice frequencies.

**--A summation of weighted frequencies. First choice = 3 points, second choice = 2 points, and third choice = 1 point.

Table 12.6--Positions Ranked First, Second and Third Best from which to launch a new Candidacy for Federal Deputy, 87 State and Federal Deputies Serving in 1970 (in percents)

Office Cited	First Choice	Second Choice	Third Choice	Simple Total	Weighted Total
State Deputy	63.6	11.1	17.5	35.0	42.3
Cabinet Secretary	15.6	28.6	25.0	22.2	20.7
Mayor or Vice-Mayor	2.6	36.5	12.5	16.7	14.3
Outstanding Leader	6.5	6.3	17.5	8.9	7.5
HI State Func.	2.6	12.7	7.5	7.2	6.3
HI Federal Func.	5.2	1.6	5.0	3.9	4.0
Vereador	0.0	0.0	12.5	2.8	1.3
Family-\$-Qualities	3.9	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.3
Party Office	0.0	3.2	0.0	1.1	1.0
Vereador BH	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.5	0.3
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses	(77)	(63)	(40)	(180)*	(337)**

*--A simple summation of the choice frequencies.

**--A summation of weighted frequencies first choice = 3 points, second choice = 2 points, and third choice = 1 point

Table 12.7--Base Office for State and Federal Deputies, as Perceived by Current Deputies and Observed for Bio Data Collected (in percents)

Office	For State Deputy			For Federal Deputy		
	Simple Total	Weight Total	Bio Data	Simple Total	Weight Total	Bio Data
State Deputy	**	**	**	35.0	42.3	34.3
Cab. Secretary	19.2	22.0	2.0	22.2	20.7	7.0
Mayor or Vice	29.2	34.6	17.2	16.7	14.3	5.6
nt State Func.	19.8	17.8	12.8	7.2	6.3	9.1
Local Vereador	12.1	9.4	16.2	2.8	1.3	3.5
Total %	80.3	83.8	48.2	83.9	84.9	69.5

Table 12.8--Level of Base Office for State and Federal Deputies, as Perceived by Current Deputies and Observed for Bio Data Collected (in percents)

Level Position	For State Deputy			For Federal Deputy		
	Simple Total	Weight Total	Bio Data	Simple Total	Weight Total	Bio Data
Federal	1.1	1.0	7.4	3.9	4.0	14.6
State	40.1	40.5	27.7	64.4	69.3	64.6
Municipal	64.0	46.2	37.8	20.0	15.9	10.1
Other	14.8	12.3	19.2*	11.7	11.8	7.0*

*--Includes unsuccessful candidacies

deputies' perceptions are comparable to the bio data for HI State Func and Local Vereador, but inflated for Mayor and Cabinet Secretary.

Taking the five most frequently cited base offices for federal deputy, again the deputies' perceptions are inflated for Mayor and Cabinet Secretary, but comparable for the other three offices.

Table 12 B makes essentially the same comparison in terms of level of office cited. The perceptions of both groups of deputies were in line with the bio data in terms of order of magnitude. It is interesting to note that the State Municipal proportions are reversed, and that the deputies' perceptions were in agreement, although somewhat inflated for the state deputies. This is consistent with conclusions observed in Chapter 8, regarding municipal experience as base for state deputies, and state government for federal deputies.

Career Perspectives (The Manifest Office)

Table 12 9 presents career perspectives for the two groups of deputies. Approximately 10% more state than federal deputies voiced career advancement interest in response to questions 13.15 and 13.16, further evidence of the federal deputies' feelings of lack of efficacy and disillusionment. Another striking difference was the greater range of career ambitions on the part of the state deputies.

Interestingly enough, no federal deputies expressed interest in becoming President of the Republic, versus 9.4% of the state deputies' responses. Also, a slightly higher proportion of state deputies cited federal cabinet positions. In terms of the upper echelon of the federal bureaucracy and federal senator, the federal deputies had the edge.¹⁴

Table 12.9--Career Perspectives of State and Federal Deputies serving in 1970 (in percents)

Future Offices	Federal Deputies	State Deputies
President of Republic	0.0	9.4
Minister of Education	0.0	1.9
Minister of Finance	4.2	0.0
Federal Minister*	0.0	3.8
Hi Fed. Functionary*	29.1	7.6
Federal Senator	8.3	1.9
Federal Deputy	**	11.3
State Governor	16.7	20.6
Sec. of Education	4.2	6.7
Cabinet Secretary*	33.3	18.8
Hi State Functionary*	4.2	7.6
Pres. State Assembly	0.0	7.6
Player Belo Horizonte	0.0	3.8
Total %	100.0	100.0
Total Responses (%)	(24)	(53)
Total Responding (N)	(20)	(36)
% of Deputies Responding	57.1%	67.5%

*--Office not specified

**--Not applicable.

This is further evidence of the lack of career perspectives and general frustration of the federal deputies, relative to their state counterparts.

Comparing Tables 12.7 and 12.9, it is interesting to note that having cited state legislative office as the "best" base office for advancement to federal deputy (39.0% and 42.3%, simple and weighted totals, respectively) that only 11.3% of the state deputy group's responses cited federal deputy as a desired future political office. If taken as the ideal and reality, respectively, this lends further support to the observation of the decline of the federal legislature's prestige, and the contention that study of state legislatures and state political systems is valid for Brazil.

Regarding state government office, state deputies showed slightly higher proportions for the governorship and high state bureaucracy, but federal deputies had higher proportions for the state cabinet. These proportions for the cabinet are the opposite of those encountered in the political career data (Tables 8.5 and 8.6), where state deputy is a more frequent base office for the state cabinet. Also, the current (1969) constitution holds that a federal deputy nominated to a non-federal political office must definitively resign his mandate (rather than going on temporary leave). Despite these mitigating circumstances, more than one third of the federal deputies' career perspectives involved state cabinet office.

As might be expected, no federal deputies cited the presidency of the state assembly, and only the state deputies expressed an interest in becoming mayor of the state capital.

Candidate Recruitment in 1970

The year 1969 closed with the new president (Garnastuz) peddling a call for renovation in the selection of the nation's political leaders. The weekly news magazine *Veja* picked this up¹⁵ and tried to embody the traditional conception of the old style politician (Figure 12.1), and in juxtaposition the image of the new politician (Figure 12.2) as interpreted from the president's call for renovation.

Recruitment from Local Government

Such renovation from the grass roots level had been purposively fostered (and anticipated) ever since the fiscal reforms enacted by Roberto Campos under Castelo Branco in 1966. These reforms drastically altered Brazil's taxation system, both collection and re-distribution. Vast sums of money for administration and public works were placed directly in the hands of local mayors (completely bypassing the state governments), who had taken office in January, 1967. It was felt that these local mayors would form a pool of young, able and strongly competitive politicians for state and federal deputy in the 1970 elections, based on their administrative successes, and their sub-regional image therein constructed.

By mid-May (1970), the point at which current office holders had to resign in order to become candidates for deputy or senator, it was obvious that renovation would not be forthcoming from this channel, as of the 650 prefeitos of the ARENA mineiro, only five resigned in time to become candidates for deputy, while none of the MDB prefeitos chose to become candidates.¹⁶

○ **video politico**



Algunos de ellos solo son cosas de
 mundo antiguo. ¿ Imaginación para ser
 tan mal hablados y mundanos? En
 los que para muchos son los grandes y los
 sencillos. ¿ También que sea necesario
 el ser sincero y saber cuándo uno es
 sincero más allá de cuando se está
 en un momento de crisis? ¿

¿ También que sea necesario el ser sincero
 cuando se está en un momento de crisis?
 ¿ También que sea necesario el ser
 sincero cuando se está en un momento
 de crisis? ¿ También que sea necesario
 el ser sincero cuando se está en un
 momento de crisis? ¿ También que sea
 necesario el ser sincero cuando se está
 en un momento de crisis? ¿

Figure 2 --"THE OLD STYLE POLITICIAN"

- 1. Area of his life isn't exerted
 himself for a long time.
- 2. Imagination to invent a thousand
 formulas and tips.
- 3. A place for new loves at any moment.
- 4. Spectators that won't support any
 weight.
- 5. Eyes turned toward higher (political)
 positions.
- 6. Wolf ears to the voters' demands.
- 7. Conservative in clothing (style) as
 well as in ideas.
- 8. Shoes undied to rest the feet.
- 9. A cigar which accompanies the good
 things in life.
- 10. Earns back cigarette to impress the
 folks to the inferior.
- 11. Pocket full of papers that are
 never read.
- 12. Prepared himself of something new
 but made good in life.

SOURCE: El, number 1, 1962, p. 2

C) *manu profeta*



Apresenta, além das características de um
 homem de espírito muito elevado, a de
 um líder de uma nação. É um homem
 de grande capacidade de trabalho e de
 grande capacidade de organização. É um
 homem de grande capacidade de trabalho e
 de grande capacidade de organização. É um
 homem de grande capacidade de trabalho e
 de grande capacidade de organização.

Apresenta, além das características de
 um homem de espírito muito elevado, a de
 um líder de uma nação. É um homem
 de grande capacidade de trabalho e de
 grande capacidade de organização. É um
 homem de grande capacidade de trabalho e
 de grande capacidade de organização. É um
 homem de grande capacidade de trabalho e
 de grande capacidade de organização.

Figure 2 2--"THE NEW POLITICIAN"

- 1 Young, tall, stately elegant.
- 2 Arm or one arm is disposed to work for the public good.
- 3 A brain capable of thinking out a way to save Brazil for democracy with us.
- 4 A star logo to the head of or in the.
- 5 Hard shoulders to support orders and leadership.
- 6 Eyes drawn toward the world.
- 7 Ears attentive to voices from the night.
- 8 Modern but sober clothing.
9. Shoes shined, as concessions to the masses.
10. Non-filter cigarette to reinforce the nationalist slogan.
11. A sense of responsibility and organized law.
12. Gaze of the people of Africa in air.

Source: *Veja*, October 17, 1968, p. 28.

As was seen in Tables 8.5, 8.6, and 12.7, the office of local mayor had traditionally been a base office for state deputy, and was viewed as such by the deputies themselves. Why then did so few mayors make the race in 1970, given their favorable administrative advantages? This question was asked of the current deputies, as item 03.42, and their multiple responses are tabulated in Table 12.10.

More than half the responses involved changes in the electoral system in 1970 (as effected by the 1967 and 1969 constitutions). The increased competitiveness of the system was the most frequently cited. This constraint involved a reduction of the numbers of seats to be filled.¹⁷ Thus, given the increased size of the electorate, the electoral quotient would be greatly increased over 1966. Other systemic changes mentioned were the replacement of the individual ballot by the long ballot throughout the state,¹⁸ and the long six-month resignation period prior to the November elections.

Other responses were grouped around the effects of the revolution on the political process and the political class in particular in the 1967/1970 period. Legislative office was seen as having lost prestige (13.9%), and many mayors were said to harbor fears and doubts about serving as deputy (9.6%). The latter with regards possible future repression of deputies and suspension of political rights and mandates.

Party leaders and regional chiefs were cited as not supporting or encouraging the candidacies of the mayors (6.2%). This is quite understandable in the case of party leaders who were themselves candidates for deputy in the highly competitive system.

Table 12 10--Reasons cited why fewer local mayors became Candidates for State or Federal Deputy in 1970 than in previous elections, multiple responses by 87 state and federal deputies serving in 1970 (in percents)

Reason Cited	N	%
Didn't want to Resign as Mayor	9	7.9
Electoral System Changes* 6 mo. resignation, long ballot	26	22.6
Elections more Competitive in 1970* more voters, fewer states	42	36.6
Legislature (Fed. & State) no longer prestigious office	16	13.9
Fear and doubts about serving as Deputy (re National Executive)	11	9.6
No support from party leaders & old or former candidates	7	6.2
Decision to wait until 1972 or 1974	1	0.9
General lack of interest and/or personal decision	13	11.3
Total	115	100.0
Total Responding (N)	(79)	----

Other responses involved general lack of interest (11.3%), decision to wait until 1972 or 1974 (8.4%),¹⁹ and reluctance to resign and lose the last eight and a half months of their mandate as mayor (7.9%).

It is ironical that the revolution itself, having consciously attempted to renovate the political class by improving the channels of recruitment from local government, would through its subsequent actions dissuade the exact "new" political group it had tried to foster. In essence, the end result was the re-election of surviving elements of the political class (exactly what the "early" revolutionaries tried to preclude),²⁰ or elements of similar backgrounds (see Chapters 5 and 6), and suffocated the emergence of new leaders.

The Role of Party

Considering the 1964 revolution their triumph, and subsequently losing the 1965 elections to the PSD, the ex-UDN group was faced with a dilemma within the newly constituted government party, ARENA. The Israel Pinheiro government had joined ARENA after the old parties were abolished, and thus PSD, JDN and PR were attempting "integration" within the new party. The UDN, fearful that the power of the PSD-dominated executive would marginalize them within the new party grouping, began demanding the protective umbrella of a set established co-existence criteria. This set of norms, drawn up by Guilherme Machado and Leivindo Coelho, specified the ground rules for the 1966 legislative elections in terms of proportions of the states allocated to each of the ex-party blocs. They also established a complicated set of rules governing the distribution of patronage and prestige among the deputies after the elections.²¹

An attempt was made to differentiate the role of party in the recruitment process (by party and election year) through questions 02.62, 02.63 and 02.66. The responses in terms of decision making group within the party are tabulated in Table 12.11

For the ARENA a trend toward more centralized decision-making is observed from 1966 to 1970, with increased proportions for the party executive committee and "party leaders." Although less discernible, the MDB (in terms of its deputies' responses) presents a trend in the opposite direction, with a decrease in the proportion for the executive committee and an increase for the regional directorio. Although not strictly comparable to Strout's analysis of the role of party in candidate recruitment in Mendoza province, Argentina, it might be said that the MDB was similar to the U.C.P.P., and the ARENA to the Christian Democrats--in terms of a less and more centralized recruitment tendency, respectively.²²

Additionally, Table 12.11 shows a reduction in the proportion of ARENA deputies citing intra-party blocs in the 1970 period.

Despite the efforts from many quarters to eliminate the existence of or even mention of the ex-parties,²³ the ex-PSD began to demand a revision of the "criteria" established in 1966. The shoe was clearly, on the other foot, as the ex-UDR would have the governorship (in the person of Rondon Pacheco, nominated in June and elected in October) and were already taking full advantage of this new prestige in the closing months of the campaign. As seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the ex-UDR bloc made considerable advances in the 1970 elections.

In the early months of 1971 the ex-UDR turned a deaf ear to the ex-PSD's requests, ignoring the existence of any criteria, and stating that

Table 12.71--Responses Citing who made the decisions for the party regarding the composition of slates for state and federal deputy by party and election year, multiple responses by 87 deputies serving in 1970 (in percents)

Cited as Decision-Maker	ARENA		NDB	
	1966 ^a	1970 ^b	1966 ^a	1970 ^b
Executive Committee	18.3	38.5	60.0	40.0
Regional Directorio	25.7	20.5	0.0	20.0
Party Leaders	15.9	20.5	20.0	20.0
President of Repb.	4.5	4.5	0.0*	0.0*
The Governor	2.3	2.3	0.0*	0.0*
Federal & State Dep.	0.0	4.5	20.0	20.0
Party Convention	4.5	6.8	0.0	0.0
Intra-Party Blocs	6.8	2.3	0.0*	0.0*
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Responses (N)	(44)	(44)	(10)	(5)
Total Responding (N)	(27)	(34)	(8)	(3)

*--Not applicable for the NDB.

a--Candidates in 1966 but not in 1970, recalling 1966.

b--Candidates in both 1966 and 1970, recalling 1970.

ARENA was now totally integrated which rendered such agreements need less.²⁴ However, in the crunch criteria were informally worked out in the composition of the mesa of the legislative assembly,²⁵ and regarding the selection of politicians for cabinet office in the the Rondon government.²⁶

In total, the role of party in the recruitment of candidates for the slates of federal and state deputy was greatly diminished in 1970 (due to the numerous constraints discussed above), as the ARENA barely was able to fill half the positions on its slates, and the MDB less than half.

Summary

The most obvious effect of the 1964 revolution on the hierarchical rankings of political offices within the state was the accrual of increased prestige by the executive, to the detriment of legislative offices. The offices of majority leader in the state assembly and mayor of the state capital were perceived more as executive positions in the second time period.

Within the executive, the positive change for the vice governorship, and negative change for the Secretary of Education were the most outstanding. For legislative offices, the most significant observation was the greater decline for federal deputy (especially as perceived by occupants of that office) relative to state deputy.

Regarding base office for state deputy, local mayor and cabinet secretary accounted for approximately one-half of the responses, as compared to only 19.4% observed for the political career data. State

deputy was the most frequently cited base office for federal deputy, 35.5% versus 34.3% observed. Cabinet secretary and local mayor accounted for 38.9% of the responses, but were again inflated relative to the observed 12.5% for the career data.

In terms of future political ambitions, 10% more state than federal deputies expressed interest in career advancement. Although state deputy was observed to be the most important base office for federal deputy (both perceived and observed), only 11.3% of the current state deputies' responses cited federal deputy as a desired future position.

Although local mayor had traditionally been the most frequent base office for state deputy (and to a lesser extent for federal deputy), and despite efforts by the national government to foster renovation through increased recruitment "from the grass roots," 1970 saw only five local mayors (out of 722) become candidates for deputy. The attenuating circumstances dissuading the mayors from candidacy were perceived as the changed electoral system, loss of prestige of legislative office, and apprehension regarding future action against the latter by the national executive.

A trend towards more centralized decision-making within the parties (for the recruitment and selection of candidates) was observed in 1970, especially for the ARENA. Despite the objections of the ex-PSD group, the ex-JDH faction, firmly in control of the ARENA, resisted the former's attempts to revise the party's political "criteria," instead pressing party "integration" and elimination of the ex-party blocs. However, in early 1971 proportional parity was maintained in allocating the seven positions for the mesa of the state assembly, and in selecting the three political appointments within the new governor's cabinet.

NOTES--CHAPTER 12

¹The seventeen offices may be found in lists A and E in the questionnaire (Appendix XI), and were presented with the instructions found in the middle of page 4 and at the top of page 8, respectively, in the main body of the instrument. Note that the Secretary of Government was the governor's *Chefe de Gabinete* in the 1962/1963 period. It was thought that more than 20 offices would be difficult for an interviewee to handle, given the time constraints of the schedule. The five offices selected to compose the elite section were included in that all the cabinet positions could not be accommodated, seven were chosen in an attempt to achieve a gradient. The remaining seven offices were chosen from state and local government, leadership positions within the state assembly, and included federal senators.

²Upon receiving the second ranking sheet (1970), a few exclaimed that they "had already done that," or when reminded that the first ranking was for the 1962/1963 period, "Well, the order is the same for 1970."

³To handle any further recalcitrance, the interviewers were instructed to recall any comments from the first ranking, such as "Yes, the Secretary of Education was a prestigious office then, but not today," or "Say, this would be quite different in the present situation," and use the interviewee's own words to "convince" him that the second period was (is) different.

⁴The rankings in Table 12.1 are expressed in terms of a relative ordering of means within each group, from "1" the highest rank, to "17" the lowest.

⁵The highest inter-group correlation was between the two groups of federal deputies for the 1962/1963 period (.0988); the lowest, for the sample of federal deputies vs. the 1970 state deputies for the 1970 period (0.838).

⁶The director of the D.E.R. (Highway Department) presents a somewhat similar pattern.

⁷Many interviewees had considerable difficulty recalling who had been vice governor in 1962/1963.

⁸This is somewhat paradoxical, in that, by the same token, both the offices of governor and vice governor were reduced in terms of autonomy and independence. Other examples of the political class adapting pragmatically to the political realities will be seen below.

⁹This may mirror the perception of the national executive by each legislative level, greater and lesser independence and autonomy, respectively.

¹⁰This is indicative of the state assembly's relative distance from, lack of control by and subservience to the National Executive, and the former's maintenance of substantial legislative initiative and prerogatives. Note that the same of federal deputies, which includes persons with tenure extending back to 1945 as well as various *passados*, presents the extreme differential, 8 relative ranks and 3.29 mean ranks between the two periods.

¹¹In a period of crisis in the state budget, public school teachers (especially at the primary level) are always the first state employees to have their salaries "retarded." During the 1967-1970 period, this reached 12 months in some areas. Also, a moratorium on new permanent appointments of teachers to the civil service was declared in 1968, and selection examinations were not conducted in 1969 and 1970. School construction and other material distributed through the secretariat were greatly reduced in the second time period. (This office was accorded the sharpest decline by the sample of cabinet secretaries.)

¹²Because some non-political positions or situations were mentioned, these were coded into the response scheme. "Outstanding leader" includes those with a regional following, leaders in their professions, leaders of class interest groups, sports or intellectual personalities, and those with an extensive clientele. "Family-S-qualities" includes having money, fame, moral and intellectual qualities, being a relative of the governor or important political families, and having a good platform or program.

¹³Data in Tables 12.7 and 12.8 were adapted from data presented in Tables 12.6 and 8.6.

¹⁴Regarding federal senator, the most frequent base office, in terms of shared arena has traditionally been federal deputy.

¹⁵"Projeto novos políticos," *Ísis*, December 17, 1969, 21-22.

¹⁶"Partidos em busca de candidatos." *Estado de Minas*, May 24, 1970, 2. For the problem nationwide, see, "Eleições: Falta Candidatos," *Ísis*, April 8, 1970, 31.

¹⁷For the banca federal and the state assembly these changes were from 48 to 35 and from 82 to 59, respectively.

¹⁸The long ballot was seen as being more confusing and a bit less susceptible to manipulation of voters, both negative constraints in the interior of the state.

¹⁹In 1972 as candidate for mayor again; in 1974, the next elections for deputy would be held.

²⁰For a discussion of the "political class," see Oliveiros & Ferreira, "Uma caracterização do Sistema," O Estado de São Paulo, October 17 and 24, 1965, O Futuro da Classe Política, Visão, March 28, 1969, 19-23, "Os novos velhos ideais," Veja, December 10, 1969, 28, and Antonio O. Cintra, "Uma nova classe política?," Visão, February 14, 1971, 43.

²¹This consisted of deciding which deputy would be "heard" regarding patronage and other policy outputs from the state government to a given município. In the event a município had cast a majority of its votes for a defeated candidate, a detailed set of calculations was set up to decide who would "represent" that entity.

²²Strout, op cit, 122-125. Strout operationalized the continuum as democracy-oligarchy, in terms of decision-making within the condonza parties.

²³For example, "Rondon so fala em ARENA. Agora os ex-partidos vão morrer mesmo," Estado de Minas, January 31, 1971, and "ARENA. As siglas baratas," Veja, August 12, 1970, 22.

²⁴"Ex-PSD quer manter os criterios," Estado de Minas, January 12, 1971, 3, Mauro Werneck, "Um criterio para Rondon-08 como contentar pressedistas e udenistas," Estado de Minas, January 17, 1971, 3, "Francelino nao aceita criterios para ARENA," Estado de Minas, January 21, 1971, 3, and "Minas. A (PSU) re-UDN A," Veja, February 10, 1971, 15.

²⁵Despite some last minute changes, the distribution remained. ex-UDN, president and second secretary, ex-PSD, first vice president and first secretary, ex-PR, second vice president, and UDB, third and fourth secretary. Estado de Minas, February 2 and 3, 1971, 3.

²⁶These were one each from the three ex-parties in the persons of Rafael Nunes Coelho, Secretary of Interior (ex-UDN), Jose Jones Domingos, Secretary of Administration (ex-PSD), and Cicero Drumont, Secretary of Labor and Social Action (ex-PR). Estado de Minas, March 12, 1971, 3.

PART VI
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This chapter will attempt to integrate the most salient conclusions from the analysis of background and interview data, in terms of changing recruitment patterns, and the effects of the 1964 revolution. Additionally, suggestions for further research on political recruitment in Minas Gerais and Brazil are presented.

Changing Recruitment Patterns in Minas Gerais

Performance of the recruitment function within the state has evolved from an ascriptive-oligarchic pattern during the First Republic, to a more fluid and competitive system in the post-1945 period, and currently involves an apprehensive adaptation to the post 1964 revolutionary environment.

The Role of Family

Kinship ties with important political families within the state were an important recruitment criterion during the First Republic, especially in terms of early Câmara entry and accelerated political career. Although still present in the post-1945 period, the effect of family ties was of reduced importance. More federal than state deputies were identified with political families during this period.

From the background data, frequency and importance of this ascriptive criterion seem to be declining over time. However, interview data reveal the importance of family background and influence as motivations involved in recruitment to first political office and first candidacy as deputy, and in determining party choice. The latter especially for the PSD and PR. So that in the current period family ties may be viewed less as a sufficient condition, and more as an underlying motivational factor.

Regionalism/Localism

Over time geographic mobility (both in terms of place of study and intra-state migration) have declined. Those serving as governor, vice governor and state deputy had the highest indices of localism. The South was a most consistent "exporter" of future politicians. Although a net importer in the early First Republic, the Mats became an exporter, paralleling the region's economic decline. Except for the early post-1945 period (which saw an increase in localism with the competitive, multi-party system), the Metalúrgica region was a consistent importer. Its attractiveness included the new state capital, mining operations, and the industrial and commercial activities thus generated.

Educational Background

A university education had a similar effect on career advancement during the First Republic as seen with family ties, early recruitment and rapid advancement. Except for the state deputies, the proportion of university educated in the elite section was quite high - over 90%.¹

Education was evident in another form as a motivational factor. Student political activities were important in more or less autonomous (and early) political socialization, and recruitment to first candidacy as deputy at earlier ages. Those candidates recruited through self-starting family or conscription mechanisms tended to be student actives.

The Party System

Once the one-party system was consolidated, with the P.R.M. at the turn of the century, recruitment became highly institutionalized, and sargentapão the most frequent advancement pattern. As described in Chapter 4, the recruitment function was centralized in the P.R.M. executive committee (Tarasca), which utilized selective ascriptive criteria within the compromisso coronelista. The existence and functioning of the latter were clearly verified in the data, as was the advantageous pattern of alternation between elected and appointed political positions. The P.R.M. system was based on the bargain maintained between the regional political chiefs and the state administration in Belo Horizonte. The latter gained the upper hand during the post-1933 interventor period.

During the First Republic, selection as an "official" candidate was tantamount to election as deputy or senator, as those elected extra-crasa were rare. With the advent of the more competitive, multi-party system (and less fraudulent elections in the local precincts), candidates were not only competing with the other parties' slates, but with other candidates within their own party as well.

Recruitment was divided among four major parties and an ever changing number of minor parties, with greater emphasis placed on the

more universalistic criterion -electoral performance. Generally, career sequences became more purely electoral as a result, with vereador, mayor and state deputy as the more frequent base offices (both in terms of the background data and the deputies' own perceptions).

Although the final level of decision-making remained in the hands of each party's executive committee, participation was broadened with three regional diretórios, and more weight given to the indications of local party committees. However, only the PSD and to a lesser degree the UDN were in a position to be selective in composing slates of candidates, as the other parties rarely were able to achieve the maximum number allowed.

With the exception of the PTB, the recruitment process was firmly within the control of the state party leaders. The PTB national president could exercise the option of naming 10 candidates of his own choosing to slates for state and federal deputy within each state.²

Regionally the PSD and UDN were the broadest based parties, competing on a state-wide basis. The former was more broadly based occupationally and made more use of the sargentação pattern in training and selecting candidates. These findings verified the popular nickname of the PSD as an escola política.³ These same two parties, which many times represented opposing family factions at the local level, might be considered more traditional in their recruitment pattern, in that, federal and state deputies elected under their aegis were high on the family variable, and deputies in the sample choosing either party for first candidacy cited family influence as prime reason in high proportions.⁴

While the PSD was characterized by sargentação the UDR was chosen by 36.4% of its adherents in the sample because of its ideological and programmatic orientation. Although the PTB was the second highest of the ex-parties in this regard, the party appeared to have less of this component than the national party, or the PTB in Guanabara or São Paulo.

As described above, the PR was similar to the PSD and UDR in many respects, and thus might also be termed a more "traditional" party. The differentiating factor, however, was its personalistic pattern of recruitment resulting from the elder Bernardes' rigid and "austere" control of party decision-making through 1955.

The ARENA, being an amalgam of three ex-parties and operating under criteria of proportions of the latter, was observed to have a recruitment pattern similar to a composite of the PSD, UDR and PR. The NOB bore a slight resemblance to the PTB.

Both new parties were high on the ideological/program element in choice of party of first candidacy, indicating the re-orientation of the ascribed political values in the post-1964 revolutionary environment. However, neither party was as successful at recruiting new elements to first candidacy as the ex-parties.

The Effects of the 1964 Revolution

From the change over time data the revolution appears to have had little effect on the general type of deputy recruited (and elected) to the state assembly and federal Câmara, except for a slight broadening of regional representation, and increases in the more "traditional" occupational sectors. However, the political environment and the recruitment process changed markedly.

The revolutionary leaders at the national level envisioned that by selectively "weeding out" adverse elements among the existing political class, and by stimulating the recruitment of viable (in electoral and revolutionary terms) new aspirants (thus in turn putting heavy competitive pressure on the remaining members of the "old" elite) that a renovation of political leaderships would be accomplished at the state and national levels. This grand design was not realized within the context of electoral politics, because of the revolution's repression of and destitution of the political class, and in particular stripping the legislative branch of its remaining legitimacy and constitutional authority; thus making elected office unattractive to aspiring "grass roots" politicians of the new breed. By making the electoral system more competitive, new entrants were actually discouraged, and the election (or re-election) of established politicians was favored.

Renovation was carried out to a greater extent within the federal and state executive (although the latter was only fully "technified" in early 1970), as technicians and professional administrators were recruited to fill the traditionally political positions within the state cabinet. Faced on the one hand with reduced prerogatives and initiative, and a state administration of technocrats basing decisions more purely on universalistic criteria on the other; the state assembly was groping in mid-1971 for a new political role--beyond that of watchdog of the executive's implementation of programs of its own initiative.⁵

The political class itself viewed the hierarchy of political positions as definitely having changed after the revolution, accruing increased political prestige and importance to executive positions within the state system.

Future Perspectives

Although the political atmosphere is more positive and tensions between the executive and the legislature are less strained than they were in 1968, the prospects for renovation from the bottom up, in terms of attracting qualified new candidates for the state and federal legislature in 1974 are not too bright. Only if the legislative branch regains most of its original initiative, independence,⁶ attractiveness,⁷ and constitutional prerogatives,⁸ will political "vocations" again be stimulated.

Many writers (works included), and even some of the deputies interviewed, feel one alternative might be the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the Army's Superior War College, *i.e.*, a purposeful training institution for political leaders. This might be fine, but there is no substitute for participation as a basic learning experience, and would have to be phased at the higher "ranks," as with the Army's school.

It is possible, of course, that many of the mayors not attracted to candidacy for deputy in 1970 may return to local government in November, 1972, municipal elections, and with five and a half years experience and prestige in the office, run for deputy in 1974. This would be an especially favorable development if predictions of party reorganization and civilian presidential candidates materialize by 1974.

An Evaluation of the Recruitment Model

At this point it is appropriate to evaluate the utility of the model of the recruitment process presented in Figure 2.4. In that the

original model was based on Browning's simulation of the recruitment process in the United States for elected office, it is somewhat inappropriate for comparison with the process as it was observed in Minas Gerais. This is most true for stages (5), (6), and (7) because of the more direct candidacy mechanisms used in Brazil, *i.e.*, the absence of pre-selection and primary election procedures accommodated in the Browning model.

The other components of the model, however, proved more useful. The recycling of subsequent recruitment to next office was observed to affect the individuals' perceptions and motivations based on his experiences in the previous office. Background characteristics, and the influence of agency and party sub-groups were found to differentially affect perceptions and basic motivations. The model should be further refined to accommodate recruitment to non-elective positions. As seen in Chapter II the questionnaire items eliciting recall of the latter, especially the office of cabinet secretary, were not as efficacious as those focusing on elected first office and first candidacy as deputy.

Finally, to more adequately evaluate the recycling aspect of the model, the research design by necessity should be expanded to include the motivations and inputs involved in the recruitment to each office in the interviewees' career sequence.

Recruitment in Minas in Theoretical Perspective

In terms of the body of theory developed for Brazilian politics, a number of new perspectives have been presented. The operation of the compromisso coronelista and the institutionalization of the P.R.M. during

the First Republic, frequently referred to in Brazilian literature, have been confirmed. Whereas, Artur Bernardes' role as a "renovator" (in terms of recruitment to federal deputy and state cabinet, was not

Differentiation of the pre-1964 political parties in Minas is readily apparent in the recruitment analysis. The role of the PSD as the escola política was confirmed. The image of the UDN as an ideological, programmatic party was corroborated as the interviewees cited these motivations most frequently regarding their choice of the UDN for first candidacy. The myth of frequent and indiscriminate party switching from one election to the next was not substantiated.

Turning more specifically to the theoretical implications for the conceptualization of political recruitment. Whereas, Soule found agent of initial socialization related to epoch (among Michigan legislators), agent was by contrast associated with specific motivation (socialization content) among the mineiro samples.

Regarding recruitment to first office, elected and nominated positions were clearly differentiated in terms of universalistic/achievement and ascriptive/particularistic criteria and motivations, respectively. In light of the discussion in the last section of Chapter 12, this is further evidence that perhaps the relative decline (in terms of prestige and stimulation of aspirations) of elected office as compared to those secured through nomination must be viewed as a regression in political development terms, i.e., a type of "political decay."

A pattern of regionalism/localism somewhat parallel to that identified by Frey for the Turkish Grand National Assembly was an evidence for the mineiro deputies; regarding association with increased party competition and the system's socio-economic development.

Perhaps the most significant finding was with regards Seligson's concept of recruitment mechanism (to first candidacy as deputy). The current analysis revealed this concept to be an important linkage among the three phases of political recruitment (as developed in Chapters 9, 10 and 11), clearly an extension beyond Seligson's initial relationship associating type of mechanism with party competition system.

A significant new relationship was elaborated through the analysis developed in Chapter 12, as the changing hierarchy of political positions was found to be directly related to changes in the political system.

Finally, the attempt at "fostered" political renovation was viewed as a failure in terms of its own objectives--recruiting a new type of politician to elected office, at the expense (or demise) of the more traditional political type (as Figures 12.1 and 12.2). This finding has significant implications regarding the tutelary role of military, and other authoritarian regimes, and their ability to promote political development--in terms of increased political participation and sharing of national responsibilities with the more "political" sections.

Suggestions for Further Research

Avenues for further research on the topic of political recruitment in Brazil are indeed varied, and a decision would depend on the time and material resources available, and the researcher's own interests.

A continuing interest in the First Republic would lead to research on the backgrounds and recruitment patterns of an extended elite section; including the Tarasca membership, regional political chiefs (coronéis), and if possible, the state legislature and chefes de gabinete.

The present research framework for Minas Gerais could be expanded horizontally to include the upper echelon of administrators within the state bureaucracy. A vertical expansion might focus on differential candidate recruitment over time, comparing samples of mayors who decided to run for deputy, and those who did not, with candidates from other career patterns for the 1962, 1966 and 1970 elections, for example. This in Minas or other states.

The most obvious direction would be replication of essentially the same design in several different types of states, to ascertain if the findings encountered in the present study are unique to Minas Gerais or can be compared to other state systems in Brazil.

Finally, the investigation could be directed vertically to the national level, studying recruitment patterns within the legislature, cabinet, bureaucracy, Army and/or judiciary. At this level, however, interview techniques (if used at all) would have to be severely modified to accommodate the many problems and constraints apparent in this environment. Perhaps a modified reputational design might be appropriate if a study of a national power elite were undertaken.

NOTES--CHAPTER 13

¹For sake of comparison, this proportion was calculated excluding the "data not known." Had complete data on educational background been available, this figure might have been lower, because of the high probability of a disproportionate number of individuals without university educations in the "not known" group.

²This was utilized more by Getúlio Vargas in the 1947, 1950 and 1954 elections. Interview with Castelar Modesto Guimarães, Belo Horizonte, February 6, 1971.

³This is also apparent in Table 11.5, concerning reasons for party choice at first candidacy. The same might be said of the PR, but to a lesser extent.

⁴Again the PR had a similar pattern.

⁵Luiz Werneck, "Políticos buscam novo caminho," Estado de Minas, August 15, 1971, 3. This article is an excellent synopsis of efforts of the Federal and state legislatures to bring their technical capacity up to date, recoup prestige, and reassert their role in decision-making.

⁶Such as a return to individual voting (i.e., repeal of the Law of Party Loyalty), permitting legislative modification of executive-drafted legislation, and elimination of attendance requirements.

⁷For example, better salaries and allowances.

⁸Especially needed here would be increased technical staff to assist in researching and developing policy inquiries and legislation.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Choice of Research Focus

A state political system was chosen for analysis over the national system for a number of reasons. Given the amount of resources and time available for field research, a study of the Brazilian system at the national level would have been difficult. In addition, the national political climate and circumstances were not conducive (in 1969 when the study was designed) to social science research on national political elites. The Congress had been closed by the military government in December, 1968, and many politicians had been either removed from office (cassado) and/or had their political rights suspended for ten years. In April, 1969, many professors in the social (and some physical) sciences were "retired" from their universities, this mainly in the Rio and São Paulo areas.

Thus the choice of a state system, and particularly that of Minas Gerais, seemed more appropriate. The availability of background data for the elite sector was good for the full historical period. The state's political climate was somewhat more tranquil, the state legislature was open and functioning quite normally (although a few cassações had occurred), and politics was on a "business as usual" basis.

The state has had a long tradition of elite representation at the national level (presidents, vice presidents, cabinet ministers, presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate), quite disproportionate to its size and congressional representation. At most important junctures in Brazil's political history, mineiros have been at the vortex of decision-making and/or agents of said changes. The mineiro politician is recognized by most Brazilians as exemplifying political cunning, propensity for efficacious bargaining, and his long political durability. Minas Gerais can also be viewed as a micro geo-economic model of Brazil (see Chapter 3), and thus a regional analysis of the state affords comparisons with the national regional division.

Finally, the author's prior experience in and familiarity with the state and its political system were factors involved in the choice. Also, prior research,¹ based on the analysis of biographical data, had raised some intriguing questions about the recruitment process during the First Republic. Questions that could be adequately answered only through field investigations using an expanded research design and time period.

Thus, because of the above reasons, easier access to data sources and (more importantly) to potential interviewees among the political elite was anticipated in Minas Gerais, than would have been the case in other states or at the national level.

Definition of the Elite Section

The first decisions required in an analysis of the recruitment of the political elite in the state of Minas Gerais, involved ascertaining who are the elite, viz. what group of persons will be selected for study.

Reputational definition of the political elite, similar to that used by Hunter in his study of community power in Atlanta, Georgia,² might have been successfully employed. However, given the time and resources available in this state-wide study, the application of even a short questionnaire to a sample of the general population in an attempt to identify the elite was impossible.

An alternative might have been to research important political decisions made at the state level, as was done by Dahl in his study of New Haven, Connecticut,³ and identify the political elite as the key decision-makers within the system. Again, given the time frame involved, this procedure was also inappropriate.

As Bachrach and Baratz⁴ have suggested, both of the above procedures offer advantages and disadvantages, and perhaps a modified synthesis of the two might be the most useful.

Considering the limited time and resources available in this study, a reputational definition was deemed inappropriate. A "modified reputational design might have been adopted at this point, involving the ranking of a variety of institutional positions by a group of "expert" local political observers, and subsequently choosing those positions ranked highest. However, such a procedure would not have been possible for the pre-1945 period, as there are very few "expert observers" from that period still alive today. For that matter, the same problem exists for the early years of the re-democratization period, i.e., post-1945:

Because of the above reasons, a "purely institutional" definition of the elite section was decided upon, and the problem became one of deciding which institutional positions should be selected. A strategy

adopted whereby certain positions would be selected for the post- 1945 epoch (inasmuch as this was the period from which the samples for personal interviews would be drawn), and where possible, analysis of background and political career data would be compared for the same positions during the full historical period.

At the apex (or cúpula) of the state's political organization is the office of governor. The office of vice-governor was also selected because during the post-1945 period this position was usually held by a leading representative of the second largest faction or party supporting the governor's coalition. Thus, the latter position was quite important in terms of party representation and political communication. In Chapter 6, the position of vice-governor during the pre-1930 period was observed to balance regional representation at the cúpula level, and was also frequently held by leaders from the state legislature.

Descending from the apex, the next level of administrative authority and responsibility is the governor's cabinet. In Chapter 7, three former governors indicated that, with varying degrees, they apportioned most of their cabinet positions among their supporting coalitions. In terms of career sequences, the cabinet was seen as an important base office to the governorship, especially the office of interior secretary (Chapter 8). Also, although the major part of preliminary policy formulation is thrashed out at lower levels within each cabinet secretariat, final decisions and subsequent political responsibility rests with the respective secretary. Had resources and time permitted, data would have been collected for the next level as well, and a sample of chefes de gabinete (the secretary's immediate staff assistant) would have been interviewed.

Again recalling the data presented in Parts II and III, the position of federal deputy was an important base position for the governorship, and evidenced a sizable degree of circulation with the cabinet. During the multi-party and current two-party systems, longer-tenured federal deputies consistently appeared as the directorates of their respective state party organizations. In Chapter 12, federal deputies frequently cited the governorship and cabinet office as among desired manifest offices.

Again in terms of both manifest office and career sequences, the position of state legislator was seen to immediately precede those of cabinet office and federal deputy.⁵ These three offices were ranked in that order (in terms of political importance and prestige) by the five interview groups, in Chapter 12.

Thus, five institutional positions were selected, and Table .1 shows the distribution within these offices for the three historical epochs. The elite cadre (encompassing most state deputies, new federal deputies, and persons holding lesser cabinet office) is defined as a "pool" of available and practicing politicians, at the state level, who have been "screened and apprenticed" by the various recruitment structures, and who might be considered for potential advancement to lower echelons of the cúpula level, (perhaps a senior cabinet post).

The extension back into the pre-1930 period of necessity omits an important political position--regional political chief, or the powerful interior coronéis referred to in Chapter 4. Both participant observer testimony and the analysis of the federal deputies' background data

Table 1.1- The Institutionally Defined Elite Group,
distribution by three historical periods,
1890-1971.

Office	Numbers serving by period			REAL TOTAL
	1890-1930	1930-1945	1945-1971	
Governor	16	3	11	30
Vice-Governor	11	2	6	17
Cabinet Secretaries	72	41	168*	265
Federal Deputy	203	55	142*	368
State Deputy	254**	48**	302*	595
State Senator	104**	--	--	104
TOTAL	660	149	639	

*-Received Hall bio-Data questionnaire

**--Biographical and political career data not available

support the contention that the regional chiefs were an important component of the state *cupula*, perhaps more so than the federal deputies and most cabinet secretaries. Unfortunately, no comprehensive means is available for ascertaining who these people were, or what their backgrounds might be.

Biographical and Political Career Data Collection

Basic background-type and political career data were collected for all persons found in the elite section. Examples of forms used may be found in Appendix X. Generally, data for the historical period (1890-1945) was more accessible. For the federal deputies serving during this historical period, four sources were used.⁶ For those governors, vice-governors and cabinet secretaries serving through 1947, the official state organ, *Minas Gerais*, proved very helpful. It was the custom to publish complete biographies of both the out-going and incoming administrations on inauguration day. Another source utilized was the rather extensive " morgue file " kept by the staff of the state archives. This card file indexes obituaries of state notables appearing in daily newspapers held at the archives.

For the post-1945 period a variety of sources were utilized. Where applicable, the above sources were used. For the federal deputies, ten printed sources were consulted,⁷ in addition to the archives of the personnel division at the Chamber of Deputies, and the files of the central committees of the ARENA and MDB parties in Belo Horizonte. A mail questionnaire was sent out to all deputies with firm addresses. The cover letter sent out may be found in Appendix X. Finally, for a number

of deputies data were collected through direct contact, with the individual or their surviving relatives in Belo Horizonte, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Two paid student interviewers were used to supplement this effort in Belo Horizonte. In a few cases the data forms were channeled through third parties to reach individuals or surviving relatives living in São Paulo or other areas.

Where applicable the above sources were also used to gather basic data for the group of post-1945 state deputies. In addition, the files of the personnel division at the state legislature were also useful, although data from the pre-1958 period were very slim, due to a fire in the Assembly building that year.

In addition to the sources cited for the state and federal deputies, some data were gathered for the post-1947 cabinet secretaries from the personnel sections at the respective secretariats.

Direct contacts and printed sources proved the most useful for the federal deputies. However, for those state deputies and cabinet secretaries not available in the printed and archive sources, direct contacts were the only means available. A pattern emerged (fortunately) that upwards of 80 and 60 percent of past secretaries and state deputies, respectively, still resided in the state capital, whereas, retiring and defeated federal deputies tended either to remain in Rio de Janeiro or Brasília or return to their places of residence in the state's interior, and relatively few (20%) took up residence in Belo Horizonte.

Considering all three groups, the return rate from the mail questionnaire was about 30 percent, quite satisfactory in light of 10 to 15 percent rates achieved in similar efforts by local scholars.

As might be expected, the scope of data collection varied greatly on an individual basis, from a full enumeration of the form, to minimum information (birthplace/birthdate/occupation), and in some cases no information at all. This "missing data" approaches 20% for some items among the state deputies and is much less among the federal deputies and cabinet secretaries. The specific magnitudes will be apparent in the descriptive tables in Parts II and III, but the net effect is tolerable for the overall analysis.

Collection of Interview Data

Parts II and III are based on the comparative analysis of the background and political career data described in the above section. To further fathom the recruitment process, in particular the motivational and attitudinal dimensions, personal interviews were conducted with 140 members of the institutionally defined elite. This interview data form the basis for the analysis presented in Parts IV and V.

The instrument

The questionnaire was elaborated in preliminary form during February and March of 1970, targeting on the April convening of the state Assembly and National Congress, for the pre-test stage. Each item was composed on an index card, which facilitated experimental ordering of items and blocks of items in the instrument. Central themes of content were aduced from the author's preliminary investigation of political recruitment in the state,⁸ and appropriate literature on the topic based on survey techniques.⁹ Finally, a vocabulary and syntax revision was conducted.¹⁰

In its final form (see Appendix XIB) the questionnaire attempts to approximate the chronological flow of the recruitment process, as might occur during an informal recall of one's political career. The self-administered lists A through F were interspersed at various points within the interview schedule, attempting to break the routine, separate content blocks of questions, involve the interviewee in active participation, and give the interviewer a respite. In practice, this seemed to work fairly well, inspiring the cooperation of the interviewees and providing a chance for the interviewer to complete prior notes and rest his or her voice.

Attitude and personality inventories (which involve sensitive treatment vis-à-vis elite interviewing beyond the local level) are next to non-existent for the Brazilian context. Therefore items 06.08 through 06.18 and 09.08 through 09.26 were taken from a political attitude/participation schedule administered by the Department de Ciencia Política with a sample of the population of Belo Horizonte in 1965.

Prior to reproduction in final form, a tentative allocation of column fields was developed, and set up vertically in the right-hand margin of each page. To facilitate the work of the coder, item numbers were made to correspond to the first column field where the item was to be coded. For example, coding for item 02.66 began in column 06 of card 02.

In September, 1970, with approximately one-third of the interviews completed, a second revision was effected on the final instrument. This involved the elimination of six items from the interview schedule, which were either not eliciting adequate responses, or were proving awkward or time consuming. The numbers of these items are circled in Appendix XIB.

The samples

Sampling for interview purposes was confined to those deputies actually elected during the period from 1945 through 1970 (eight parliamentary elections), and not including those whose only service was as a suplente, or substitute deputy by way of proportional representation system employed in Brazil. For the cabinet secretaries, interviewing was confined to those serving from November 5, 1945, through March 15, 1971. Thus, the cohort of new deputies elected in November, 1970, are included, whereas the cabinet inaugurated on March 15, 1971 is not included.

The 1945 cut point was chosen because this marked the end of the eight-year Estado Novo period, and the beginning of re-democratization, plus almost all of those serving prior to 1930 and many of those serving prior to 1945 are deceased, thus making it difficult to fill sample quotas.

Table I.2 details the parameters of the sampling process. First, the universe was reduced to those not known to have been deceased. This was accomplished with the aid of long-tenured deputies of various parties, and data available in the files of the state assembly. Each of the three reduced universes was then stratified to insure proportional samples for subsequent analysis. The federal deputies were stratified by their seven cohort groups and seven political parties. The state deputies, according to the ten parties and seven cohort groups. The cabinet secretaries, in turn, were stratified by their first service in a post-1945 administration, for eleven secretariats and seven administrations. Within these strata, the secretaries were further stratified according to whether they had ever served as deputy or not.

Table I.2--The Parameters of the Sampling Process, Cabinet Secretaries, and State and Federal Deputies, 1945-1971

Office	Total Universe	Total Not Deceased	Sample (N)	Completions (N)	%
Federal Deputy	142	116	29*	29	100
State Deputy	302	247	62*	52	84
Cabinet Secretary	168	134	45**	43	96
TOTAL	612	---	136	124	91
Overlap	137	---	23	23	--
REAL TOTAL	475	---	113	101	90

*--25% sample

**--33 1/3% sample

Within each stratum of state and federal deputies a sample of 25 percent was drawn. For the secretaries, a one-third (33 [1/3]) sample was drawn, due to the larger number of stratifications. Each time that an individual from a certain stratum was judged unattainable another person from the same stratum was chosen as a substitute, using the same criteria of equal probability. Table 1.2 details the completion rate for the three samples.

The pre-test

The questionnaire in preliminary form was pre-tested in late April and May, 1970. The pre-test group was not randomly selected from within the sample, but rather interviewed by the author on a first available basis. Their distribution was as follows:

Current federal deputies	- 2
Current state deputies	- 8
Cassados, one federal and one state deputy	- 2
Ex-state deputy	- 1
Ex-cabinet secretary	- 2

The interviewees proved to be quite helpful in the process of evaluating and revising the instrument. Informal contact was made with the current (1970) president of the ARENA party in Minas Gerais during January, when he agreed to help evaluate the preliminary questionnaire in terms of its "acceptability" among the state political elite, given the uncertain political climate at the time. His subsequent election as President of the Chamber of Deputies the following April enhanced this role somewhat, while at the same time reduced his availability. He found nothing particularly "offensive", and suggested a few modifications in vocabulary and phrasing.

Some of the younger state deputies were particularly helpful in modifying certain items to a closer approximation of the legislators' reality and cognition.

The pre-test also provided the means to evaluate the amount of space required to note responses in longhand for the open ended items. The order of certain items was changed to conform more closely to the natural flow of recall about one's political career. Certain items, especially those in the attitudinal inventories were eliminated, in that they were confusing beyond modification, or elicited nonvalid responses.

Interviewing

The instrument was revised and reproduced in final form during June, and a group of paid student interviewers recruited and trained in July.¹¹ The main body of the interviewing began in August on two fronts, while the student interviewers concentrated on the current state deputies and other members of the sample in the state capital, my wife and I began a 40-day period of interviewing and data collection in Brasília.

The trip to Brasília was necessitated by the fact that few of the federal deputies reside in Belo Horizonte, and only pass through on their way to the national capital. This was accentuated by the pressures of the election campaign which got under way in August.

Twenty-one interviews were conducted in Brasília during this period, concurrently with another twenty-six conducted by the students in Belo Horizonte. In September the interviewer group was reorganized and another 40 were completed through December. This was an especially difficult period due to the pressures leading up to the November 15 elections, the aftermath plus the holiday season. In January, 1971, a

new group of interviewers was recruited and trained and by March the remaining 53 interviews were completed. This period also involved five day trips to Brasília and Rio de Janeiro, and several trips to the interior of the state. The bulk of the non-overlapping sample elements were interviewed during this period. For example, 13 of the 29 elements in the sample of federal deputies were done in Rio during the five day period in early March.

In all, 140 interviews were conducted, 60 by the author, 11 by my wife, and the remaining 69 by the student interviewers. Interviewer turnover was a considerable problem, in all 17 paid interviewers were used; for an average of only four interviews each, (the range was from two to nine each). During the initial phase the interviewers were paid Cr\$15.00 per completion (US\$3.25). During the second and third phases September through March this was increased to Cr\$20.00 (US\$4.00), in an effort to provide greater incentive.

Performance by graduate students was quite disappointing, however, most of the third and fourth year undergraduate students proved to be quite reliable interviewers. The young ladies had markedly easier access with the interviewees.

Within a more normal setting (non-election year), interviewing over such a long period of time (eight consecutive months and five and a half full months) might have caused some problems of contamination, especially among the cross sectional groups of current state and federal deputies. However, in a normal situation, the deputies would have been more readily available, thus reducing the time span required.

Although some contamination probably did occur, it would appear that its effect on the attitudes and predispositions of the interviewees

was minimal. During the first phase, the interviewers' task was highly structured, i.e., each was assigned a specific group of deputies. During the more hectic second phase (September through December), the procedure was opened up, and each interviewer was given a master list of the remaining deputies, with the instructions that any name was fair game. However, they were to coordinate daily to update their lists. This resulted in two deputies being interviewed twice, and one three times during the four-month period. The results showed that the deputies had such hectic campaign schedules and activities that these three did not recall having been previously interviewed.¹²

Contamination was not a problem with those sample elements who were not currently deputies. The probability of their having contact with a person previously interviewed was extremely small.

Receptivity was in general quite good. Only four flat rejections were encountered, although several individuals were evasive at first and subsequently had to be contacted through third parties of mutual acquaintance. Two questionnaires had been run in the state assembly during 1968 by a PA candidate and a professor in the Political Science Department of the Federal University,¹³ but there was no evidence of any other survey-type research having been conducted among national legislators during the sixth legislature (1967-1971). Local scholars and even some interviewees hinted at the fact that given the current political climate and contingencies, the foreign researcher probably would have better receptivity and access than local social scientists.

Only two isolated hostile incidents occurred, one each in Belo Horizonte and Brasília. The latter was an unsolicited interview "set up"

by a hostile journalist, which was skillfully handled by my wife. The former involved occurred one of the student interviewers and a suplente who had only briefly served as deputy in 1969. The latter was in neither the samples nor the cross sectional group. Both were handled tactfully and caused no adverse effect on the research effort.¹⁴

As can be ascertained from the above, sample elements who were not currently participating in politics were the most accessible. Current federal deputies (when they appeared in Brasília) were much more accessible than their counterparts at the state level. This was due in part to differential levels of legislative activity in Brasília and Belo Horizonte. The Chamber of Deputies had lost most of its traditional legislative prerogatives and is located at considerable distance from most constituencies. Thus the federal deputies had considerably more time available than the state deputies, for whom it was "politics as usual" in the state Assembly, and who were constantly besieged by constituents and campaign workers in the centrally located state capital.

As may be noted in Appendix XIB, the questionnaire varied in size according to the type elite being interviewed. For example, for secretaries who never had served as deputy, items 01.60 through 03.48 were omitted. It will be noted that pages 11 through 16 are not included in Appendix XIB. These pages were a separate questionnaire focusing on legislative behavior in the state Assembly that was "piggy-backed" into the current instrument, and are not treated here.

Thus the current state deputies evidenced the longest interview times, a mean of 121 minutes. The secretaries who had not served as deputy had the shortest mean of 53 minutes, while the remaining deputies

had a mean of 87 minutes. The longest interview conducted took 240 minutes; the shortest 35 minutes.

NOTES--APPENDIX I

¹Fleischer, loc. cit.

²Floyd Hunter, Community Power...

³Dahl, Who Governs?

⁴Bachrach and Baratz, loc. cit., Wolfinger, loc. cit., and Polsby, loc. cit.

⁵The state legislature is currently unicameral, but was bicameral prior to 1930. The office of federal senator is not included, in that the number of persons involved is not sufficient for statistical analysis, and also that traditionally persons elected to this office were somewhat remote from the state's decision-making process, due to advanced age and a certain horrific function of the office.

⁶João Dunshie de Abranches, Os Governos e Congressos da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: Abranches, 1918; Augusto Evares de Lira, "Fim da República, 1830-1833," Revista do Instituto de História e Geografia Brasileira, vol. 210 (January, April, 1951), pp. 9-132; Walter R. D'Almeida and Osvaldo S. Andrade, Constituintes Brasileiros de 1934 Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Oficial, 1934; and "As eleições formadoras o conteúdo da Independência Brasileira," vol. 2 (Boia Horizonte: Imprensa Oficial, 1924), pp. 397-480.

⁷The most useful sources were: Justino Pereira da Silva, Constituintes de 1889 Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Synoza, 1947; Amador Cysneiros, Parlamentares Brasileiros, vol. 1, 1953-1954; Rio de Janeiro: Batista de Souza, 1953; Brasil, Congresso, Câmara dos Deputados, Biblioteca, Notas dos trabalhos preparatórios para a elaboração dos estatutos da Câmara dos Deputados (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Oficial, 1966); Brasil, Congresso, Câmara dos Deputados, Biblioteca, Estados Brasileiros Sexto Legislativo, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro, 1962); Parlamentares Brasileiros, appearing in Who's Who in Congress (Brazilia) during the periods of April 7 to December 12, 1962, July 22 to November 13, 1964, and March 13 to June 5, 1965.

Other biographical sources consulted were: Aurício Vaitman, Sangue Novo no Congresso Rio de Janeiro: W. Ozon, 1960; Ronald Hilton (ed.) Who's Who in Latin America, Part VI (Brazilia 3rd ed. rev., Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968); Quem é Quem no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Sociedade Brasileira de Expansão Cultural Ltda., 1966); Afrânio Coutinho, Brasil e Brasileiros de Hoje (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Sul Americana, 1963); and Paulo G. de Azevedo, Alberto Munari and Fernando Ribeiro, Quem é Quem no Brasil (Brasília, 1967).

⁸Fleischer, *op. cit.*

⁹Seligman, "Political Recruitment and...", Mahke et al., *The Legislative System* .., and James W. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966).

¹⁰My thanks to Prof. Antônio Otávio Cintra of the Dept. de Ciência Política at the UFPA for his helpful suggestions at this stage.

¹¹Preference was given to recruitment of students with prior interviewing experience, and to those favorably recommended by colleagues at the UPMG. The group training of the students consisted of (1) a detailed run through of the questionnaire instrument and interview strategy; (2) role playing portions of the questionnaire; (3) completion of one interview by each student; (4) a second group session to go over problems encountered and clarification of procedures; and (5) a mutual (author/student) decision on the final selection of interviewees.

¹²Both cases evidenced fairly consistent answers. In each case the most completely elaborated questionnaire was selected for inclusion.

¹³An analysis based on the latter study may be found in Bastos and Walker, *op. cit.*

¹⁴The former case developed into a completed interview, which was included in the cross sectional group of federal deputies. The latter case did not involve a completed interview, as the person involved had only served as a sapiente, and had never been elected state deputy in his own right.

APPENDIX II

RESEARCH INVENTORY ON POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

NATIONAL LEVEL--U.S.

Congressional

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Challengers | Fishell (1969), (1971) |
| Congressmen | - Polsby, Jleszek, Schlesinger (1966), Smitr and Brockway |
| Senators | - Matthews, Schlesinger (1966) |
| Judiciary | - Schmidhauser, Goldman |
| Fed. Executive | - Linquist, Stanley, Mann and Daig, Warner <u>et al.</u> |
| Governors | - Schlesinger (1967), (1966) |

STATE LEVEL--U.S.

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Wisconsin | - Epstein, Kingdom, Patterson (1964) |
| South Carolina | - McConaughy |
| Michigan | - Soule (1967), (1969) |
| California | - Price and Pell, Mahike <u>et al.</u> (1958), (1961), (1962)
Bowles, Eulau and Koff |
| Oklahoma | - Patterson (1963) |
| New York | - Ruchelman (1965), (1967), (1970), Goodman <u>et al.</u> |
| New Jersey | - Mahike <u>et al.</u> (1959), (1961), (1962), Eulau and Koff |
| Ohio | - Mahike <u>et al.</u> (1959), (1961), (1962), Eulau and Koff |
| Tennessee | - Mahike <u>et al.</u> (1959), (1961), (1962), Eulau and Koff |
| Connecticut | Barber |
| Oregon | Seligman (1959), (1961), Zeigler and Baer |
| Minnesota | - Tucker |
| Indiana | - Janda <u>et al.</u> |
| Kentucky | Jewell and Cunningham, Engstrom, Goodman <u>et al.</u> |
| Pennsylvania | - Scarf, Bowles |
| North Carolina | - Crotty, Zeigler and Baer |
| Washington | - Beckell and Sunderland |
| Utah | - Zeigler and Baer |
| Massachusetts | - Zeigler and Baer |
| Colorado | - Hjelm and Piscrotte |
| Louisiana | Jacob |
| Maryland | - Goodman <u>et al.</u> |
| Rhode Island | - Goodman <u>et al.</u> |

SUB-STATE SYSTEMS AND AREAS--U.S.

- New Haven - Horned, Dohl
 Boston - Schwartz (1965), (1969)
 New York City - Hirschfield et al., Fiellin, Lowl
 St. Louis - Downs
 San Francisco - Prewitt and Nowlin, Prewitt (1970)
 Detroit - Eldersveld
 Berallillo Co.,
 N.H. - Judak and Goldberg
 Mass. Regional - Rosenzweig, Bowman and Boynton
 N.C. Regional - Bowman and Boynton
 Seattle - Kornberg and Smith, Bone
 Minneapolis - Kornberg and Smith
 Chicago - Snowiss, Forthal, Gosnell
 "Dixie City,"
 Ala. - Osland
 Los Angeles - Harvick and Nixon

GENERAL COMPARATIVE LEVEL

- Quandt (1969), Force, Searing, (1969), Wences (1967), (1969),
 Schlesinger (1967), Seligson (1964), (1967)

EUROPE AND DEVELOPED COMMONWEALTH

- Great Britain - Mott, Guttman (1960), (1961), (1963), Berrington and
 Finer, Wilson, Ranney, Buck
 France - Hung, Haxon, Dogan (1960), (1961), (1965), Edinger
 and Searing
 Germany - Grukshanks, Harzenstien and Liepelt, Schmidt, Knight,
 Edinger (1960), (1961), Edinger and Searing,
 Kirchheimer, Mayntz, Fishell (1969)
 Italy - Satori (1961), (1963), Lotti
 Norway - Rokkan and Valen
 Greece - Legg (1968), (1969)
 Russia (USSR) - Bialer, Gubin, Gehlen and McBride
 Eastern Europe - McBride
 Canada - Porter, Laing, Williams, Kornberg and Thomas,
 Kornberg and Winsborough
 Australia - Ence
 New Zealand - Foster, Campbell, Mitchell (1961), (1962)

MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA

- Syria - Winder (1962), (1963)
 Turkey - Frey, Szliowicz
 Israel - Aksin, Seligman, Czadnowski
 Morocco - Waterbury
 Tunisia - Radebeck, Brown
 Algeria - Qandt

SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

- West Africa - Wallerstein
 Nigeria - Choudhury

ASIA

- Burma - Badgley
 India - Becher, Verma, Meyer, Choudhury, Shrader
 China - Mei
 Japan - Kin
 Ceylon - Singer
 Sarawak - Glick

LATIN AMERICA

- Argentina - Canton, Strout (1967), (1968), Snow, Ranis
 Guatemala - Verner (1971a), (1971b)
 Jamaica - Bell
 Mexico - Tuchs and Ronfeldt
 Colombia - Hoskin

A P P E N D I X III

GOVERNORS OF MINAS GERAIS

1890 -- 1971

NAME OF GOVERNOR	TENURE IN OFFICE	
	ENTERED	LEFT
JOSÉ CESÁRIO DE FARIA ALVIM	18-07-891	14-03-892
EDUARDO ERNESTO DA GAMA CERQUEIRA	14-03-892	14-07-892
AFFONSO AUGUSTO MOREIRA PENNA	14-07-892	06-09-894
CRISPIM JACQUES BIAS FORTES	07-09-894	06-09-898
FRANCISCO SILVIANO DE ALMEIDA BRANDÃO	07-09-898	21-02-902
JUÃO CÂNDIDO DA COSTA SENA	21-02-902	06-09-902
FRANCISCO ANTÔNIO SALES	07-09-902	06-09-906
JUÃO PINHEIRO DA SILVA	07-09-906	26-10-908
JÚLIO BUENO BRANDÃO	26-10-908	03-04-909
WENCESLAU BRÁS PEREIRA GOMES	03-04-909	06-09-910
JÚLIO BUENO BRANDÃO	07-09-910	06-09-914
DELFIN MOREIRA COSTA RIBEIRO	07-09-914	06-09-916
ARTUR DA SILVA BERNARDES	07-09-916	06-09-922
EDUARDO CARLOS VILHENA DJ AMARAL	16-02-922	16-04-922
RAUL SOARES DE MOURA	07-09-922	04-09-924
OLEGÁRIO DIAS MACIEL	04-08-924	21-12-924
FERNANDO PELO VIANA	22-12-924	06-09-926
ANTÔNIO CARLOS RIBEIRO DE ANDRADA	07-09-926	06-09-930
OLEGÁRIO DIAS MACIEL	07-09-930	05-09-933
GUSTAVO CAPAVENA FILHO	05-09-933	15-12-933
DENSOITO VALLADARES RIBEIRO	15-12-933	29-11-944
NÍSIO BATISTA DE OLIVEIRA	05-11-944	03-01-946
JUÃO TAVARES CORRÊA BERALDO	04-02-946	17-11-946
MORALDINO LIMA	17-11-946	20-12-946
ALCÍDES LINS	21-12-946	19-03-946
MILTON SOARES CAMPOS	19-03-947	31-01-951
JUSCELINO KUBITSCHER DE OLIVEIRA	31-01-951	31-03-955
CLÓVIS SALGADO DA GAMA	31-03-955	31-01-956
JOSÉ FRANCISCO BIAS FORTES	31-01-956	31-01-961
JOSÉ DE MAGALHÃES PINTO	31-01-961	31-01-966
ISRAEL PINHEIRO DA SILVA	31-01-966	15-03-971
ROMDÊN PACHECO	15-03-971	31-01-976

A P P E N D I X IV

VICE GOVERNORS OF MINAS GERAIS

1890 -- 1971

NAME OF VICE GOVERNOR	TERM IN OFFICE	
	ENTERED	LEFT
EDGARDO ERNESTO DA GAMA CERQUEIRA	18-07-891	14-03-892
FRANCISCO BERNARDINO RODRIGUES SILVA	14-07-892	06-09-894
JÓÃO NEPOMUCENO KLBITSCHEK	07-09-894	06-09-898
JÓÃO CÂNDIDO DA COSTA SENA	07-09-898	21-02-902
PACÍFICO GONÇALVES SILVA MASCARENHAS	07-09-902	06-09-906
JÓLIO BUENO BRANDÃO	07-09-906	26-10-908
JÓLIO BUENO BRANDÃO	03-04-909	05-04-41
ANTÔNIO MARTINS FERREIRA DA SILVA	07-09-910	09-09-914
LEVINDO FERREIRA LOPES	07-09-914	06-09-919
EDUARDO CARLOS VILHENA DO AMARAL	07-09-918	06-09-922
OLEGÁRIO LIAS MACIEL	07-09-922	04-08-924
OLEGÁRIO LIAS MACIEL	22-12-924	06-09-926
ALFREDO SÁ	07-09-926	06-09-930
PEDRO MARQUES DE ALMEIDA	07-09-930	05-09-933
JOSÉ RIBEIRO PENA	19-03-947	31-01-951
CLÓVIS SALGADO DA GAMA	31-01-951	31-03-955
ARTUR BERNARDES FILHO	31-01-956	31-01-961
ARTUR BERNARDES FILHO	31-01-961	31-01-966
PIO CANEDO	31-01-966	15-03-971
CELSO PURFÍRIJ DE ARAÚJO MACHADO	15-03-971	31-01-976

A P P E N D I X W

STATE CABINET SECRETARIES

MINIS GENAIS 1890 - 1971

ALPHABETIC LIST IN MULTIPLE SERVICE

NAME OF SECRETARY	A	S	S	FIGURE	IN	OFFICE
						LEFT
	M	C	O	ENTERED		LEFT
BOEL KAROL PIYU	27	10	1	01-02-1961	71	04-1961
BOULOT AMEL T	23	07	1	19-12-1947	32	04-1950
BOUAK MICHOUT	24	09	2	01-01-1950	14	04-1959
BOUAK MICHOUT	26	08	3	14-04-1958	11	04-1970
BOUAK MICHOUT	26	08	4	02-07-1957	18	01-1967
BOUAK MICHOUT	26	08	5	03-07-1958	18	07-1959
BOU. SAC. O ST. T	29	11	1	16-02-1971		
BOUILLON J. S. P. P. O. S. L. L. L.	04	13	1	25-12-1947	76	03-1961
BOUILLON J. S. P. P. O. S. L. L. L.	27	01	1	13-10-1961	74	04-1962
BOULLE CUSTE	24	01	1	02-01-1953	34	04-1959
BOUSSO MIRA M.	19	05	1	26-07-1919	97	04-1922
BOUSSO MIRA M.	19	05	1	07-07-1918	97	04-1922
BOUSSO MIRA M.	19	05	1	07-07-1918	15	11-1919
BOUSSO MIRA M.	20	07	1	13-04-1956	14	01-1970
BOUSSO MIRA M.	21	10	1	17-10-1962	14	04-1963
BOUSSO MIRA M.	10	13	1	28-11-1929	76	03-1971
BOUSSO MIRA M.	21	08	2	15-12-1913	75	04-1915

NAME OF SECRETARY	A S S		T E R M		E N		O F F I C E		
	M	C	E	E	E	T	E	E	
			E N T E R E D		L E F T				
CARLOS COELHO VAS F. LINDA	24	03	1	17	06	1953	31	08	1954
CARLOS COELHO VAS F. LINDA	25	10	2	13	06	1955	31	03	1956
CARLOS LARA B. PEREIRA ALVES	23	08	1	28	07	1950	30	11	1951
CARLOS LARA B. PEREIRA ALVES	23	09	2	10	06	1950	31	10	1951
CARLOS MARTINS DE OLIVEIRA JR	26	05	1	01	06	1950	30	03	1951
CARLOS COELHO DA LUIZ	19	10	1	01	01	1951	30	03	1951
CARLOS COELHO DA LUIZ	20	08	2	07	09	1953	31	12	1953
CARLOS COELHO DA LUIZ	21	05	3	18	12	1953	31	06	1955
CARLOS MARTINS	09	10	1	29	10	1950	30	06	1950
CARLOS MARTINS	10	15	2	04	06	1951	30	03	1952
CARLOS MARTINS MAC AGO	20	08	1	18	06	1951	30	06	1952
CARLOS MAURO ADEVEDO	27	01	1	23	06	1952	31	01	1952
CARLOS MAURO ADEVEDO	27	09	2	01	03	1954	31	01	1954
CARLOS ROBERTO DE ARAUJO MACHADO	21	05	1	05	05	1955	31	1	1955
CARLOS ROBERTO DE ARAUJO MACHADO	25	04	7	24	2	1953	30	11	1951
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	15	11	1	07	03	1952	31	06	1954
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	16	11	2	04	06	1954	32	12	1954
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	18	13	3	16	10	1950	28	11	1950
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	19	05	4	07	09	1950	29	04	1951
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	21	05	5	02	09	1950	30	11	1950
CHRISTIANO DIVINO MACHADO	20	07	1	16	03	1951			
CIRIO ADRIAR MACILLO	26	09	1	14	03	1959	31	0	1961
CIRIO ADRIAR MACILLO	26	06	1	01	02	1955	31	05	1955
CIRIO ADRIAR MACILLO	25	06	2	01	06	1955	31	01	1956
CIRIO ADRIAR MACILLO	13	10	1	07	09	1950	31	09	1953
CIRIO ADRIAR MACILLO	26	06	1	27	06	1957	31	01	1971
CORNELIO MAZ DE MELO	12	13	1	07	09	1951	31	05	1951
CORNELIO MAZ DE MELO	28	04	1	31	11	1956	31	08	1956

NAME OF SECRETARY	M	S	S	TOTAL		IN OFFICE
				LEFT	LEFT	
CYRO FRANCO	28	05	1	21-08-1966	21	4 407
CYRO FRANCO	28	05	2	23 07 197	23	04 967
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	15	10	1	07 04 197	06	04 126
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	16	10	3	04-10-1966	02-12-1966	
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	17	10	3	22 12 196	06-09 1966	
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	27	08	1	04-06-1962	07-06-1963	
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	27	08	2	14-09-1964	07 1964	
DAVID MURPHY DE CAMPESTA	09	10	1	14 07 196	04 09 196	
DAVID MURPHY DE CAMPESTA	09	09	3	07-09-1966	02-02-1967	
DAVID MURPHY DE CAMPESTA	09	09	1	27 04 197	14 09 197	
DELYM MENEZES DA COSTA ALBUQUERQUE	07	09	1	07 14 197	05 14 196	
DELYM MENEZES DA COSTA ALBUQUERQUE	11	05	2	07-09-1960	07-04-1964	
DELYM MENEZES DA COSTA ALBUQUERQUE	24	09	1	14 04 197	14 1965	
DELYM MENEZES DA COSTA ALBUQUERQUE	24	01	1	01 09 1972	14 07 1966	
CLAUDIO PIMENTA DE AGUIAR	17	08	1	0-10-1965	04-09-1966	
CLAUDIO PIMENTA DE AGUIAR	18	10	2	04 06 1960	04 06 1960	
CLÁUDIO CARVALHO MOURA	17	05	1	4 07 1965	9-07-1965	
CLÁUDIO CARVALHO MOURA	23	04	1	04 09 1960	02 02 1961	
EDUARDO DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	27	06	1	07-07-1961	03-07-1961	
EDUARDO DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	27	07	2	04-05-1964	04-04-1964	
EDUARDO DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	28	04	1	14 11 196	14 01 1967	
EDUARDO DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	08	12	1	24 07 196	04 09 1964	
EDSON ALVARES DA SILVA	21	05	1	7-12-1964	05-14-1965	
EDSON ALVARES DA SILVA	21	08	2	10 04 1965	14 10 1965	
EDSON ALVARES DA SILVA	27	10	1	24 09 196	18 10 1965	
EDSON ALVARES DA SILVA	28	09	1	14-11-1960	14 11 1961	
ELISEU DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	28	09	1	10 05 1967	04 05 1967	
ELISEU DE ALMEIDA FERREIRA RICHARDO	28	12	1	27-12-1966	24-02-1967	

NAME OF SECRETARY	A			B			C			TELEPHONE	IN	OFFICE
	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L			
ENZO PINO CORREIA	10	06	1	13	70	956	70	04	967			
ERNESTO CORREIAS	21	04	.	08	04	919	17	04	942			
ESTERAO LEITE DE MAGALHES PINTO	09	05	1	29	10	908	71	04	919			
ESTERAO LEITE DE MAGALHES PINTO	10	05	2	04	04	942	70	04	910			
EVILIO S PER 194 P 754	04	1	1	07	01	994	76	11	811			
EVILIO S PER 194 P 754	20	07	.	11	0	955	14	10	956			
EVARDO ALVARADO DE FIGUEIRA JR	27	04	.	13	10	966	12	04	956			
FRANCISCO SOARES DO PAULI	20	01	1	04	02	910	17	12	970			
FELIX S VIEIRA SILVA	24	01	.	11	11	956	71	7	950			
FELIX S VIEIRA SILVA	27	01	.	04	02	956	70	04	955			
FERNANDO ANTONIO MOURAO REIS	24	01	.	14	03	971						
FERNANDO DE SOUZA GIL VIANA	22	01	.	14	10	956	70	12	956			
FERNANDEZ REGES ATILIO	29	04	.	10	11	971						
FERNANDEZ REGES ATILIO	15	04	.	07	04	922	74	04	924			
FERNANDO LUIS DE SILVA CAMPOS	10	05	.	07	02	926	70	04	910			
FLEURY BARBOSA DE MELO SANTOS	19	03	.	07	04	922	74	04	924			
FLEURY BARBOSA DE MELO SANTOS	14	03	2	04	04	924	73	12	924			
FLORENTINO DE SALES	17	13	1	12	11	924	70	10	926			
FLORENTINO DE SALES	04	04	.	07	03	914	71	04	940			
FRANCISCO ANTONIO DE SALES	04	10	2	14	04	997	76	04	970			
FRANCISCO ANTONIO DE SALES	06	13	3	04	11	910	70	04	910			
FRANCISCO ANTONIO DE SALES	20	02	.	11	04	947	15	11	970			
FRANCISCO BRISLANE ALVES	05	11	1	07	04	914	10	04	914			
FRANCISCO BRISLANE ALVES	06	12	2	10	10	910	70	04	912			
FRANCISCO BRISLANE ALVES	06	12	3	24	11	912	70	12	912			
FRANCISCO BRISLANE ALVES	07	13	4	07	04	907	71	04	915			
FRANCISCO DE ASSIS BRANCO DOS SANTOS	04	04	1	24	04	916	70	04	910			
FRANCISCO DE ASSIS BRANCO DOS SANTOS	20	04	1	04	04	967	71	07	942			

NAME OF SECRETARY	A S S		P E R I O D		I N		O F F I C E	
	D	E	S	T	F	R	M	N
	M O N		T H U R S		F R I		S A T	
	D A Y		D A Y		D A Y		D A Y	
FRANCISCO DA VEIJA ALVES BRANDÃO JR	21	21	1	07-09-910	77	09	914	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND BRANDÃO JR	12	21	2	07-09-916	77	09	916	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND BRANDÃO JR	19	21	3	07-09-930	78	09	933	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA	26	19	4	18-09-942	18	09	942	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA	27	20	5	01-10-965	78	09	965	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA	28	19	1	07-09-964	18	09	967	
FRANCISCO DE ALMEIDA SILVA AND ALMEIDA BRANDÃO	05	05	1	10-09-932	78	09	936	
GABRIELA DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS	06	12	1	07-09-926	29	10	928	
GABRIELA DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS	09	12	2	29-10-928	31	04	934	
GABRIELA DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS	10	12	3	04-10-963	78	09	910	
GABRIELA DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS	21	09	4	01-10-979	18	09	936	
GABRIELA DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS	22	09	5	18-10-946	23	12	946	
GERALDO LUIZ BRANDÃO MASCARENHAS DA SILVA	22	03	1	21-12-946	17	03	947	
GERALDO LUIZ BRANDÃO MASCARENHAS DA SILVA	27	05	1	02-01-964	12	12	964	
GERALDO LUIZ BRANDÃO MASCARENHAS DA SILVA	28	07	1	01-01-970	14	12	971	
GERALDO LUIZ BRANDÃO MASCARENHAS DA SILVA	24	05	2	01-10-972	25	02	954	
GERALDO LUIZ BRANDÃO MASCARENHAS DA SILVA	20	01	3	01-01-966	17	02	967	
GILBERTO ALVES DA SILVA DOBAGLIA	27	04	1	01-07-964	15	05	964	
GILBERTO ALVES DA SILVA DOBAGLIA	28	03	1	21-07-964	11	07	964	
GLAUBIA VASQUES DE MARIANO	27	02	1	02-07-965	18	11	965	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	18	08	1	07-09-916	71	04	930	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	27	08	1	26-09-965	78	04	966	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	22	12	1	17-09-966	75	12	966	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	19	05	1	21-09-931	75	10	933	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	27	05	1	07-10-965	78	08	965	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	04	05	1	07-09-944	78	09	938	
GUSTAVO DE SÁ PIRES	25	05	1	05-10-956	78	11	956	
HERALDO MOURÃO DE MARIANO	28	03	1	13-01-970	14	03	971	

NAME OF SECRETARY	4		5		FEBRUARY		IN OFFICE		
	M	D	M	D	M	D	M	D	
HERCULANO CESAR FERREIRA DA SILVA	11	04	8	01	04	954	27	09	954
HERCULES OPI VENTURA	28	11	1	14	01	958	14	03	971
HOWA JOO RR	28	02	1	01	02	988	12	04	988
ING VICTORIO PIMENTAL	22	03	1	05	11	945	02	02	948
ISRAEL QUARTO FILHO	29	04	1	16	03	971			
ISRAEL PINHEIRO DA SILVA	21	08	1	08	04	955	15	04	957
J. PAULA MOTA	20	04	1	04	11	955	04	02	955
JAIR NEDELI DE LIMA	22	08	1	04	02	944	09	04	944
JOSÉ S. RODRIGUES DA SILVA	27	09	1	14	07	988	08	01	988
JOSÉ JOÃO DE ARAÚJO	27	07	8	07	07	945	00	01	955
JOSÉ RAFAEL DE S. A. VILHENA JR	08	09	1	07	09	944	29	02	951
JOSÉ RAFAEL VILHENA JR	21	10	8	14	02	933	05	04	933
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	23	04	8	21	03	947	01	01	951
JOSÉ CARVALHO DE M. PAIVA	12	02	8	04	04	954	07	08	954
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	22	05	8	22	12	944	21	04	947
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	23	08	8	24	07	945	28	04	945
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	22	08	1	20	04	944	05	11	945
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	24	03	7	21	03	947	13	12	947
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	27	05	3	24	02	942	1	01	943
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	28	04	4	24	04	947	01	04	947
JOSÉ FRANCISCO DE LIMA	28	05	5	01	07	947	15	03	971
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	21	05	1	01	04	934	14	04	943
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	22	11	8	07	01	945	04	01	945
JOSÉ LUIZ ALVES	03	08	1	15	11	951	07	04	971
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	05	12	1	07	04	978	21	02	978
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	24	05	1	02	04	955	7	10	954
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	29	05	2	05	11	955	02	02	954
JOSÉ ROBERTO DE S. S.	07	04	1	04	12	901	06	09	936

NAME OF SECRETARY	A S S T R U M E N T				I N O F F I C E			
	M	C	D	S	T	R	A	S
JOSÉ PEREIRA DE VEIGA	23	04	1	04-02-044	17	01-044		
JOSÉ VAS SOUZA	27	04	1	04-02-045	17	01-045		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	24	04	1	04-02-046	18	01-046		
JOSÉ DA FERRAZ GONÇALVES	28	04	2	04-02-047	19	01-047		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-048	19	01-048		
JOSÉ GONÇALVES DE SAUS	28	04	1	04-02-049	19	01-049		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	27	04	1	04-02-050	18	01-050		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	27	04	1	04-02-051	18	01-051		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-052	19	01-052		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-053	19	01-053		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-054	19	01-054		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-055	19	01-055		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-056	19	01-056		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-057	19	01-057		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-058	19	01-058		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-059	19	01-059		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-060	19	01-060		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-061	19	01-061		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-062	19	01-062		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-063	19	01-063		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-064	19	01-064		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-065	19	01-065		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-066	19	01-066		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-067	19	01-067		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-068	19	01-068		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-069	19	01-069		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-070	19	01-070		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-071	19	01-071		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-072	19	01-072		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-073	19	01-073		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-074	19	01-074		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-075	19	01-075		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-076	19	01-076		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-077	19	01-077		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-078	19	01-078		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-079	19	01-079		
JOSÉ DE PAZ SILVA	28	04	1	04-02-080	19	01-080		

NAME OF SECRETARY	A S S TANT IN OFFICE		
	NO	CLASSIFIED	OFFICE
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	24	10	1 07-03-953
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	26	05	2 24-03-954
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	09	11	1 28-10-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	10	13	2 04-04-959
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	12	04	1 07-03-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	04	00	1 10-10-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	10	08	2 04-04-959
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	21	13	1 14-04-960
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	03	00	1 15-03-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	27	08	1 14-04-960
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	22	13	1 21-12-966
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	10	03	1 07-03-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	24	03	1 04-03-954
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	21	10	1 13-04-963
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	22	13	2 07-04-966
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	27	01	1 04-04-963
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	28	08	1 13-04-970
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	14	13	1 07-03-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	24	03	1 01-03-954
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	24	04	1 17-10-962
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	22	03	2 05-03-960
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	28	09	1 04-02-956
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	27	05	1 11-12-964
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	27	04	2 10-03-965
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	08	03	1 07-03-958
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	14	12	1 10-04-961
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	20	12	2 04-04-963
JOSÉ DE SOUZA CARVALHO	27	09	1 11-03-963

NOME DO SECRETÁRIO	N.º DE		TELEFONE		DE		OFFICE		
	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	DE	
ARRIGO CARVALHO DE ALMEIDA	19	12	1	07	07	918	97	09	922
ARTE CARVALHO DE ALMEIDA	24	08	1	02	02	951	93	04	954
ARTE MATOS	21	12	1	13	12	913	91	04	913
RAFAEL DA SILVA BICALHO	26	03	1	7	12	934	92	04	934
RAFAEL DA SILVA SOUSA	27	04	1	32	04	963	97	01	963
MIGUEL AUGUSTO GONCALVES DE SOUSA	27	08	1	30	08	964	78	06	964
MIGUEL AUGUSTO GONCALVES DE SOUSA	27	11	2	19	09	965	71	01	965
ROSELA ALVES FERREIRA	22	12	1	18	11	946	73	12	946
RAFAEL DA SILVA BICALHO	28	11	1	01	02	966	78	08	966
ROSALENE LIMA	15	12	1	07	09	922	74	02	924
ROSALENE LIMA	16	12	2	7	11	974	77	12	974
ROSALENE LIMA	17	12	3	2	12	924	76	07	926
ROSALENE LIMA	18	12	4	07	09	924	71	04	926
ROSALENE LIMA	19	12	5	07	08	930	74	01	931
ROSALENE LIMA	19	03	6	15	04	931	73	09	933
ROSALENE LIMA	20	03	7	04	04	931	75	17	931
ROSALENE LIMA	21	03	8	11	12	933	78	02	935
OCTAVIO MORAES DE LIMA	22	1	1	08	04	933	78	04	933
OCTAVIO MORAES DE LIMA	19	11	1	23	12	933	75	04	933
OCTAVIO MORAES DE LIMA	20	13	2	04	04	933	74	12	933
OCTAVIO MORAES DE LIMA	20	3	1	04	09	933	78	12	933
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	29	04	1	15	13	931	76	09	930
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	18	04	1	21	10	929	76	09	930
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	24	03	1	27	04	931	77	08	933
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	24	04	2	1	10	931	78	12	931
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	25	08	3	14	04	935	79	04	934
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	26	01	1	17	04	942	74	04	943
DOLENE FERREIRA COSTA	27	09	1	27	02	961	79	05	967

NAME OF SECRETARY	A	B	S	TENURE	IN	OFFICE
	D	E	E			
	M	C	C	ENTERED		LEFT
RAFAEL CABO DE FELICIANO	29	01	1	04-15-1962	29	05-1962
RAFAEL CABO ALBERTO FELICIANO	29	05	2	10-03-1961		
RAFAEL CABO FELICIANO DE SILVA RABIER	21	03	1	14-02-1955	25	04-1955
RAUL BERNARDO DE SOUTO DE SOUZA	20	11	1	19-05-1967	14	04-1970
RAUL DE BARROS FERREZ	27	05	1	12-05-1963	03-03-1964	
RAUL MOURA SA	21	01	1	01-04-1955	17	06-1961
RAUL SERRA	12	10	1	07-07-1964	11-11-1967	
RAUL SERRA DE ALMEIDA	19	05	2	07-09-1968	11-07-1969	
RAYMUNDO ROCHA DE CASTRO	24	02	1	03-04-1966	19	05-1967
RAYMUNDO ROCHA DE CASTRO	24	02	2	15-04-1970	15-03-1971	
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	06	1	12-12-1961	24-05-1963	
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	10	2	11-05-1961	4	09-1963
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	01	2	10-05-1962	24-05-1967	
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	12	4	12-06-1962	21	05-1964
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	10	5	14-10-1965	11	11-1966
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	01	04	1	01-07-1962	26	07-1964
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	04	1	07-07-1966	20	04-1967
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	05	1	03-05-1961	10	05-1967
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	06	1	11-07-1964	0	06-1967
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	15	07	1	04-07-1964	17	12-1964
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	17	05	2	07-05-1964	04-04-1966	
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	23	01	1	07-01-1962	10	01-1961
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	24	08	1	11-07-1968	23	08-1968
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	24	11	1	17-06-1961	17-06-1964	
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	01	2	21-01-1962	04	01-1963
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	17	04	1	07-04-1964	07	04-1968
ROBERTO REBEIRO DE ALBUQUERQUE RESENDE	27	06	1	11-06-1965	11-06-1966	

NAME OF SECRETARY	A S S		TELEPHONE		IN OFFICE	
	M	C	C	ENTERED	LEFT	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	22	03	1	18-08-946	20-12-946	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	24	10	2	31-01-951	31-02-951	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	25	08	3	14-08-957	31-01-958	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	26	08	4	02-02-958	21-01-958	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	28	08	5	13-09-958	17-01-957	
FRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	29	08	6	23-07-957	20-07-958	
GRASO DE MELO NOTENHO	27	08	1	02-07-958		
VALÉRIO PACHECO JUNIOR	29	04	1	01-07-958	11	
VIRGÍLIO MARCELINO MOURÃO	28	01	2	17-05-960	27-06-960	
VITÓRIA DA SILVA S. BRITO	28	03	1	1-05-967	17-02-970	
VITÓRIA DA SILVA S. BRITO	28	02	2	17-02-970	7-01-971	
WALDIR LUIZ SILVA FERREIRA	23	04	1	07-04-936	27-09-922	
WALDIR LUIZ SILVA FERREIRA	22	13	1	05-02-946	17-11-946	
WASHINGTON FERREIRA PERES	28	08	1	02-02-946	11-03-948	
WENCESLAU BRÁS FERREIRA GOMES	05	05	1	07-07-908	21-02-902	
WENCESLAU BRÁS FERREIRA GOMES	07	13	2	17-08-908	11-01-909	
WENCESLAU BRÁS FERREIRA GOMES	06	05	3	23-02-902	26-04-902	

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY

	L	C	G	I	S	L	A	P	M	A	E
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
JÓLIO PILETTI								X	X		
JÓLIO DE PINO BRANDÃO FILHO								X		X	X
JACELINO RUDOLFO DE OLIVEIRA											X
JARDY C. M. DURO GUIMARÃES	X	X	X								
JANUÁRIO RICHARDI MAGALHÃES	X	X			X	X		X			
LAURO DE OLIVEIRA JACQUES										X	
LEOPOLDO DE OLIVEIRA									X		
LEVINO COLAÇO COELHO										X	X
LEOPOLDO LAFRANCO DE SOUZA E SILVA	X	X	X	X	X	*					
LUÍZ ARTUR COSTA	X	*									
LUÍZ EUGÊNIO ROSEFINO DE SAZES	X	X	X								
LUÍZ MARTINS SARRAS											X
LYCORGO LEITE											X
MARCEL ALVES DA SILVA								X			
MARCEL FRANCISCO ALVES PEREIRA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
MARCEL THOMAZ DE CARVALHO BRITO							X	*		X	
MÁRIO DA SILVA NETOS										X	X
MÁRIO COSTA DE NO											X
MARCOS JOSÉ TAVARES	*	*									
MELHOR COSMELHO DE SOUSA									X	X	X
MURACIO DE LIMA											X
OSVALDO FERREIRA DE SAITO	X	X									
OSVALDO CARVALHO DE SAITO											X
OSVALDO DE VESGOTTEN											X
OSVALDO BARROS MARQUES DE ANDRADE								X	X		
OLGEMAR DA SILVA										X	X
OLAVO COSTA											X
OLGEMAR DE SOUZA MACIEL	X	X	X	X	X	X					

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY	L E G I S L A T I V E													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
OLIMPIO AUGUSTO NISÉIA														
OLIMPIO MACHADO DE MAGALHÃES														
PACIFICO JULIANO DA SILVA NASCIMENTO	X													
PAULO PINHEIRO DA SILVA													X	
PEDRO ALVES														X
PEDRO LUIZ DE OLIVEIRA														
PEDRO MACEDO DE ALMEIDA														X
PEDRO MATEA MACHADO									X					X
PEDRO RIBEIRO														X
POLYCARPO DE MAGALHÃES VIOTTI														X
POLYCARPO RODRIGUES VIOTTI	X													
RAUL DE FARIA														
RAUL NORONHA SA													X	X
RAUL SOARES DE MOURA													X	X
RAUL PINO GUSTAVO FERREIRA														
RAUL PINO DE ARAUJO DE ARAUJO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
RAUL PINO GUSTAVO DE ARAUJO		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
RAUL PINO														
SALVADOR FELICIANO DOS SANTOS														
SANDRINA SOARES DE ARAUJO													X	X
SANTOS DA SILVA NASCIMENTO									X	X	X	X	X	X
SIMÃO DA SILVA ALVES FERREIRA	X													

A P P E N D I X V I I

FEDERAL DEPUTIES ELECTED FROM
MINAS GERAIS 1946 -- 1971

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE

	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	9 9 9 9 9 9 9
	4 5 5 5 6 6 7
	6 1 5 9 3 7 1
ABEL RAFAEL PINTO	S F F S S
AÉCIO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	E E F F F
AFONSO ARINOS DE MELO FRANCO	S F F
ALBERTO OECATO MATA BARRETO	Z F S
ALTAIR CHAGAS	E E F
AMÍLIAS FERREIRA DE BARROS	S F S
ANTÔNIO AURELIANO CHAVES DE MENDONÇA	S E F F
ANTÔNIO LUCIANO PEREIRA FILHO	F S
ANTÔNIO PEIXOTO DE LUCENA CUNHA	S F
AQUILES GINIZ	S S F
ARTUR DA SILVA BERNARDES	F S F
ATHOS VIEIRA ANDRADE	S C E E F
AUGUSTO CHAGAS VIEIGAS	F S
AUGUSTO MARIJO CALDEIRA BRANT	F S
AUSTREGESILLO RIBEIRO MENDONÇA	F F S
BENEJITO VALADARES RIBEIRO	F F A A A A
BENTO GONÇALVES FILHO	S S F F F F F
CAMILE ROQUEIRA DA GAMA	S F F A A
CARLOS ALBERTO COTTA	I F
CARLOS ALBERTO LÚCIO BITENCOURT	F A A
CARLOS COIMBRA DA LUZ	F F F F
CARLOS LO LAGO	F
CARLOS MURILO FELÍCIO DOS SANTOS	E F F S
CELSONO CLARO MURTA MURTA	F S S S
CELSONO GABRIEL RESENDE PASSOS	F F
CELSONO PORFÍRIO DE ARAÚJO MACHADO	F S
CELSO TEIXEIRA BRANT	S F S
CHRISPIAN JACQUES BIAS FORTES	F F F F F F
CLEMENTE MÉRADO FERRANDES	S F F S
CLÓVIS SALGADO DA GAMA	F

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
	4	5	5	6	6	7	
	6	1	5	9	3	7	1
CRISTIANO MONTEIRO MACHADO	F						
DANIEL SERAPIÃO DE CARVALHO	F	F	S				
DELSON SCARANO					E	E	F
DILERMANDO M. DA COSTA CRUZ FILHO	X	F	S	S			
DNAR MENDES FERREIRA	\$	E	E	E	F	F	
EDGAR DE GODOÍ DA MATA MACHADO	\$	E	\$				F
EDGAR MARTINS PEREIRA						F	F
ELIAS DE SOUSA CARMO	X	S	S	S	F	F	F
EUVALDO LODI	S	F	F				
EZEQUIEL DA SILVA MENDES	F						
FÁBIO FONSECA E SILVA							F
FELIPE BALBI	F	S	S	S			
FELICIANO DE OLIVEIRA PEÑA	E	F	S	F	S		
FERNANDO JORGE FAGUNDES NETO							F
FRANCLINO PEREIRA DOS SANTOS			\$		F	F	F
FRANCISCO BADARÓ JÚNIOR	E	\$	S	F	S		
FRANCISCO CLEMENTINO SANTIAGO DANTAS					F	F	
FRANCISCO DUQUE DE MESQUITA	F	S	S				
FRANCISCO RODRIGUES PEREIRA JR	F	S	S				
GABRIEL DE REZENDE PASSOS	F		F	F			
GERALDO FREIRE DA SILVA			S	S	F	F	F
GERALDO STARLING SOARES	E	F					
GERALDO VASCONCELOS				F	S	S	
GILBERTO ANTUNES DE ALMEIDA					E	F	S
GILBERTO DE ANDRADE FARÇA					F	F	
GUILHERME MACHADO	\$	F	F	S	F	F	
GUILHERMINDO DE OLIVEIRA	E	F	F	F	F	F	
GUSTAVO CAPANEMA	F	F	F	S	F	F	
HÉLIO CARVALHO GARCIA					E	F	
HILDEBRANDO BIZAGLIA		F	S				
HOMERO DOS SANTOS					E	E	F
HUGO AGUIAR					E	E	F
ILACIR PEREIRA LIMA	E	E	F	S	\$	\$	
ISRAEL PINHEIRO DA SILVA	F	F	F				
ISRAEL PINHEIRO FILHO					E	S	F
JACI DE FIGUEIREDO	F	S	S				
JAÉDER SOARES DE ALBERGARIA	E	F	F	S	F	S	
JAIR MONTEIRO CUNHA MAGALHÃES					E	E	F
JARBAS DE LERI SANTOS	F		S	S			
JOÃO BATISTA MIRANDA		\$	\$	E	E	F	F

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
JOÃO GLIOG							F
JOÃO H. SAMPAIO VIEIRA DA SILVA	F	S					
JOÃO HERCULINO SOUZA LOPES			E	S	F	F	
JOÃO NOGUEIRA DE REZENDE	2	S	F	F	F	F	F
JOÃO PIMENTA DA VEIGA	S	S	F				
JOAQUIM LIDIANO LETTE RIBEIRO	F						
JOAQUIM MENDES DE SOUZA			F				
JORGE FERRAZ	S	S	S	E	E	E	F
JORGE VARGAS					E	E	F
JOSÉ ANTÔNIO DE VASCONCELOS COSTA	F	F	F	S	S	S	S
JOSÉ APARECIDO DE OLIVEIRA						F	
JOSÉ DOMÍFÁCIO LAFAIETE DE ANDRADA	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
JOSÉ ESTEVES RODRIGUES	C	S	F	S			
JOSÉ FRANCISCO BIAS FORTES	F						
JOSÉ HUMBERTO RODRIGUES DA CUNHA				F	S		
JOSÉ MACHADO SOBRINHO							F
JOSÉ MAGALHÃES PINTO	F	F	F	F	F	F	
JOSÉ MARIA DE ALKMIN	F	F	F	F	F	F	S
JOSÉ MARIA LOPES GANSADO	F	S	S	S			
JOSÉ MARIA MAGALHÃES					E	F	
JOSÉ MAURÍCIO DE ANDRADE	E	E	F	F	F	F	S
JOSÉ MONTEIRO DE CASTRO	F	F	S	F	F		
JOSÉ RAIMUNDO SOARES DA SILVA		E	E	F	E	S	
JOSÉ RODRIGUES SOUSA	F	S	S				
JOSÉ SOUSA NOBRE				S	F	F	F
JLAREZ DE SOUZA CARMO	E	E	E	F	S		
JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK DE OLIVEIRA	F						
LEOPOLDO LIAS MAGALHÃES	X	F	S	S	S		
LEVINCO DEANAN COELHO	E	S	E	F	F	F	F
LICURGO LEITE FILHO	F	F	F	S	S	S	
LUÍZ DE GONZAGA MACHADO SOBRINHO		F	S				
LUÍZ DE PAULA FERREIRA						F	S
LUÍZ MARTINS SOARES	F						
MANOEL FRANÇA CAMPOS		E	F	F			
MANOEL INÁCIO PEIXOTO		F					
MANOEL JOSÉ DE ALMEIDA			E	F	F	F	F
MANOEL TAVEIRA DE SOUZA	E	E	E	F	F	F	F
MÁRIO DE ASCENÇÃO PALMÉRIO		F	F	F			
MÍLTON REIS		F	E	S	F	F	
MÍLTON SOARES CAMPOS	F	F	A	A	A		

NAME OF FEDERAL DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE									
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
TANCREDO DE ALMEIDA NEVES	E	F			F	F	F			
TEÓFILO RIBEIRO PIRES			E	E	F	F	S	S		
TRISTÃO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	S	F	F	F						
ÚLTIMO DE CARVALHO	S	E	F	F	F	F				
URIEL DE REZENDE ALVIN	E	F	F	F	F	S				
WALTER GERALDO AZEVEDO ATAÍDE	S	F	F	F			D			
WALTER PASSOS							S	F	F	
WELLINGTON BRANDÃO	F	S	S							

KEY TO SYMBOLS USED

F = ELECTED FEDERAL DEPUTY
 S = SUPLENTE FEDERAL DEPUTY
 E = ELECTED STATE DEPUTY
 S = SUPLENTE STATE DEPUTY
 A = ELECTED FEDERAL SENATOR
 D = SUPLENTE FEDERAL SENATOR

ELECTIONS OF 1945/1947

X = FEDERAL SUPLENTE-1945/
 ELECTED STATE DEPUTY-1947
 Z = SUPLENTE-1945/SUPLENTE-1947
 O = FEDERAL DEPUTY-1945/
 FEDERAL SENATOR-1947
 C = SUPLENTE FEDERAL DEPUTY-1945/
 SUPLENTE FEDERAL SENATOR-1947

A P P E N D I X V I I I

STATE DEPUTIES ELECTED FROM

MINAS GERAIS 1947 -- 1971

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
	4 5 5 5 6 6 7
	7 1 5 9 3 7 1
ADOLFO DE OLIVEIRA PORTELA	E E
AÉCIO FERREIRA DA CUNHA	E E F F F F
AGOSTINHO CAMPOS NETO	E E S
ALBERTO TEIXEIRA DOS SANTOS FILHO	E S S
ALCIDES ROSCONI	E
ALOÍSIO FREITAS ALTRAN GOURADO	S E S
ALTAIR CHAGAS	E E F
ALUÍSIO COSTA	E S
ALVARO SALES	E E S E S
ALVINAR MOURÃO	E E S
AMADEU A. DE LACERDA RODRIGUES	E E S
AMÉRICO BRASIL MARTINS DA COSTA	E L
ANÍLCAR CAMPOS PADOVALE	E E
ANÍBAL MARQUES CONTIJO	F S S
ANÍBAL TEIXEIRA DE SOUSA	E E
ANTERO ROCHA	S E
ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO SOARES CANEDO	E
ANTÔNIO AURELIANO CHAVES DE MENDONÇA	S E F F
ANTÔNIO CAETANO DE SOUZA	F S
ANTÔNIO DE OLIVEIRA GUIMARÃES	E S S
ANTÔNIO FRANCO RIBEIRO	E
ANTÔNIO GOMES PIATO	E S
ANTÔNIO LUNARDI	E S S S S S
ANTÔNIO MOURÃO GUIMARÃES	E
ANTÔNIO PACHECO RIBEIRO	E E
ANTÔNIO PEDRO BRAGA	E S
ANTÔNIO PEIXEIRA DE ALMEIDA	E E
ANTÔNIO PIMENTA	E E
ANTÔNIO PRÓSPERO	E
ANTÔNIO SINGES DE ALMEIDA	E S

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARLINDO ZANINI	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
ARMANDO ZILLER	4	5	5	6	6	7	
ARTUR FAGUNDES OLIVEIRA	7	1	5	9	3	7	1
ASYDLO DUTRA NICÁCIO	E	E	S				
ATALIBA MENDES DE OLIVEIRA	X			E	E	E	
ATHOS VIEIRA ANDRADE	E	S		E	S	E	S
AUGUSTO BATISTA DE FIGUEIREDO				S	E	E	F
AUGUSTO COSTA				S	E	E	S
AUGUSTO ÉLIAS JORGE ZENUM	E	E					
AURÉLIO DE ALBUQUERQUE MESQUITA				E	S	S	S
BOLÍVAR DE FREITAS	E	E	E				
BONIFÁCIO JOSÉ TAMM DE ANDRADE				E	E	E	E
CÂNDIDO GONÇALVES ULHOA	E	E	E	E			
CARLOS ALBERTO COTTA							E
CARLOS DE FARIA TAVARES				S	E	S	
CARLOS ELUI CARVALHO GUIMARÃES							E
CARLOS HORTA PEREIRA				S	E	E	E
CARLOS MARTINS PRATES	E	E		S			
CARLOS MURILO FELÍCIO DOS SANTOS				E	F	F	S
CASTELLAR MODESTO GUIMARÃES				S	E	S	S
CÉLSO ARINUS MOTA				E	S	E	S
CHRISTOVAM CHIARADIA							S
CÍCERO DUMONT				S	E	S	S
CIRO DE AGUIAR MACIEL				E	E	S	I
CLÁUDIO PINHEIRO DE LIMA							S
CLODSMITH REANI				E	S	E	
CORNÉLIO DIAS DE CASTRO	E						
CRISANTO DE AVELAR HUNZ							F
CRISTIANO DE FREITAS CASTRO				E	E	S	S
JAILTON MOREIRA CANABRAVA							S
DANIEL DE FREITAS BARROS							E
DÉLSON SCARAVO							E
DÊNIO MOREIRA DE CARVALHO							F
VERNEVAL JOSÉ PIMENTA FILHO							F
DIETERMANDO N. DA COSTA CRUZ FILHO	X	F	S	S			
DIRCEU DUARTE BRAGA	S	S	S	E	S	S	
DIVINO RAMOS				S	E	S	
DNAR MENDES FERREIRA	S	E	E	E	F	F	
DOMINGOS JORJO FILHO							E
EDGAR DE JODÓI DA MATA MACHADO	S	E	S				F

	LEGISLATRE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
	4	5	5	5	6	6	7
	7	1	5	9	3	7	1
* c OF STATE DEPUTY							
JIL VILELA	\$	E	\$				
GODFREDO PRATA		E	E				
GREGORIANO CANEDO		E	E	\$	\$		
GUILHERMINO DE OLIVEIRA	E	F	F	F	F	F	
MARCELO LOPES DA COSTA							E
MELI DUARTE FIGUEIREDO	\$	E		\$			
MÉLIO CARVALHO GARCIA					E	F	
MÉLVIO MOREIRA DOS SANTOS					E	\$	
HERACLITO CUNHA ORTIGA							\$
HERMELINDO PAIXÃO		E	\$	E	\$	\$	
HERNANI DE MORAIS LEMOS		E	\$				
HERNANI MAIA	2	\$	E	E	\$		
MILO WILSON ESTEVÃO DE ANDRADE					E	E	
HOMERO DOS SANTOS						E	F
HOMERO MACHADO CUELHO			E	\$			
HUGO AGUIAR				E	E	F	F
IBRAHIM ABI ACKEL						\$	E
ILACIR PEREIRA LIMA	E	E	F	\$	\$	\$	\$
ISRAEL PINHEIRO FILHO					E	\$	F
IVO MIRANDA DE MORAIS							E
JAEDER SOARES DE ALBERGARIA	E	F	F	\$	F	\$	
JAIRO MONTEIRO CUNHA MAGALHÃES						E	F
JAIRO PEREIRA DA SILVA							E
JARDAS NOGUEIRA MEDEIROS SILVA						E	E
JASON SOARES ALBERGARIA	E						
JESUS TRINDADE BARRETO						\$	F
JOÃO ARADJO FERRAZ						\$	F
JOÃO BATISTA MIRANDA		\$	\$	F	F	F	F
JOÃO BELLO DE OLIVEIRA FILHO				E	E	E	E
JOÃO CAMILO TEIXEIRA FONTES	E	\$	\$				
JOÃO CARLOS DE ALMEIDA PEIXOTO						E	\$
JOÃO CARLOS RIBEIRO NAVARRO						E	E
JOÃO DE ALMEIDA LISBOA	\$	\$	E	E			
JOÃO DE LIMA GUIMARÃES	X	\$	D	D			
JOÃO GOMES MOREIRA		\$	\$	E	E	\$	E
JOÃO HERCULINO SOUZA LOPES			E	\$	F	F	
JOÃO MARGUES DE VASCONCELOS							E
JOÃO PEDRO GUSTIN							E
JOÃO VAZ DA SILVA SOBRINHO					E	\$	
JOÃO VAZ DE OLIVEIRA	E	\$					

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
JOÃO VIDAL DE CARVALHO							
JOAQUIM DE MELO FREIRE							
JOAQUIM MARIANO DA SILVA							
JOAQUIM MOREIRA JUNIOR							
JOAQUIM ROBERTO LEÃO SOARES							
JORG- CARNE FILHO							
JORGE FERNANZ							
JORGE VARGAS							
JOSÉ ALCINO BICALHO							
JOSÉ ANDRÉ DE ALMEIDA							
JOSÉ ANTÔNIO PIMENTA							
AUGUSTO FERREIRA FILHO							
JOSÉ CABRAL							
JOSÉ CARVALHEIRA RAMOS							
JOSÉ CHAVES RIBEIRO							
JOSÉ CÉSAR SARAGI							
JOSÉ DE ABREU REZENDE							
JOSÉ FARIA TAVARES							
JOSÉ FERNANDES FILHO PSD							
JOSÉ FERNANDES FILHO PSP/POC							
JOSÉ GERALDO DE OLIVEIRA							
JOSÉ GOMES PIMENTA							
JOSÉ GOMES							
HUGO CASTELO BRANCO							
LAVIDLA MATOS							
LUIZ BACCARINI							
LUIZ PINTO COELHO JÚNIOR							
MAGALHÃES CARNEIRO							
MARIA DE O. SOUSA							
MARIA MAGALHÃES							
MARQUES CHEREM							
MAURICID DE ANDRADE							
MENDES HONORIO							
PEREIRA CAVALCANTI							
PIRES DA LUZ							
RAIMUNDO SOARES DA SILVA							
RENZADITH RENO							
RIBEIRO NAVARRO							
RIBEIRO PENA							

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
JOSÉ SOARES DE FIGUEIREDO							
JOSÉ VARGAS DA SILVA							
JOBERT GUERRA							
JUAREZ DE SOUZA CARMO							
JÚLIO FERREIRA DE CARVALHO							
LADISLAU SALLES							
LEOPOLDO DIAS MACIEL							
LEVI DE SOUSA E SILVA							
LEVINGO QZANAN GOELMO							
LOURENÇO FERREIRA DE ANDRADE							
LOURIVAL BRASIL FILHO							
LÓCIO DE SOUSA CRUZ							
LUÍS MARANHA							
LUÍS SOARES DE SOUZA ROCHA							
LUÍZ ALBERTO FERREIRA DE SOUZA							
LUÍZ DOMINGOS DA SILVA							
LUÍZ FERNANDO FARIA DE AZEVEDO							
MANOEL DA SILVA COSTA							
MANOEL FRANÇA CAMPOS							
MANOEL JOSÉ DE ALMEIDA							
MANOEL TAVEIRA DE SOUSA							
MARCOS WELLINGTON DE CASTRO TITO							
MÁRIO ASSAD							
MÁRIO HUGO LACEIRA							
MARIA JOSÉ NOGUEIRA PENA							
MARTA NAIR MONTEIRO							
MATEUS SALOMÉ DE OLIVEIRA							
MATOSINHOS DE CASTRO PINTO							
MURILIO MIRANDA CAMBRAIA							
MIGUEL BATISTA VIEIRA							
MILTON REIS							
MILTON SALGADO SALES							
MOACIR LOPES DE CARVALHO							
MOACIR REZENDE							
MORVAN ALCÍDIO AGAYARA DE RESENDE							
MURILO PAULINO BACARÓ							
NACIF RAIDAN GOUTINHO							
NARCÉLIO MENDES FERREIRA							
NELSON JOSÉ LOMBARDI							
NILSON CONTIJO SANTOS							

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE					
	1	1	1	1	1	1
	9	9	9	9	9	9
	4	5	5	5	6	6
	7	1	5	9	3	7
ODILCY REZENDE ANDRADE						E
OLAVO DRUMOND						E S
OLAVO TOSTES FILHO	2					E
OMAR DE OLIVEIRA DINIZ	5					E S S
ORLANDO DE ANDRADE						S E E S
OSCAR BOTELHO						E
OSCAR DIAS CORRÊA	E	E	F	F	F	F
OSCAR GOMES MOREIRA JÚNIOR						E S
OSWALDO GUIMARÃES TOLENTINO						S E S
OSWALDO PIERRUCCETTI						E E E
JTACÍLIO NEURÃO DE LIMA	E					F
OTELINO FERREIRA SOL						E E E E
PAULINO CÍCERO DE VASCONCELOS						E E F
PAULO CAMPOS GUIMARÃES						E S E
PEDRO ALEIXO	E					S P F
PEDRO MACIEL VIDIGAL	S	S	E	F	F	F
PIO SOARES CANEDO						S E E E
QUINTINO VARGAS	E					
RAFAEL CAIO NUNES COELHO	S	E	E	S	E	E E
RAIMUNDO SOARES ALBERGARIA FILHO						S E S S
RAIMUNDO TARCÍSIO DELGADO						E
RAUL BERNARDO NELSON DE SENNA						E
RAUL DE BARRAS FERNANDES						E S
RAUL DÉCIO DE BELÉM MIGUEL						S E
RENATO MÁRIO AVELAR AZEVEDO						E E F F F
RENI RABELO	S	S	E	S	E	S
RICARDO ALVES PINTO FILHO	S	E	S			S
RUDOLFO LEITE DE OLIVEIRA						S E
RONALDO PASSOS CANEDO						E E
RUI DA COSTA VAL						S E
SADY DA CUNHA PEREIRA						S E S S
SAÍD PAULO ARCES						S E S S E
SALIM TEÓFILO NACJR						E S
SAMIR TANNUS						E
SAULO DINIZ						S E

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE						
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SEBASTIÃO ALVES DO NASCIMENTO	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
SEBASTIÃO ANASTÁCIO DE PAULA	4	5	5	5	6	6	7
SEBASTIÃO FABIANO DIAS	7	1	5	9	3	7	1
SEBASTIÃO NAVARRO VIEIRA							
SEBASTIÃO PARTUS SOLZA							
SEBASTIÃO PIÑHEIRO CHAGAS							
SÍLVIO DE ANDRADE ADEU							
SÍLVIO MINICUCCI							
SIMÃO VIANA DA CUNHA PEREIRA							
SINVAL BOAVENTURA							
SINVAL DE OLIVEIRA DAMIENRA							
SINVAL SIQUEIRA							
SYLO DA SILVA COSTA							
TÂNCREDO DE ALMEIDA NEVES							
TARCÍO RAIMUNDO DE FIGUEIREDO							
TEÓDÓSIO BANDEIRA CAMPOS							
TEÓFILO RIBEIRO PIRES							
TUBAL VILELA DA SILVA							
ULISSES DE ARAÚJO COUTO							
ULISSES MARCONDES ESCOBAR							
ÚLTIMO DE CARVALHO							
URIEL DE REZENDE ALVIM							
VALDIR LISBOA							
VALDIR MELGAÇO BARBOSA							
VICENTE FERNANDES GUABIROBA							

NAME OF STATE DEPUTY	LEGISLATURE					
	1	1	1	1	1	1
WALDIR JOSÉ VASSIF	E	E	\$			
WALDOMIRO AGOSTINHO LOBO	E	E	E	E	\$	
WALDIR MENDES NORATO DE ANDRADE					E	E
WALTON DE ANDRADE GOLLART			E	E	E	\$
WILSON ALVARENGA DE OLIVEIRA					\$	E
WILSON DE ARAÚJO					E	
WILSON DE ARAÚJO GUIMARÃES			\$	E	E	\$
WILSON DE PAIVA					E	\$
WILSON JOÃO BERALDO	E	\$				
WILSON LUIZ TANURE					\$	E
WILSON MODESTO RIBEIRO	\$	\$	\$	E	E	
XENOPONTE MERCADANTE	E	\$				

KEY TO SYMBOLS USED

- F = ELECTED FEDERAL DEPUTY
- S = SUPLENTE FEDERAL DEPUTY
- E = ELECTED STATE DEPUTY
- \$ = SUPLENTE STATE DEPUTY
- A = ELECTED FEDERAL SENATOR
- D = SUPLENTE FEDERAL SENATOR

ELECTIONS OF 1945/1947

- X = FEDERAL SUPLENTE-1945/
- ELECTED STATE DEPUTY-1947
- Z = SUPLENTE-1945/SUPLENTE-1947
- D = FEDERAL DEPUTY-1945/
- FEDERAL SENATOR-1947
- C = SUPLENTE FEDERAL DEPUTY-1945/
- SUPLENTE FEDERAL SENATOR-1947

APPENDIX IXA

FEDERAL ELECTION ZONES, 1894-1905



DISTRICT CENTERS

- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1--Ouro Preto | 7--Formiga |
| 2--Barbacena | 8--Sabará |
| 3-- Leopoldina | 9--Diamantina |
| 4--Juiz de Fora | 10--Minas Novas |
| 5--Bassendf | 11--Montes Claros |
| 6--Campanha | 12--Iberaba |

*--In accordance with Article no. 16 of Law no. 35, January 26, 1892; and Decree Law no. 153, August 3, 1893

APPENDIX IXB
FEDERAL ELECTION ZONES, 1906-1930



DISTRICT CENTERS

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| 1--Belo Horizonte | 5--Pouso Alegre |
| 2--Leopoldina | 6--Uberaba |
| 3--Barbacena | 7--Grão Mogol |
| 4--Avarés | |

*--In accordance with Article no 58 of Law no 1269, November 15, 1935, and Decree Law no. 1425, November 27, 1905.

APPENDIX X
MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE MATERIALS

Cordial Saudação

É com prazer que venho agradecer-lhe um projeto de acesso muito interessante, ou seja, um estudo de dados parlamentares pelo Roteiro de Dados deste Departamento. O "Roteiro de Dados Parlamentares" é um projeto de dados de larga escala, que se encontra em fase de produção em Minas Gerais desde 1941, dados estes colhidos na Tribuna Federal, em Belo Horizonte.

Atualmente, na fase final de registro de dados biográficos dos Senhores Deputados mineiros que se serviram bancas na Assembleia Legislativa ou na Câmara Federal. Devo a publicação do dicionário "GOVERNOS E CONGRESSOS DO BRASIL" por Danubio de Abreu em 1938, tem-se notado uma escassez de dados biográficos, sistematicamente levantados para parlamentares e outros líderes políticos no Brasil. Em 1968, a Biblioteca da Câmara dos Deputados em Brasília realizou registro de dados de natureza com e publicação "DEPUTADOS BRASILEIROS: REPERTÓRIO BIOGRÁFICO DOS MEMBROS DA CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS DO BRASIL (1889-1967)". No entanto, somente 94 deputados federais responderam ao questionário enviado pela Biblioteca da Câmara.

No momento, não dispomos de recursos bastantes para incluir o registro de todos os parlamentares e não nos cabe cadastrar interesse na liderança parlamentar e priorizar aqui estudos e sua publicação no âmbito nacional. Começamos com os Senhores parlamentares mineiros. Portanto, vou solicitar que você prepare um formulário, que segue o modelo elaborado pela Biblioteca da Câmara. Peço-lhe o favor de especificar os dados nos vários itens. Por exemplo, em "PROFISSÃO" no lugar de "comerciante", pede-se especificar "industrial" ou "agrícola" ou "empresário" ou "empresário". "RA POLÍTICA" - "Atividade política" - "Atividade política" ou "específico". "Colégio estadual em Contagem, de 1/1948 a 1/1953".

Cópia deste formulário será encaminhada ao gabinete da Câmara, no caso de Sr. deputado federal e à Biblioteca da Assembleia Legislativa, no caso dos Senhores deputados estaduais. É possível que os seus dados biográficos sejam publicados numa espécie de dicionário biográfico de liderança parlamentar e que a versão final seja publicada em uma obra de uma alta porcentagem de respostas dos Senhores Deputados mineiros.

Para sua conveniência, fornecemos um envelope já subscrito e selado, para que V. Exa. possa remeter o formulário a nosso Departamento em Belo Horizonte.

Se V. Exa. desejar saber mais sobre a natureza do nosso projeto de registro de dados parlamentares e estatísticas, eu teria muito prazer em prestar informações por escrito ou em uma visita aos nossos Departamentos.

Atenciosamente

Prof. David Fleischer
Diretor do Projeto de Registro
de Dados Parlamentares

SECRETARIA DO ESTADO DE MINAS GERAIS

Nº 10 _____ 471.1114.03 7 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 12 13 14
 ANO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Nome _____ Estado de _____ Data _____

Nascimento em MG _____ Profissão _____

Religião _____

PAI { Natural de _____ Data _____ Profissão _____
 e Mãe de _____ Profissão _____

Cônjuge _____ Data _____ Nome do cônjuge _____

SÓCIO, Profissão _____ Atividades Políticas _____

Filhos _____

ESTADOS Residência de _____

Experiência _____

Outros _____

CÂMERA POLITICA e seus integrantes.
 Prefeitos _____
 Deputados _____

ASSOCIAÇÕES QUE PERTENCE

ATIVIDADES ECONÔMICAS E PROFISSIONAIS

Atividade _____ Classe _____

Outros dados

OUTROS PARENTES LIGADOS NA POLÍTICA

Parentes _____ Nome _____ Profissão _____

Contatores _____

Missão no Estado _____

Outras viagens estranhas _____

Serviço Militar _____

APPENDIX XIA

INTERVIEWERS' INTRODUCTION LETTER

Prezado Senhor

Cordiais Saudações

Vimos apressar-lhe nosso entrevistador,

Francisca Nunes Calzem

que está colhendo os dados para nossa pesquisa sobre as lideranças políticas e administrativas de Minas Gerais, para a qual contamos com o apoio e colaboração do Departamento de Ciência Política da U.F.M.G.

Como talvez é de seu conhecimento, estamos coletando dados dos biografados sobre ilustres homens públicos de Minas, parlamentares (deputados estaduais e federais, e senadores), bem como administradores (governadores e ex-governadores e secretários de Estado). A pesquisa já está em andamento através de um questionário enviado pelo correio, que o Senhor já deve ter recebido.

Agora nos encontramos na fase de entrevistas pessoais com uma amostra dos homens públicos acima mencionados. Como o Senhor se encontra em nossa amostra, vimos solicitá-lo sua valiosa colaboração cedendo um pouco do seu tempo para esta entrevista.

Estamos interessados em suas recordações sobre a política mineira e em suas impressões sobre o processo de liderança política no estado. Todas as respostas serão consideradas confidenciais e anônimas. Seu nome não constará nos resultados que serão analisados em grupo e não individualmente.

Se o Senhor desejar qualquer esclarecimento adicional, pode telefonar para nosso Departamento (26-8477) onde poderá obter as informações desejadas.

Contado com sua estimada colaboração, apresentamos-lhe desde já nossos agradecimentos.

Atenciosamente,



David V. Fischer
Professor Visitante


Fabio W. Reis
Diretor

APPENDIX XIB
QUESTIONNAIRE

RECRUTAMENTO DAS
LIBERAÇÕES POLÍTICAS
EM MINAS GERAIS

DEPTº DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA
DA U. F. M. G.

PESSOAL PRINCIPAL:

Profº David Fleischer

ENTREVISTADOR:

BELO HORIZONTE -- 1970

Nº DE ID _____

ENTREVISTADO: _____

-02-

Nº de ID: 11Ficha: C 1

Tipo de Elite: _____

Data: / / Entrevistador: _____

01.08 Lugar de Entrevista: _____ 01

Hora que Começou _____

01.09 QUANTO TEMPO QUE U SE. NASCEU? (Ano) _____

01.12 Município _____ 05 0

01.15 Estado _____ 1

01.17 (Região Geo.) _____ 07

01.18 QUANTO TEMPO PASSOU A MAIOR PARTE DA SUA JUVENTUDE?
(Antes de entrar na Universidade) _____ 08

01.19 Município _____ 09

01.22 Estado _____
(Região Geo.) _____ 12

01.25 JÁ MOROU NUMA FAZENDA?

1 - Sim

5 - Não, nunca

01.27 POR QUANTO TEMPO? _____ 15

1 - de 1 a 5 anos

2 - de 6 a 10 anos

3 - de 11 a 20 anos

4 - mais de 20 anos

5 - reside atualmente, de 1 a 5 anos

6 - reside atualmente, de 6 a 10 anos

7 - reside atualmente, de 11 a 20 anos

8 - reside atualmente, mais de 20 anos

9 - não apuro _____ 17

01.28 QUAIS JORNAIS COSTUMA LER DIARIAMENTE? _____ 19

_____ 22

O SE. VOTA EM QUAL ZONA ELEITORAL? _____ 24

01.30 Município _____ 25

01.33 (Nº da Zona Eleitoral) _____ 26

01.36 COMO FOI QUE INTERESSOU PELA POLÍTICA INICIALMENTE? _____ 27

_____ 28_____
_____ 30_____
_____ 33_____
_____ 35_____
_____ 36_____
_____ 38_____
_____ 40_____
_____ 40

-01-

Ficha 01
(Cont.)

01.41 QUANDO FOI ISTO? _____ 01.44 (Idade) _____
 1968, V. DOS PRIMEIROS DO SEU PRIMEIRO CARGO POLÍTICO OU
 ADMINISTRATIVO. (antes de ser deputado.)

01.46 QUAL FOI? _____

01.49 QUANDO FOI? _____ 01.52 (Idade) _____
 (Se for deputado mesmo, passar p/ nº 01.50)
 (Se for cargo de nomeação, passar p/ nº 01.54)

01.54 COMO FOI QUE DECIDIU . C. ADMINISTRATIVO. ESTE CARGO?

(Agora, passar p/ nº 01.50)

01.54 COMO FOI QUE CONSEGUIU SER CONSIDERADO SELECIONADO
 PARA ESTE PRIMEIRO CARGO ADMINISTRATIVO?

(Se for secretário que nunca se candidatou para depu-
 tado estadual nem federal, passar p/ nº 01.48, Pág.08)

01.60 EM QUELS EPÓCAS O SR. FOI CONSIDERADO A DEPUTADO?

PER-ESTADUAL

1947	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966	1970
(60)	(63)	(66)	(69)	(72)	(75)	(78)

PER-FEDERAL

1946	1950	1954	1958	1962	1966	1970

(Indique o partido e o resultado da candidatura):

Por exemplo. PR-It. = eleito pelo PR
 UDN-Exo. = Suplente em exercício,UDN
 PSD-Sup. = Suplente pelo PSD que não
 exerceu mandato

Com relação a 1970, indique se já é candidato:

AREMA-Cand. = Candidato pelo AREMA

-04-

11-6-63

02.08 AGORA VAMOS LEGISLAR A PRIMEIRA VEZ POR SEU PAIS. POR

PARA DEPUTADO,

1- Deputado Estadual

2- Deputado Federal

02.09 QUANDO FOI INDEMNADO?

02.10 (Idade) _____

1 - 1946/47

5 - 1952

2 - 1950

6 - 1956

3 - 1954

7 - 1970

4 - 1958

9 - antes de 1945

02.12 POR QUAL PARTIDO?

00 - PSD

10 - Colig. UEL/PDC Rio ID

01 - UEN

11 - " ID LTD

02 - PR

15 - " ID PDC

03 - PUS

20 - Colig. PUS/PSB/PL/PSD

04 - PTM

23 - " ID 3

05 - PCB

26 - " ID PSP

06 - PDC

30 - Colig. AL/PUS/PSB

07 - PRP

40 - ARENA

08 - PSP

50 - MDB

09 - PSL

POIS HOJE, QUANTO A SUA SITUAÇÃO NESTA ÉPOCA, NISSA NÃO

SERIA CANDIDATO?

02.14 MOTIVO ONDE?

02.17 QUAIS ERAM SEUS PRINCIPAIS ATIVIDADES ECONÔMICAS?

02.21 COMO ERAM OS RECEBIMENTOS POLÍTICOS NESTA ÚLTIMA ÉPOCA?
(Controle da Prefeitura, Câmara, etc.?)02.26 AGORA VAMOS PENSAR ESPECIFICAMENTE NA SUA PRIMEIRA
CANDIDATURA PARA DEPUTADO:

COMO FOI SEU DECÍDIO SER CANDIDATO?

02.31 POR QUE DECIDIU SAIR E UNIR-SE A QUALQUER PARTIDO?

(Se mudou de partido entre 1946 e 1962):

POR QUE DECIDIU MUDAR DE P. PARTIDO?

02.35 (Mudou de _____ para _____ em 19____)

02.40

(Se mudou de partido pela segunda vez):

POR QUE DECIDIU MUDAR DO PARTIDO OUTRA VEZ?

02.42 (Mudou de _____ para _____ em 19____)

02.47

(Se passou a disputar outra cadeira):

02.49 1 - de Dep. Estadual para Federal

2 - de Dep. Federal para Estadual

02.50 POR QUE P. SEU A. DISPUTAR UMA CATEG. DE DEPUTADO FEDERAL (ESTADUAL)?

02.52 O SR. CHE. QUE TEM. P. PASSAR A DISPUTAR V. G.

PARA

1 - DEPUTADO FEDERAL

2 - ESTADUAL

02.53

1 - Sim, sim e pens

2 - Não, não valeu e pens


3 - Sim, sim

4 - Não sabe

5 - Não apurou

6 - Não aplica

02.54 QUAIS MUNICÍPIOS CONSIDER. (CONSIDER. V.) MAIS COMO SUA ZONA DE REGIÃO ELEITORAL? (Se ele cite sua votação esperada, pergunta nº de municípios na esperança, e a proporção -- esperada/região.



ACOR. V NOS PENS. P. " ÚLTIM. VES " E CANDIDATOS-S?
PARA EMPLEADOS (estadual ou Federal)

- 02.59 QU NDO?
 1 - 1946/47 5 - 1962
 2 - 1950 6 - 1966
 3 - 1954 7 - 1970
 4 - 1958
- 02.60 PARTIDO? _____
- 02.62 O SR. PARTICIPOU ESTE PARTICIPANDO DIRETAMENTE NAS
DECISÕES SOBRE A COMPOSIÇÃO DAS CRIAS DO PARTIDO?
 1 - Sim
 2 - Não
 3 - Talvez, ou indefinido
 4 - Não sabe, não lembra
 5 - Não aparece
 6 - Não aplica
- 02.63 QUAIS PESSOAS OU GRUPOS TOMAVAM(ESTCO TOMANDO) ESTAS
DECISÕES PAR. O PARTIDO?

- 02.66 QUAIS ERAM(EM) OS CRITÉRIOS USADOS P. RA ESCOLHA DE
CANDIDATOS P. RA COMPOZ. A. CRIAS?

- 02.71 EM 1965 PERTENCIA A QUAL PARTIDO? _____
- 02.73 ATUALMENTE PERTENCE A QUAL? _____
- 02.76 POR QUE DECIDIU SE AFIILIR A. (AMESA OU MES)?

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Página 03

(Se não for candidato em 1966, a não constar, 1964/70):

03.08 POR QUE DEIXOU NÃO SER CANDIDATO OUTRO VEZ?

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(Se não for candidato, 1964/70):

03.11 O SR. PREFERE CANDIDATAR-SE DEPOIS DO ESTE ANO?

- 1 - Sim
 2 - Não
 3 - Talvez, ou indefinido
 4 - Não sabe
 5 - Não respondeu
 6 - Não aplica

03.12 POR QUÊ?

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(Se não for candidato, 1964/70)

03.15 EM OUTRAS POSIÇÕES POLÍTICAS OU CARGOS ADMINISTRATIVOS QUE O SR. OCUPARÁ DE OUTRA (além do cargo atual)?

- 1 - Sim
 2 - Não
 3 - Talvez, ou indefinido
 4 - Não sabe
 5 - Não respondeu
 6 - Não aplica

(Se respondeu "Sim" ou "Talvez"):

03.16 QUAIS SÃO SEUS CARGOS?

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03.19 AGORA, VAMOS TRATAR DO PROCESSO SELETIVO E DO EXERCÍCIO, BASEADO EM SUA EXPERIÊNCIA POLÍTICA, QUAIS SÃO AS TÉCNICAS E OS MÉTODOS USADOS NA CAMPANHA P.R. SE ELEGER DEPUTADO? (Campanha, recursos, acordos, etc.)

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03.57 UM SIST^{MA} DISTINTO E VEREDADEIRO LOCAL PARTIDO,
TIPO DE POLITICO, COMO, OU REGIÃO ?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
7 - Talvez
8 - Não sabe
9 - Não apurei

(Se respondeu "Sim" ou "Talvez").

03.58 QUALIS ? _____

03.61 ESTE SIST^{MA} GEREL. LUGAR PROBLEMS OU DESEJ. ST SIST
D.R. OS PARTIDOS, POLITICOS, GRUPOS, OS REGIÕES ?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
7 - Talvez
8 - Não sabe
9 - Não apurei

(Se respondeu "Sim" ou "Talvez").

03.62 QUALIS PROBLEMAS ? _____

AGORA, QUERO QUE O SR. RECORDE O PARTIDO POLITICO NOS
ANOS 1952 e 53. VOU LER A.S. QUA. LISTA COM VARI S POSI-
ÇÕES POLITICAS E CARGOS PÚBLICOS. QUERO JUI O SR. OS CO
LOQUE PEL. ORDEM D^E IMPOR^{TAN}ÇA E PARTIDO POLITICO, DE
ACORDO COM SUAS RECORDAÇÕES D.QUEL. ÉPOC. DE 52 e 53.

(Entregar a Lista "4" para ser preenchida.)

AGORA, VAMOS LEMBRAR SU. VIDA ESTUDANTIL.

03.65 FORMOU SE EM QUEL ESCOLA/UNIV. ? _____

03.66 QUANTOS ANOS ? _____ (Idade)

(Trata-se do nível mais alto feito; secundária ou superior)

03.76 QUANTO ER. ESTUDANT. PARTICIP. D. POLITIC. ESTUDANTIL ?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
8 - Não sabe, não lembra
9 - Não apurei

(Se respondeu "Sim"):

03.77 QUEL ER. A SU. PARTICIPAÇÕES (Direções, conselhos, UEL,
UNE, etc.)

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Ficha nº 4

04.08 NESTA QUEST. ESPEC. JÁ VOU VOTAR? (secundário ou universitário), e PRINCIPALMENTE EM QUAL DAS SEG. POLÍ-
TICAS EM VIGOR ATUALMENTE, EST. EST. L. OU N. CION. L?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
3 - Não sabe
4 - Não oporou

(Se respondeu "Sim"):

QUAL SERÁ A NATUREZA DESTA PARTICIPAÇÃO?

- 04.09 MUNICIPAL 1 - Sim 5 - Não
04.10 ESTADUAL 1 - Sim 5 - Não
04.11 NACIONAL 1 - Sim 5 - Não

(associação, companhia, debates, presenças; capital e no interior, etc.)

04.12 _____

04.15 NESTA ESPEC. ESTUDANTIL, JÁ TENHO AFILIAÇÃO PARTICIPAR?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
3 - Não sabe
4 - Não oporou

04.16 (Se respondeu "Sim"): QUAL PARTIDO? _____

04.18 NESTA ESPEC. JÁ VOTAVA?

- 1 - Sim
2 - Não
3 - Não sabe
4 - Não oporou

04.19 QUANDO FOI A PRIMEIRA VEZ QUE VOTOU? _____ (Idade) _____

04.24 LEMBRAR-SE EM QUEM VOTOU?

LOGO DEPOIS DE SE FORMAR, QUAL FOI SEU PRINCIPAL EMPRE-
FREGO?

04.25 _____ (Idade) _____

04.34 O SR. TORCE P. B. QUAL CLUBE DE FUTEBOL EM SÃO SP?

- 1 - Atlético 5 - Nenhum
2 - Grusiro 6 - Não sabe
3 - América 9 - Não oporou
4 - Outro

AGORA VOU LER D.E. EM LIST. COM VÁRIAS OPINIÕES. QUANDO
O SR. INDICAR SE ESTÁ DE ACÓRDO, MAS COM VOTOS, OU
ESTÁ EM DESACÓRDO.

(Entregar Lista "B" para ser preenchida.)

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(Para os que foram Secretários de Estado):

04.35 QUANDO FOI A 1ª VEZ QUE FOI NOMEADO SECRETÁRIO? _____

04.36 QUEM LHE NOMEOU? _____

04.40 QUEL SECRETÁRIO? _____

04.42 QUAL ERA SUA SITUAÇÃO ANTES? _____

04.46 PORQUE DEIXOU DE EXERCER ESTA NOMEAÇÃO P.R. SECRETÁRIO?

(Se deixou o cargo de Deputado para ser Secretário):

04.51 FOI VIAGEM TER SE LICENCIADO COMO DEPUTADO P.R. OCUPAR
O CARGO DE SECRETÁRIO? _____

04.52 PORQUE? _____

04.54 DEIXOU O CARGO DE SECRETÁRIO POR QUAL RAZÃO?

04.56 DEPOIS FOI NOMEADO PARA OUTRAS SECRETARIAS? _____

04.57 QUAIS? _____

04.59 QUAIS ERAM OS CRITÉRIOS QUE O GOVERNADOR USAVA P.R. LHE
COLHER SEUS SECRETÁRIOS?

04.64 QUEM ERA SEU CHEFE DE GABINETE? _____

04.67 POR QUE O ESCOLHEU? _____

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05.25 QUAL TIPO DE CULÇÃO? (Das sigs: M-externo, F-interno)

<u>Tipo</u>	<u>Nomes</u>	<u>Posições/Cargos</u>
05.27 M F	_____	_____
05.31 M F	_____	_____
05.35 M F	_____	_____
05.39 M F	_____	_____
05.43 M F	_____	_____
05.47 M F	_____	_____
05.51	QUANDO O SR. M. MÓÇO, SEU P. I CONVERSOU SOBRE A POLÍTICA COM O SR. ?	
	1 - não conversava comigo, nem ninguém	
	2 - conversava apenas com os outros	
	3 - conversava com os outros, mas em minha presença	
	4 - conversava comigo, e não com os outros	
	5 - conversava comigo e os outros também	
05.52	CONVERSOU V. QUANTO?	
	1 - Nunca	
	2 - Raramente	
	3 - Pouco, de vez em quando	
	4 - Frequentemente	
	5 - Muito	
	6 - Não sabe	
	7 - Não soube	
05.53	QUANDO O SR. M. MÓÇO, QU L SA. O EMPREGO QUE SEU PAI TINHA?	
	O SR. TEM QUANTOS IRMOS? (incluindo os que morreram depois de adultos.)	
05.56	Total	_____
05.58	Irmãos	_____
05.60	Irmãs	_____
05.62	O SR. É QUAL NÚMERO ENTRE ILES? (decrecente)	
	Nº	_____ entre _____
05.66	ALGUNS DOS SEUS IRMOS E (OU FOI) ATIVO NA POLÍTICA?	
	1 - Sim	
	2 - Não	
	3 - Não sabe	
	4 - Não soube	
	(Se respondeu "Sim"):	
05.67	QUAIS AS POSIÇÕES OU CARGOS POLÍTICOS?	
	<u>Nomes</u>	<u>Cargos</u>
05.68	_____	_____
05.72	_____	_____
05.74	_____	_____
05.77	_____	_____

-20-

Ficha 06

ABORA, VOU LER VARIAS LISTAS COM VARIAS OPINIOES,
 QUERO QUE O SR. INDIQUE A PROPOSTA MAIS DE CON-
 VENIO COM SEUS INTERESSES.
 (Entregar Lista "P")

- 06.08 QUE OCORRERIA MAIS IMPORTANTE AO VOTAR NUM CONGRESSO,
 PARA QUALQUER CLASSE ELEITIVO?
- 2 - O FATO DE O CONGRESSO SER CONHECIDO SEU? CO
 GEMER IMAG. V DE
- 1 - O PARTIDO DO CONGRESSO?
- 06.09 COMO ACHA O SR. QUE O POVO PODE INFLUIR NO MUNDO QUE O
 GOVERNO DE DE DEIS S?
- 1 - O POVO NAO TEM COMO INFLUIR,
 2 - O POVO SO PODE INFLUIR PELO VOTO,
 3 - O POVO TEM DIVERSOS MEIOS PARA INFLUIR
 4 - NAO sabe
 5 - NAO oporou
- (Se respondeu "3"):
- 06.10 QUAIS SAO ESTES OUTROS MEIOS ALÉM DO VOTO?

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- (a) ALGUNS DIZEM QUE SE PODE CONFLITAR NA MAIORIA DAS
 PESSOAS.
- (b) OUTROS PENSAM QUE SE DEVE TER MUITA CORTESIA AO
 TRATAR COM OUTRAS PESSOAS.

- 06.12 QUAL É SUA OPINIÃO RESPEITO?
- 1 - De acordo com (a)
 2 - De acordo com as duas
 3 - De acordo com (b)
 4 - Não sabe
 5 - Não oporou
- 06.13 QUE TIPO DE GOVERNO CONSIDERA MELHOR PARA RESOLVER OS
 PROBLEMAS RECORRENTES?
- 1 - UM GOVERNO ELEITO PELO POVO
 2 - UM GOVERNO CIVIL FORTE
 3 - UM GOVERNO MILITAR FORTE
 4 - Nenhum destes
 5 - Outro tipo _____
 6 - Não sabe
 7 - Não oporou

06.16 O GOVERNO DO PAÍS SEMPRE TEM UM CUIVÃO DE MUITOS PROBLEMAS. COM QUAIS DOS SEGUINTE ASSUNTOS O SR. ACHA QUE O GOVERNO DEVERIA SE PREOCUPAR MAIS?

- 1 - Política salarial
- 2 - Comunismo
- 3 - Custo de v. de
- 4 - Corrupção do governo
- 5 - Aluguel
- 6 - Desenvolvimento industrial do país
- 7 - Melhoramento da educação
- 8 - Política externa do país
- 9 - Não sabe, ou não apurei

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06.17 É EM SEGUNDO LUGAR? _____ 06.18 Y TERCEIRO LUGAR? _____
 YOU LHE DÁ UM CARTÃO COM VÁRIAS FAIXAS DE R.R.M.A.
 (Entregar o cartão.)

06.19 QUAL É, APROXIMADAMENTE, A SUA FAIXA DE RENDA MENSAL, CONSIDERANDO TÔMOS AS POSTES, (SALÁRIOS, LUCROS, RENT DA DE ALUGUEIS, ETC.)?

(Se for deputado atual, inclui salário como deputado.)

- 1 - Faixa A
- 2 - Faixa B
- 3 - Faixa C
- 4 - Faixa D
- 5 - Faixa E
- 6 - Faixa F
- 7 - Faixa G
- 8 - Faixa H
- 9 - Não respondeu

06.20 LOCAL "LIVRE" A PARTE FORM E D. ENTREVISTA. HÁ MAIS ALGUMA COISA SOBRE A LIBERDAÇÃO POLIT. G. AQUI LO ESCREVA, E O ALISTAMENTO E O TRATAMENTO DE NOVOS ELEMENTOS, QUE DEVEMOS INCLUIR NESTE ESTUDO? O QUE?

(Agradece e se despeça)

06.30 Hora que terminou _____ Total de minutos _____

06.31 Entrevista teve que ser dividida em porções? Nº _____

06.34 Alguém mencionou? Quem? _____ Tempo? _____

06.38 Atitude/Transcôrre _____

Não esquecer - anotar ordem dos cartões em Lista "C".

- anotar os Nº de ID nas LISTAS avulsas.

Entrevistador (Assm.) _____

I. I. S. T. a. "B"

ID 1 1 1

Ficha C6

Que pensa das seguintes opiniões: Está de acordo, mais ou menos, ou está em desacordo?

09.06 Apesar de que algumas pessoas dizem, a situação do homem está piorando de ano em ano.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

09	

09.09 De um modo geral, o povo brasileiro ainda não tem capacidade de votar bem.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

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09.10 Quando a gente precisa mesmo das outras, é que vê que ninguém está disposto a ajudar.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

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09.11 Muita gente que vive falando deveria ser impedida de dar opinião.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

09.12 Tal como estão as coisas, é melhor que o povo trate de ter poucos filhos.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

09.13 Não convém que as pessoas de opiniões políticas perigosas tenham chances de se eleger.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

09.14 Tal como estão as coisas, o melhor é a gente viver o dia de hoje sem pensar no de amanhã.

- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

L I S T A "B"ID _____
Ficha 09
(Cont.)

Que acha das seguintes opiniões: Está de acordo,
mais ou menos, ou está em desacordo?

14 _____
15 _____
16 _____
17 _____
18 _____
19 _____
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21 _____
22 _____

- 09.15 As pessoas podem ser divididas em dois grupos: as fortes e as fracas.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.16 A coisa mais importante que se deve ensinar aos filhos é a obediência absoluta aos pais.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.17 O que este país necessita, em vez de leis e programas políticos, é de alguns dirigentes enérgicos e decididos.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.18 O único problema realmente importante no Brasil é o problema da falta de caráter e de honestidade.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.19 As vezes a política e o governo são tão complicados que não se pode realmente entender o que se passa.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.20 A gente na verdade não tem vez no que o governo faz.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.21 O governo não se preocupa muito com o que a gente pensa.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo
- 09.22 É tanta gente que vota nas eleições que meu voto não passa nos resultados.
- 1 - de acordo
2 - mais ou menos
3 - em desacordo

LISTA Nº
(Con't.)

Ficha 09
(Con't.)

- 09.23 Qual é sua opinião sobre a reforma agrária? Escolha a frase com que esteja mais de acordo.
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- 1 - É preciso uma reforma agrária profunda, com desapropriação de terra, para resolver os problemas econômicos do país.
 - 2 - É preciso uma reforma agrária que dê créditos e máquinas, e sumante a produção sem mexer na propriedade da terra.
 - 3 - É preciso uma reforma agrária que apenas ensine o homem do campo a trabalhar.
 - 4 - O Brasil não precisa de reforma agrária.
- 09.24 Qual é sua opinião sobre as empresas americanas no Brasil? Escolha a frase com que esteja mais de acordo:
- 1 - As empresas americanas exploram o povo brasileiro.
 - 2 - Uma boa parte delas nos exploram, mas outras são boas.
 - 3 - As empresas americanas são benéficas para o país.
- 09.25 Qual é sua opinião sobre o voto do analfabeto? Escolha a frase com que esteja mais de acordo
- 1 - O analfabeto deve ter os mesmos direitos que os que sabem ler, e deve votar em todas as eleições.
 - 2 - O analfabeto deveria votar apenas nas eleições menos importantes, para prefeito e vereador.
 - 3 - O analfabeto não deve votar em nenhuma eleição.
- 09.26 Com qual das frases abaixo está mais de acordo?
- 1 - Não adianta nada pôr penas pesadas; só uma mudança profunda e que vá à raíz do nosso problema é que poderá resolvê-lo.
 - 3 - É ilusão pretender resolver os problemas brasileiros de um só vez; pequenas transformações, dadas que bom feitas, podem solucionar muitos desses problemas.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David Verge Fleischer was born April 30, 1941 at Washington, D.C. In June, 1958, he was graduated from Chatham Central School, Chatham, New York. The same year he enrolled at Antioch College where he studied chemistry. In January, 1962, he withdrew from college and entered the Peace Corps. His assignment in Brazil involved working with the rural youth programs of the state extension service (ACAR) in Minas Gerais. In September, 1964, Mr. Fleischer re-enrolled at Antioch where he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science in 1966. On one of his cooperative job periods at Antioch Mr. Fleischer was employed by the State Department's Office of Brazilian Affairs.

Beginning his graduate studies in Political Science at the University of Florida in September, 1966, Mr. Fleischer received his Masters in March, 1967. While at Florida he held a Graduate School Fellowship and a NDEA Title VI Fellowship. During this time he was also elected president of the Brazilian Club and was employed as area studies coordinator on the Brazil Peace Corps training program conducted by the Westinghouse Learning Corp. at Cedar Key, Florida, in the Fall of 1967.

In September, 1969, Mr. Fleischer began his field research in Brazil under the sponsorship of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. He was affiliated with the Dept. de Ciência Política at the UFMG in Belo Horizonte as a part time instructor and data archive consultant. Returning to Florida in April, 1971, Mr. Fleischer was an instructor in the Political Science Department during the Fall, 1971.

Mr. Fleischer attended the ICPR summer program in political behavior at the University of Michigan in 1968, and was an instructor at the University of Florida the following summer. In January, 1972, he was appointed to the faculty of the Dept. de Ciências Sociais at the Universidade de Brasília.

David Yerge Fleischer is married to the former Edyr Resende of Lavras, Minas Gerais, Brazil. He is a member of the American and Southern Political Science Associations, the Latin American Studies Association, and Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Fraternity.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Andres Suarez, Chairman
of Supervisory Committee and
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Ruth McQueen
Associate Professor of Political Science

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John V.D. Saundert
Professor of Sociology

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Weston H. Agor
Assistant Professor of Political Science

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Assistant Professor of Political Science

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

March, 1972

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